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A traditional legal education in England and Wales has seen the separation of theory and 
practice.  Undergraduate law students did not study ethics nor did they consider the 
relationship between the law and wider society.  However, recent years have seen the 
integration of practice within many undergraduate degree programmes, often through 
clinical legal education programmes.  There has also been recognition that law graduates 
should understand their ethical obligations and the impact of law on society.  Reforms to 
legal education, most notably the forthcoming implementation of the Solicitors 
Qualifying Exam, mean that universities may take a more liberal approach to the 
curriculum and are encouraged to innovate in their teaching. 
 
The history of clinical legal education has shown two streams of intent; ‘social justice’ 
including the provision of legal services to the indigent and the inculcation of social 
justice values in law students and ‘education’ of knowledge and skills. This thesis 
commentary, together with the supporting publications, considers what is, or should be, 
the intent of clinical legal education.  Further, this thesis commentary critically examines 
the evidence of the impact of clinical legal education upon law students. 
 
This thesis commentary will conclude by proposing a re-imagining of clinical legal 
education, namely an intent to educate students in not only substantive legal knowledge 
and skills but also to critically examine the law in society.  Drawing upon educational 
theory, the thesis commentary will propose how clinical legal education programmes can 
be designed to enhance reflective practice and allow students critically evaluate their own 







‘…it is of the highest importance that in the election of judges, persons should be 
selected who have not only a knowledge of the law, sound judgment and vigorous 
intellect, but a keen, correct and cultivated moral sense, and a healthy conscience, 
and who are fully up to the intellectual and moral progress of the people and the 
spirit of the age.’1 
 
Traditional approaches to legal education have students sitting dutifully in a lecture theatre 
listening to their professor followed by hours in a library with textbooks learning the theory of 
law based upon rules and definitions that have evolved over hundreds of years.2 In England 
and Wales, little, if any regard was paid to the practical aspects of law as such matters were left 
to vocational programmes3 and the training stages of professional qualification.4  A traditional 
undergraduate law degree did not therefore address professional skills or values. [9] 
 
There has been a long tradition of separation between the academic and vocational study of 
law.  Historically, the regulation of qualification into the legal profession can be traced to the 
Attorneys and Solicitors Act 1728 that specified no man5 could practise as a solicitor unless 
his name was on the Roll, and he had undertaken Articled Clerkship for a minimum of 5 years.  
By 1843, graduates of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, Durham or London were 
only required to undertake a 3-year Articled Clerkship.  Subsequently, entrants to the legal 
profession were required to pass an exam set by the Law Society of England and Wales 
following the enactment of the Solicitors Act 1877.  Following the Solicitors Act 1956, 
qualification as a solicitor required: service under “articles”; attendance at a course of legal 
education; and passing examinations as prescribed by the Law Society.  The Law Society’s 
Training Regulations 1970 specified that the longest period of service under Articles was 4 
                                                          
1 Charles B Waite, 'A Definition of Law' (1887) 1 CHI L TIMES 35, 37 
2 For example, Magna Carta 1215 is still often cited today 
3 For example, the Legal Practice Course or the Bar Practice Training Course 
4 Similar issues arise in other jurisdictions.  For example, see Richard J Wilson, 'Western Europe: Last Holdout 
in the Worldwide Acceptance of Clinical Legal Education' (2009) 10 German LJ 823 
5 It should be noted that women could not be admitted as a solicitor until the enactment of the Sex 
Disqualification Act 1919. In Bebb v. the Law Society (1914) 34(7) Can L Times 620, the Court of Appeal held 
that a woman was not a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Solicitors Act 1843.  The first female solicitors were 
admitted on 18 December 1922 (BBC News, 75 years of women solicitors (19 December 1997) 
<www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/40448.stm> accessed 13 June 2018). 
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years, although graduates of law commonly served 2 years.  The Solicitors Act 1974 permitted 
the Law Society to create Training Regulations, although this function has been transferred to 
the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA). 
 
At present, the SRA Training Regulation 2014 governs qualification as a solicitor.  Pursuant to 
Regulation 2, an individual seeking admission as a solicitor must usually have completed the 
academic6 and vocational7 stages of qualification or an apprenticeship.8  The SRA must also 
be satisfied as to the character and suitability of the prospective solicitor before admitting them 
to the Roll.9  There are other routes to qualification as a solicitor although these are beyond the 
scope of this thesis commentary.   
 
A Qualifying Law Degree (QLD) is one recognised under the Joint Statement issued by the 
Law Society and the General Council of the Bar.  A QLD must have at least 240 credits in the 
study of legal subjects in a 360 or 480 credit degree programme.  Further, the Foundations of 
Legal Knowledge10 must together account for a minimum of 180 credits.  Students must also 
undertake research and study legal subjects in the final year of the programme.  A conversion 
course, such as the Graduate Diploma in Law, for non-law graduates provides the equivalent 
of the Foundations of Legal Knowledge within a one-year period of study. 
 
The Joint Statement is not prescriptive as to how subjects are taught and, as Sylvester observes, 
these areas are ‘traditionally covered by a lecture/seminar approach’.11 The academic stage of 
qualification is not required to encompass professional skills and knowledge and may well be 
regarded as a liberal education. There has been much discussion as to the dichotomy between 
the liberal and the professional perspectives of a law degree.12 [9]  
                                                          
6 The academic stage of training means a Qualifying Law Degree, Common Profession Exam (also known as 
Graduate Diploma in Law) or an Exempting Law Degree 
7 The vocational stage of training means the Legal Practice Course, a period of recognised training and the 
Professional Skills Course 
8 SRA Training Regulations 2014 – Qualification and Provider Regulations, reg. 2 
9 ibid., reg. 2.1(c) 
10 Public law, including Constitutional law, Administrative law and Human Rights; Law of the European Union; 
Criminal law; Obligations including Contract, Restitution and Tort; Property law and Equity and the Law of 
Trusts   
11 Cath Sylvester, 'Bridging the Gap - The Effect of Pro Bono Initiatives on Clinical Legal Education in the UK' 
(2003) 3 Int'l J Clinical Legal Educ 29, 31 
12 For example Anthony Bradney, Conversations, Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-
first Century (Bloomsbury Publishing 2003); Jess Guth and Chris Ashford, “The Legal Education 





The SRA have set out proposals to introduce a new common assessment that all aspiring 
solicitors will need to pass, known as the Solicitors Qualifying Examination (SQE).  From 
autumn 2021, those wishing to enter the solicitors’ profession will be required to pass stages 1 
and 2 of the SQE.  Stage 1 focuses on legal knowledge and stage 2 focuses on practical legal 
skills.13  Individuals seeking admission will be required to hold an undergraduate degree (in 
any subject) or an equivalent qualification and undertake a substantial period of work 
experience.14  Finally, they must also pass the character and suitability requirements.15 
 
One cannot help having a sense of déjà vu when considering the SQE proposals.  These 
proposals appear to be taking us back to the days of Articles and Law Society Finals.  Martin 
Coleman, Chair of the SRA Education and Training Committee, stated the objectives of the 
reforms are: 
 
 To focus the education and training system on ensuring that those who deliver legal 
services meet our standards with less emphasis on the process by which high quality 
outcomes are achieved. 
 In doing this to increase flexibility for higher education institutions, vocational 
training providers and employers to come up with innovative and efficient ways of 
achieving the necessary outcomes. 
 To ensure that the education and training system can adapt over time to take account 
of changes in legal services markets. 
 To target our activities as a regulator on protecting the public interest, including 
consumer interests, in a proportionate manner.16 
 
The history of legal education and qualification as either a solicitor or a barrister in England 
and Wales illustrates the separation of academic, vocational and training stages of qualification.  
The structure was criticised in the ACLEC Report that stated, ‘the division has encouraged the 
separation between theory and practice, between “academic” knowledge and “professional” 
                                                          
13 SRA Training Regulations 2014 – Qualification and Provider Regulations, reg. 2.1(a)(ii)  ; See also Solicitors 
Regulation Authority ‘A new route to qualification: the Solicitors Qualifying Examination’ (2016) 5 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
16 Martin Coleman, ‘Policy statement: Training for Tomorrow’ (2013) <www.sra.org.uk/sra/policy/training-for-
tomorrow/resources/policy-statement.page> accessed 14 June 2018  
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expertise, and between the study of substantive and adjectival law.’17  In essence, this means 
we teach students substantive law without reference to procedure or professional ethics: for 
example, teaching criminal law by reference to statute and case law without reference to 
criminal procedure and the professional code of conduct.  The ACLEC Report goes on to state 
that the distinction between academic and vocational stages ‘has deprived the legal profession 
of the contribution of a wider range of academic lawyers to the development of subjects which 
are thought to be appropriate only for the vocational stage.’18  This highlights the tension 
between “academics” who believe the law degree is about teaching the theory of the law and 
“skills trainers” who wish to equip the students for professional practice.19  Such tensions still 
persist as highlighted in the LETR Report with one academic respondent stating, ‘the more you 
start getting these skills in, the less room you have to teach philosophy, theory, rights, justice, 
the liberal arts kind of side of it’ in relation to the content of the undergraduate degree.20 [9] 
 
If we teach substantive law in isolation, there is a risk that context is lost and thus students will 
not understand how the law operates in practice.  The law is a ‘system of rules which a 
particular country recognizes as regulating the actions of its members and which it may enforce 
by the imposition of penalties.’21  As such, the law is a human construct effecting everyone 
within the community regulated by the law.  However, there are also other rules that govern 
society which are not laws ‘but merely social conventions’.22  The law is not static but changes 
‘to conform to the advanced intellectual and moral condition of the people.’23  To understand 
and critically analyse the law, one is required to go beyond rote learning and consider why the 
law is set out as it is and applied in practice.  For example, it is meaningless to know that 
discrimination on the grounds of gender is unlawful if there is no effective mechanism in which 
to challenge such unlawful behaviour.  It is also important to understand the rationale behind 
law.  Dror sums this up stating: 
 
                                                          
17 The Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct, ‘First Report on Legal Education 
and Training’ (April 1996) 28 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 Legal Education and Training Review, ‘Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services Education and Training 
Regulation in England and Wales’ June 2013 
21 https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/law 
22 James A. Holland and Julian S. Webb, Learning Legal Rules (4th edn, Blackstone Press 2001) 2 
23 Waite (n 1), 36 
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‘By its very nature, law consists of a number of norms which constitute obligatory 
rules of behavior for the members of the society.  These legal norms are closely 
related to various social values, being either a direct expression of them or servicing 
them in a more indirect way.’24  
 
As well as the law and societal values, professions such as the legal profession, are governed 
by their own professional rules or ethical codes.  Legal professionals deem legal ethics and 
procedure as the most important area of professional knowledge.25  Legal ethics is perceived 
as a critical defining feature of professional service.26  Whilst the LETR Report indicates 
‘support for more and earlier emphasis on legal values and ethics’, there was not strong support 
for it to be listed as a separate Foundation subject.27  Thus, the LETR Report recommended 
that: 
 
‘LSET [Legal Services Education and Training] schemes should include 
appropriate learning outcomes in respect of professional ethics’28 and ‘[t]he 
learning outcomes at initial stages of LSET should include reference (as 
appropriate to the individual practitioner’s role) to an understanding of the 
relationship between morality and law, the values underpinning the legal system, 
and the role of lawyers in relation to those values.’29 
 
As a consequence of the tensions highlighted above, the characterisation of an undergraduate 
law degree has been the subject of significant debate.  Is a law degree a liberal arts degree, a 
liberal arts degree enabling some students to become legal professionals or a professional 
degree directed at solely becoming a legal professional?  Guth and Ashford defined a liberal 
education as ‘education for education’s sake, equipping students for life and helping them to 
“call their minds their own”’.30  This ‘nuanced’ definition ‘does not oppose the teaching or 
exploration of practice relevant subjects or the learning of professional knowledge and 
                                                          
24 Yehezkel Dror, ‘Values and the Law’ (1957) 17(4) Antioch Rev 440 
25 LETR 33 
26 LETR 34 
27 LETR 35 
28 LETR Recommendation 6 
29 LETR Recommendation 7 
30 Guth and Ashford (n 12) 
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skills…because they facilitate or come with the wider learning that constitutes a liberal 
education.’31 [9] 
 
The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) recognised that a law graduate 
was ‘far more than a sum of their knowledge and understanding, and is a well skilled graduate 
with considerable transferable generic and subject-specific knowledge, skills and attributes.’32  
Further clarification is provided by the QAA in their contextual statement that states: 
 
‘At undergraduate level students are aware of the consequences of law as a human 
creation and that it is subject to the ethics and values of those that make and apply 
it.  The implications of this in the context of securing justice and the public interest 
is considered as part of legal study. Law schools will determine for themselves how 
ethics are addressed in the curriculum, but it is expected that students will have 
opportunities to discuss ethical questions and dilemmas that arise in law and to 
consider the features of ethical decision making.’33 
 
Clinical legal education is often cited as a method to address the gap between legal theory and 
practice and numerous reviews and reports into legal education from various jurisdictions have 
recommended the introduction of clinical programmes to address the gap.34  Clinical legal 
education initially developed within the mainstream legal education system of the United States 
during the 1950s and 1960s gradually spreading throughout the globe.35 [10] Clinical 
                                                          
31 ibid. 
32 Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education, ‘Subject Benchmark Statement: Law’ (July 2015), 4  
33 ibid. 
34 See American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, ‘Legal Education and 
Professional Development – An Educational Continuum: Report of The Task Force on Law Schools and the 
Profession: Narrowing the Gap’ (1992)(‘The MacCrate Report’); The Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on 
Legal Education and Conduct, (1996) ‘First Report on Legal Education and Training’ (The ACLEC Report); Gov’t. 
of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, ‘Report of Expert Committee on Legal Aid: Processual 
Justice to the People’ (1973); Gov’t. of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Report on National 
Juridicare and Equal Justice–Social Justice (1977);  Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, ‘Australian 
Law Schools: A discipline assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission’ (1987) (‘Pearce 
Report’); The Canadian Bar Association, ‘CBA legal futures initiative Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal 
Services in Canada’ (August 2014); Winkler Institute for Dispute Resolution, ‘Justice Innovation and Access to 
Justice Reform: Report’ (2016) 
35 For a summary of the global spread of clinical legal education, see Paul McKeown and Elaine Hall, 'If We 
Could Instil Social Justice Values through Clinical Legal Education, Should We' (2018) 5 J Int'l & Comp L 143 
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programmes are now common within the legal education system of many jurisdictions.36  
However, the extent to which an educational intent drives such programmes is unclear. [10] 
 
Clinical legal education is intertwined with notions of social justice and public service, so much 
so that for many these notions form part of the definition of clinical legal education.  As a 
consequence, an epistemic system belief37 has been established that students’ experiences 
within clinical legal education have a transformative effect on their values, thereby creating a 
body of graduates who will engage in public service work and uphold social justice values. 
[10] 
 
Drawing upon my body of published work, this thesis commentary will consider whether 
clinical legal education can make any claims in relation to the transformative effect on students’ 
values.  The thesis commentary will critically analyse the conceptual and empirical literature 
to firstly, establish the intent of clinical legal education and secondly, to address the impact of 
teaching values in clinical legal education. As outlined above, clinical legal education and 
social justice have become intertwined with scholarship suggesting that participation instils a 
social justice ethos in students, although there is little empirical evidence to support this.38 [10] 
The body of literature upon which this thesis commentary relies will consider various clinical 
models and practices to address the intent and impact of clinical legal education. By reframing 
or re-imagining the intent and impact of clinical legal education on values, this work makes a 
significant and original contribution to knowledge. 
 
2. Morality, values and ethics 
 
‘The Mayors of Bordeaux and Montaigne have ever been two by very manifest 
separation.  Because one is an advocate or a financier, he must not ignore the 
knavery there is in such callings; an honest man is not accountable for the vice or 
                                                          
36 See generally Frank S. Bloch (ed), The Global Clinical Movement: Educating Lawyers for Social Justice (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 
37 Peter Achinstein, The Book of Evidence (Oxford University Press 2001); Tone Kvernbekk, ‘The Concept of 
Evidence in Evidence-Based Practice’ (2011) 5 Educational Theory 515 
38 McKeown and Hall (n 35) 
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absurdity of his employment, and ought not on that account refuse to take the 
calling upon him’39 
 
As this thesis commentary will explore issues around morality, ethics and values in clinical 
legal education, it is fundamental that we give meaning to such words. Often used 
interchangeably, there may be subtle differences between these concepts. ‘Ethics’ are defined 
as ‘moral principles that govern a person’s behaviour or the conducting of an activity.’40  
Rooted in the Greek word ‘ethos’, it means ‘the characteristic spirit or attitudes of a community, 
and how we behave and function in society.’41 ‘Morals’ are defined as ‘standards of behaviour; 
principles of right and wrong’.42 Stemming from the Latin equivalent of the Greek word 
‘ethics’, it also refers ‘to social customs and etiquette regarding what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in 
theory and social practice.’43  These definitions are very similar and therefore it is easy to 
understand how these terms are conflated, given that ‘morals’ and ‘ethics’ have the same 
meaning in their origin.  However, in reality, the locus distinguishes the concepts.  A distinction 
has grown between ‘morals’ (and ‘morality’) and ‘ethics’ (and ‘ethical’).44  Morality is a 
societally imposed belief system, or standards of behaviour, for determining what is good and 
bad or right and wrong.45  Ethics and ethical behaviour tends to refer to the moral standpoint 
of certain groups.46 For example, ethical behaviour is a generally accepted set of moral 
principles such as a code of conduct governing how an individual must act in certain 
professions such as the legal profession. ‘Values’ are defined as ‘principles or standards of 
behaviour; one’s judgement of what is important in life’ {emphasis added}.47  Values are 
therefore a personal belief system intrinsic to the person.  Whilst an individual’s values may 
be shaped by society in general, or groups in which the individual socialises, their values are 
their own beliefs as to what is right and wrong.  Moral philosophy also illustrates the 
complexity of determining what is right and wrong.  Depending upon perspective, an individual 
                                                          
39 Michel de Montaigne, Essays of Montaigne, vol. 9, (Charles Cotton tr, William Carew Hazlett ed, Edwin C. Hill 
1910) 157 
40 ‘Definition of ethics’ <www.en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ethics> (LEXICO) accessed 6 August 2019 
41 Ian E Thompson, Kath M Melia, Kenneth M Boyd and Dorothy Horsburgh, Nursing Ethics (5th edn, Elsevier 
Limited 2006), 36 
42 ‘Definition of moral’ <www.en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/moral> (LEXICO) accessed 6 August 2019 




47 ‘Definition of value’ <www.en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/value> (LEXICO) accessed 6 August 2019 
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may adopt a Utilitarian approach, a Kantian approach or a Virtue Ethical perspective and draw 




In terms of moral development, we can draw upon Bronfenbrenner’s Ecological Systems 
theory49 to help understand how morality, ethics and values interact explaining why individuals 
behave differently in different contexts. Individuals encounter different environments 
including the microsystem, mesosystem and macrosystem as visualised at figure 1 above.  The 
microsystem is the direct environment in an individual’s life and this can be equated to an 
individual’s personal values and beliefs. The mesosystem involves the relationships between 
microsystems, and thus professional ethics and the principles governing how one acts, may 
form the mesosystem. The macrosystem is the cultural setting of the individual including 
socioeconomic status. Therefore, morality forms part of the macrosystem. Ecological systems 
theory also encompasses the exosystem, or the indirect influences on an individual’s 
                                                          
48 See McKeown and Hall (n 35), 35-36; Paul McKeown, ‘Can Social Justice Values be Taught Through Clinical 
Legal Education?’ in Social Justice and Legal Education (Ashford, C. & McKeown, P. eds) (Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing 2018) 
49 Urie Bronfenbrenner, The Ecology Of Human Development (Harvard University Press 1979) 
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development, and the chronosystem, or transitions throughout an individual’s life.  Exosystems 
are likely to have a significant impact upon character development.  For example within the 
context of public service and pro bono work, the Corporate Social Responsibility policy of a 
law firm is likely to impact upon lawyers’ attitude towards pro bono and public service.   
 
The distinction is important as conflicts can arise between professional ethics, morality and/or 
personal values.  An example in the legal profession relates to client confidentiality.  Whilst I 
will approach this from the perspective of a solicitor in England and Wales, confidentiality is 
internationally recognised as a core value of the legal profession.50 In England and Wales, the 
Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) state that solicitors must ‘keep the affairs of clients 
confidential unless disclosure is required or permitted by law or the client consents’.51  The 
duty of confidentiality is absolute and leaves, on the face of it, no margin for personal 
judgement. In certain circumstances, however, society is likely to believe it is morally 
acceptable to disclose confidential information. Further, an individual may also believe they 
should disclose information. Examples may include situations where the solicitor believes there 
is a risk of serious harm to the client or others.  The law does not require such disclosures and 
therefore, if a solicitor gains knowledge whereby he or she reasonably believes a child or a 
vulnerable adult is suffering sexual, physical or mental abuse, they must decide whether to 
breach confidentiality. 
 
If you know someone is abusing children, the morally correct approach would be to disclose 
this information to the relevant authorities.  Ethically, for a solicitor, the disclosure should not 
be made. The SRA has recognised this point and have published guidance stating: 
 
‘We would not want concerns about possible regulatory action to prevent solicitors 
raising concerns when it is in the public interest to do so in order to protect their 
client or other’52 
 
                                                          
50 For example, International Bar Association, ‘IBA International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession’ 
(2011), 21-24 
51 Solicitors Regulation Authority, SRA Handbook version 19 (2017), ‘Confidentiality and disclosure’, O(4.1); an 
example of a disclosure required or permitted by law would be in relation to money laundering under Part 7 of 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
52 Solicitors Regulation Authority, ‘Ethics guidance: Disclosure of client’s confidential information’ (2016); cf. 
The Law Society, The Guide to Professional Conduct of Solicitors (8th edn, The Law Society 1999), 16.02 – The 
Law Society set out a prescribed list of circumstances whereby the duty of confidentiality could be overridden 
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The guidance clearly states that any disclosure ‘will be a breach of [the solicitor’s] duty’53 and 
therefore any disclosure would be ethically wrong.  However, ‘the justification will be taken 
into account and is likely to mitigate against regulatory action.’54  In essence, it is for the 
individual to determine ‘whether the threat to the person’s life or health is sufficiently serious 
to justify a breach of the duty of confidentiality’{emphasis added}.55  If the breach were 
investigated, the solicitor would need to hope that they were not sanctioned, although each case 
is likely to turn on its facts. 
 
Whilst a breach of confidentiality may be mitigated if the rationale for the breach was to prevent 
serious harm, the SRA guidance makes it clear that disclosure is not allowed after the event.  
Unlike the prior scenario, where the breach may be mitigated, this scenario draws a stark 
conflict between morality and professional ethics.  An example of this conflict can be seen in 
the case of Stephen Victor Chittenden.56  Mr Chittenden was rebuked for disclosing 
confidential information that led to a murder conviction. It should be noted that Mr 
Chittenden’s client was not the individual convicted of the murder, indeed Mr Chittenden 
successfully represented his client in defending the prosecution. Mr Chittenden was motivated 
to disclose the documents ‘not for personal gain but in the greater interests of justice which 
were ultimately served by the conviction…’57 It would seem morally permissible to have made 
the disclosure in question and certainly it appears that Mr Chittenden’s own values motivated 
the conduct.  However, ethically the conduct was ‘completely unacceptable on the part of a 
solicitor’ and had Mr Chittenden not removed himself from the roll, he may have been struck 
off reflecting ‘the gravity of his misconduct’.58 
 
The paragraphs above outline the importance of morality, values and ethics within the legal 
profession and illustrate these concepts do not always align, and indeed may be in conflict with 
one another.  Mr Chittenden stated: 
 
“I was in my 20s, at the start of my career and I risked that because I knew who 
had killed [the victim].   
                                                          
53 Solicitors Regulation Authority (n 51) 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56 SRA decision TRI/1193822-2017 
57 ibid., para. 17 
58 ibid, para. 12 
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Had he killed someone else, I would have been criticised as the lawyer who stuck 
to his guns and allowed someone else to die.”59 
 
It is apparent that the conflict between an individual’s values and professional ethics impact 
upon not only their professional life but also their mental well-being. The quote above 
illustrates Mr Chittenden’s awareness that his actions threaten his professional reputation and 
indeed his career. Despite this, his own intrinsic values compelled him to disclose information 
in breach of his professional obligations.  This case illustrates the consequences where the 
microsystem (values) and the mesosystem (ethics) are misaligned.  This emphasises the need 
for education in relation to not only professional ethics (the Code of Conduct), but also to allow 
students the opportunity to examine themselves and their own perceptions of the world and the 
legal system. Students need to be alive to the issues so they are prepared to address them in 
their professional lives.60 [9] Clinical legal education provides an appropriate pedagogical 
approach to assist students with aligning there ecological system, reconciling their individual 
values with their professional responsibilities.  How this is achieved will be addressed below.  
 
3. Lawyer Identity: Saint or Sinner? 
 
The patron saint of lawyers is Saint Ivo (or Yves).  It is said that he ‘slept only on a pallet of 
straw; he wore the humblest garments; he gave away the moneys that came to him; and often 
he shared his meals with the poor.’61  As an individual, Saint Ivo possessed many positive 
character traits such as humility and charity.  It was reported that Ivo ‘took only the cases of 
the poor, the widows, and the orphans.  Every applicant for his help he required first to make 
oath that his cause was in conscience a just one; then Ivo would say ‘“Pro Deo te adjuvabo,” 
(“For the sake of God, I will help you”).’62 Within this depiction of St Ivo, we can see that he 
required alignment of the microsystem, mesosystem and macrosystem. However, it is arguable 
as to whether such alignment is always possible for a legal practitioner. 
 
                                                          
59 Martin Naylor, ‘Retired Derby solicitor Stephen Chittenden fined for helping snare Lynn Siddons' killer’ 
(DerbyshireLive, 4 July 2017) <https://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/news/derby-news/retired-derby-solicitor-
stephen-chittenden-163550> accessed 6 August 2019 
60 See Nigel Duncan, 'Ethical Practice and Clinical Legal Education' (2005) 7 Int'l J Clinical Legal Educ 7 
61 John H Wigmore, 'St. Ives, Patron Saint of Lawyers' (1932) 18 ABA J 157, 402  
62 ibid., 403 
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The portrayal of Saint Ivo as a lawyer has been criticised.  Goldsmith states that it is not just 
‘the poor, widows and orphan who deserve justice.’63  Highlighting the role of religion, which 
at the time would have been highly influential in questions of morality, Goldsmith asks about 
those who can afford legal assistance but cannot find representation due to their unpopularity 
and ‘morally questionable or even wicked’ behaviour.64  Goldsmith states that the requirement 
for clients to take an oath is meaningless as most believe their case to be just.65 Even those 
clients who think their case is bad, still deserve a lawyer.66 Finally, Goldsmith suggests that 
‘For the sake of democracy and the rule of law’ clients should receive assistance.67  Goldsmith 
therefore positions the lawyer as an actor with professional obligations, such as their duty to 
their client and the administration of justice at the fore. [9] 
 
Scholars have identified four different types of lawyer: the adversarial advocate; the 
responsible lawyer; the moral activist; and the [practitioner of the] ethic of care.68 The 
traditional notion of lawyering is that of an adversarial advocate, someone who will advance 
their clients’ interests within the bounds of the law. The responsible lawyer is an officer of the 
court and a trustee of the legal system and therefore their overriding duty is towards the 
institutions of law and justice.  Moral activists follow their own ethical standards and accept 
moral culpability for their actions.  In particular, moral activists are closely intertwined with 
concepts of ‘cause lawyering’. Cause lawyering has been defined ‘as the set of social, 
professional, political, and cultural practices engaged in by lawyers and other social actors to 
mobilize the law to promote or resist social change.’69  It is important to highlight that cause 
lawyering encompasses a broad range of activities, and activists who have no formal legal 
training or qualification may be engaged in cause lawyering.70  However, the focus of this 
thesis commentary is on lawyers. Practitioners of ethics of care are concerned with preserving 
or restoring relationships and avoiding harm. [9] 
                                                          
63 Jonathan Goldsmith, The Perfect Lawyer (The Law Society Gazette, 27 January 2014) 





68 Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics  (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2014); see 
also Ross Hyams, 'On Teaching Students to Act Like a Lawyer': What Sort of Lawyer' (2008) 13 Int'l J Clinical 
Legal Educ 21 
69 Anna-Maria Marshall and Daniel Crocker Hale, ‘Cause Lawyering’ (2014) 10 Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 301, 303 




Labelling lawyers into particular groups as identified above suggests that membership of a 
particular group is mutually exclusive.  However, the role of a lawyer is multifaceted.  Within 
England and Wales, lawyers are required to be adversarial advocates acting in the best interests 
of their clients71 and providing them with proper standard of service.72 Lawyers are also 
responsible lawyers with a duty to the court and in the administration of justice.73  These 
principles as to the role of a lawyer are recognised internationally. For example, the 
International Bar Association state: 
 
‘Lawyers throughout the world are specialised professionals who place the interests 
of their client above their own, and strive to obtain respect for the Rule of Law’74 
 
The United Nations also recognise the basic principles governing the role of a lawyer stating: 
 
‘12. Lawyers shall at all times maintain the honour and dignity of their profession 
as essential agents of the administration of justice.  
13. The duties of lawyers towards their clients shall include:  
(a) Advising clients as to their legal rights and obligations, and as to the working 
of the legal system in so far as it is relevant to the legal rights and obligations of 
the clients;  
(b) Assisting clients in every appropriate way, and taking legal action to protect 
their interests;  
(c) Assisting clients before courts, tribunals or administrative authorities, where 
appropriate.  
14. Lawyers, in protecting the rights of their clients and in promoting the cause of 
justice, shall seek to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized 
by national and international law and shall at all times act freely and diligently in 
accordance with the law and recognized standards and ethics of the legal 
profession.  
                                                          
71 Solicitors Regulation Authority, (n 51), SRA Principles 2011, principle 4; Bar Standards Board, The Bar 
Standards Board Handbook version 4.2, The Code of Conduct (9th edn), Section B The Core Duties, CD2 
72 SRA Principles 2011 (n 71), principle 5; Bar Standards Board (n 71), CD7 
73 SRA Principles 2011 (n 71), principle 1; Bar Standards Board (n 71), CD1 
74 International Bar Association (n 50) 
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15. Lawyers shall always loyally respect the interests of their clients.’75 
 
The minimum requirement for any lawyer must therefore be both an Adversarial Advocate and 
a Responsible Lawyer.  Hyams identifies the problem with a Responsible Lawyer as the 
potential for conflict between duties to the client and duties to the court.76  Such a situation 
may arise where a lawyer is instructed, or knowingly allows a client, to ‘mislead’ the court.  
Typically, if a lawyer is unable to resolve such a conflict, they are required to cease acting.77 
[9] 
 
However, it is important not to discount the Moral Activist or the Practitioner of Ethics of Care, 
even if these roles do not form the core of a lawyer’s identity.  In relation to the Moral Activist, 
a starting point is to redefine the role.  Parker and Evans state that the lawyer places their own 
individual value system and commitment to justice above the duty to their client.  They also 
state that no particular duty is prescribed to the law or the legal system. If an individual fails to 
abide by the principles of their profession, then that individual is not part of the profession.  
However, the basic tenant of the moral activist is that the lawyer will follow their own ethical 
standard about what it means to do justice.  In principle, any lawyer is free to do that.  At the 
outset, any lawyer seeking employment may wish to consider the ethos and values of 
prospective employers thus aligning their work with their own ethos and values.  Most lawyers 
are at liberty to decline instructions provided that the reason for declining those instructions is 
not discriminatory. One notable exception to this is the ‘cab-rank rule’ requiring barristers in 
England and Wales to accept instructions that are appropriate irrespective of, inter alia, any 
‘belief or opinion which [the barrister] may have formed as to the character, reputation, cause, 
conduct, guilt or innocence of the client.’78  There are also pragmatic implications to consider 
such as the need for paid employment and the commercial reality that most legal undertakings 
are businesses and would therefore be reluctant to decline fee-paying work.  The moral activist 
may also strive to challenge and change the law through case selection. [9] 
 
As to the Practitioner of Ethics of Care, again, this role needs to be redefined.  The principle 
trait of preserving or restoring relationships and avoiding harm is however a positive 
                                                          
75 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner Human Rights, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 
(1990) <www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/roleoflawyers.aspx> accessed 13 June 2018 
76 Hyams, (n.68), 23 
77 Solicitors Regulation Authority, (n 51), IB 5.4 and 5.5 
78 Bar Standards Board, (no 71), rC29.d 
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component of any lawyer. Over recent years, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has 
become increasingly important.  In particular, mediation is a form of ADR in which a neutral 
third party facilitates the parties in reaching a negotiated settlement. The benefits of mediation 
are recognised nationally and internationally.  At a European level, the Mediation Directive79 
states: 
 
‘Mediation can provide a cost-effective and quick extrajudicial resolution of 
disputes in civil and commercial matters through processes tailored to the needs of 
the parties. Agreements resulting from mediation are more likely to be complied 
with voluntarily and are more likely to preserve an amicable and sustainable 
relationship between the parties.’80 
 
In England and Wales, parties in civil proceedings are encouraged to participate in ADR at 
various stages before and during litigation81 whilst in family proceedings it is a legal 
requirement in most cases to attend a Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting 
(MIAM)82. The legal system therefore recognises, and indeed encourages, the amicable 
resolution of disputes. 
 
In light of the importance of mediation in the legal system, a lawyer must have an awareness 
of their value and the ability to resolve disputes without recourse to litigation.  However, 
lawyers must also respect their clients’ wishes and should a client not wish to mediate, that is 
their decision. 
 
In determining a type of lawyer, all lawyers must be an adversarial advocate and a responsible 
lawyer as these attributes are core values of the legal profession. However, lawyers should also 
be mindful of moral activism and ethics of care from a personal and client perspective.  
Lawyers should have the ability to recognise when these roles are appropriate in any given case 
and how they interact with other roles.  These roles can be visualised at Figure 2. 
     
                                                          
79 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of 
mediation in civil and commercial matters 
80 ibid., Preamble 
81 Civil Procedure Rules, Practice Direction – Pre-action Conduct and Protocols, paras 8-11 
82 Children and Families Act 2014, s 10(1); Family Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 3A – Family Mediation 







‘Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom’83 
 
As stated above, an individual’s moral compass is constructed over the course of their lives, 
shaped by their experiences, their family, their socio-economic status, their education on so on. 
[4][9][10] If one is going to analyse values, one must reflect upon their own values. 
 
I am not from a privileged background. My father worked in factories whilst I recall my mother 
had numerous jobs including bar work, school secretary and child minding.  Her most 
important job was raising five children, particularly after the death of my father in 1993 when 
I was 13 years old.  This is also important as it played a significant role in my own identity.  I 
was baptised a Catholic and as a child I believe it would be fair to say that I was devout.  I 
attended church most days and followed all the rules.  However, following the death of my 
father, I became, and remain, an atheist.  I include this not to evoke sympathy and wish to make 
it clear that I do not believe I had a deprived upbringing.  In fact, I believe I had a very good 
upbringing.  Whilst I did not appreciate it at the time, I now know how difficult it would have 
been for my mother to raise five children. 
                                                          














I followed a ‘traditional’ route into the legal profession obtaining an undergraduate law degree, 
completing the Legal Practice Course and then a two-year training contract.  I did not 
participate in any experiential learning throughout my undergraduate studies, undertaking 
numerous theoretical modules. The Legal Practice Course provided some simulated exercises 
during which I learnt and was assessed on the basic skills such as legal writing, practical legal 
research, interviewing and advocacy.  I was also required to learn solicitors’ ethics which were 
assessed throughout the programme. At this time, ethics were governed by the Solicitors Code 
of Conduct which set out the rules that must be followed and therefore any aspiring solicitor 
was required to learn the ‘rule book’.84 
 
Before joining Northumbria University as a lecturer, I had trained, qualified and worked as a 
solicitor in law centres.  Specialising in social welfare law, law centres were established in the 
1970s and ‘work within their communities to defend the legal rights of local people.’85 Above 
all, Law Centres ‘exist to improve the daily lives of the communities they work in.’86  My 
professional background was therefore within organisations seeking to promote social justice.  
I specialised in housing and employment law, occasionally working on some social security 
cases as well.  I enjoyed, for the most part, the work that I did.  I dealt with real people, many 
of whom were vulnerable and disadvantaged, often with significant social and legal problems.  
The vast majority of my clients were eligible for public funding.  Those who were not eligible 
received some limited assistance, usually advice. For reasons of confidentiality, I cannot 
provide the details of specific cases.  Suffice it to say that some cases I felt passionate about 
due to a sense of injustice suffered by the client whilst others, I provided with the best service 
I could. 
 
When asked, “What do you do?”, I respond by saying that I am a solicitor.  The job title 
‘solicitor’ is not on my contract of employment.  Indeed, my contract states that I am an 
‘Associate Professor’ yet that is not what I publicly identify as.  I tell people that I am a 
solicitor; because I am a solicitor, continuing in practice in the Student Law Office.87  However, 
I have worked in academia longer than I worked as a solicitor in practice.  Alternatively, 
                                                          
84 The Law Society, (n 52) 
85 Law Centres Network ‘About Law Centres’ (2012) <www.lawcentres.org.uk/about-law-centres> accessed 26 
July 2018 
86 ibid. 
87 SRA Number: 357069 
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perhaps it is easier for people to understand what I do if I say I am a solicitor.  If I informed 
people that I am an academic88 in law, they imagine an individual who stands at the front of a 
lecture theatre espousing various legal principles that have been established over the course of 
hundreds of years.  Many of these principles are from appellant cases.  However, this is far 
from what I do. 
 
At the outset of my academic career I had no experience in teaching nor did I have much 
knowledge of clinical legal education.  As highlighted above, my own legal education did not 
encompass such a pedagogical approach.  My understanding of my role was to train law 
students to be lawyers through the teaching of legal skills and the supervision of their work on 
real cases.  Whilst the students embarked upon their learning journey, I also set out on my own.  
The lessons I learnt throughout my early career are set out in a co-authored article89 [1] and 
illustrate the belief that I was training future lawyers.  In hindsight, the article does not directly 
reference the role of clinic in the moral development of law students, merely addressing the 
need for a student to act as a ‘professional’, that is to say abide by the professional conduct 
rules.  However, many of the lessons are crucial in the moral development of students that I 
will address shortly. 
 
5. The Clinical Legal Education Belief System 
 
“No one believes more firmly than Comrade Napoleon that all animals are equal. 
He would be only too happy to let you make your decisions for yourselves. But 
sometimes you might make the wrong decisions, comrades, and then where should 
we be?”90 
 
5.1 What is the Belief System in Clinical Legal Education? 
 
Scholars have extensively written about the history of clinical legal education.91  Suffice it to 
say, clinical programmes have taken root and thrived in areas of political and social upheaval.92 
The origins of the modern clinical movement can be traced to the social turmoil of the United 
                                                          
88 Lecturer, Senior Lecturer or Associate Professor as my grade has changed over the years 
89 Angela Macfarlane and Paul McKeown, '10 Lessons for New Clinicians ' (2008) 13 Int'l J Clinical Legal Educ 65 
90 George Orwell, Animal Farm (first published 1944, eBooks@Adelaide 2016) chapter 5 
91 For example see Bloch (n 36); McKeown and Hall (n 35) 
92 McKeown and Hall (n 35) 
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States in the 1960s.  Further, much of the literature surrounding clinical legal education 
emanated from the United States and thus reflected their ideology of clinical legal education.  
Whilst recognising the educational benefits of clinical activity, the early clinical literature 
espoused community service as the primary purpose.93 As the clinical legal education 
movement has spread, clinicians from the United States have often been at the forefront whilst 
clinical programmes have received significant financial backing from funders in the United 
States.94 [10]  
 
There is little empirical evidence supporting assertions as to the transformational impact of 
clinical legal education. [10] I have undertaken and published empirical research adding to the 
evidence of the impact of clinical legal education that will be addressed below supporting this 
thesis commentary.95 [4][8]   
 
Quantitative studies have concluded there is no correlation between clinical legal education 
and an ongoing commitment to public service.96 [4][6] Whilst other studies have indicated that 
students undertaking a clinical programme were more likely to have an on-going commitment 
to pro bono, it is noted that these were voluntary clinical programmes.97 With such 
programmes, it is arguable that students volunteering already had a public service ethos and 
therefore it is unclear as to the impact of the programme. [6] 
 
                                                          
93 William Woodruff and Andreas Bucker, “The Bologna Process and German Legal Education: Developing 
Professional Competence through Clinical Experiences” (2008) 9 German LJ 575  
94 For example see Leah Wortham, 'Aiding Clinical Education Abroad: What Can Be Gained and the Learning 
Curve on How to Do So Effectively' (2006) 12 Clinical L Rev 615; Lee Dexter Schinasi, 'Globalizing: Clinical Legal 
Education: Successful Under-Developed Country Experiences' (2003) 6 TM Cooley J Prac & Clinical L 129;  Jane 
M Picker and Sidney Jr Picker, 'Educating Russia's Future Lawyers--Any Role for the United States' (2000) 33 
Vand J Transnat'l L 17 
95 Paul McKeown, 'Law Student Attitudes towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience at 
Northumbria University' (2015) 22 Int'l J Clinical Legal Educ [vi]; Paul McKeown, 'Pro Bono: What's in It for Law 
Students: The Students' Perspective' (2017) 24 Int'l J Clinical Legal Educ 43  
96 For example see McKeown, 'Law Student Attitudes towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience 
at Northumbria University' (n 95); Robert Granfield, 'Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: Results on 
the Impact of Mandatory Pro Bono Programs' (2007) 54 Buff L Rev 1355; Deborah L Rhode, 'Pro Bono in 
Principle and in Practice' (2003) 53 J Legal Educ 413 
97 For example see Bharat Malkani and Linden Thomas, ‘The Birmingham Pro Bono Group: A Case Study of 
Social Justice in Legal Education’ in Chris Ashford and Paul McKeown (eds) Social Justice and Legal Education 
(Cambridge Scholars 2018); Deborah A. Schmedemann, ‘Priming for pro bono: The impact of Law School on 
Pro Bono Participation in Practice’ in Robert Granfield and Lynn Mather (eds) Private Lawyers in the Public 
Interest (Oxford University Press 2009); Sally Maresh, “The Impact of Clinical Legal Education on Decisions of 
Law Students to Practice Public Interest Law” in Jeremy Cooper and Louise Trubek (eds), Educating for Justice: 
Social Values and Legal Education (Ashgate 1997) 
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There is no singularly accepted definition of clinical legal education although one broad 
definition is ‘learning through participation in real or realistic legal interactions coupled with 
reflection on this experience’.98 Clinical legal education can therefore encompass ‘live-client’ 
experiences [4] as well as public legal education programmes such as StreetLaw. [7] This 
definition incorporates simulated experiences although it is not universally accepted that such 
experiences are clinical.99 
 
Live-client clinical programmes usually involve the provision of legal advice and/or 
representation to members of the public.  In essence, the student is placed in the role of the 
lawyer.  In recent years, there has been a development of clinical programmes aimed at 
assisting litigants in person.100[5] These programmes do not always permit the students to 
provide legal advice nor do they permit the student to represent the client.  The role of the 
student is to provide emotional support and assist the litigant in pursuing their claim.  For 
example, whilst the student may help a litigant complete a court form, they will not advise the 
litigant what to write on the form. [5] Public legal education programmes will usually involve 
students delivering a presentation to community groups or schoolchildren to educate on their 
legal rights and/or responsibilities. [7] 
 
From an educational perspective, participation in such programmes benefit the students’ skills 
development such a legal writing, research and communication, as found in my own 
research.101 [4][6][8] The range of skills and the extent of impact upon development will 
depend upon the nature of the clinical programme. For example, an advice-only live client 
programme is unlikely to have the same impact on a students’ case management ability as a 
full representation model. 
 
From a social justice, and therefore moral development perspective, it is argued that students 
are exposed to social and cultural situations that they would not otherwise have experienced. 
                                                          
98 Kevin Kerrigan, ‘What is clinical legal education and pro bono’ in Kevin Kerrigan and Victoria Murray (eds)  A 
Student Guide to Clinical Legal Education and Pro Bono (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 5 
99 There was a significant level of discussion as to what activities should be included within the definition of 
clinical legal education in the General Assembly of the European Network for Clinical Legal Education at the 
annual conference at Comenius University, Bratislava, 3-5 July 2019.  There was a view that simulated work 
should not be included within the definition. 
100 Paul McKeown and Sarah Morse, ‘Litigants in Person: Is there a role for Higher Education’ (2015) 49(1) Law 
Tchr 122 
101 McKeown, 'Law Student Attitudes towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience at Northumbria 
University' (n 95); Paul McKeown, 'Pro Bono: What's in It for Law Students: The Students' Perspective' (n 95) 
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[6][9] Clinical legal education is therefore a chronosystem where an individual transitions from 
law student to lawyer.  Students are exposed to the practice of law, which has the potential to 
be a disorientating experience.  Unlike the classroom and learning the theory, students are 
required to consider how the law and legal practice effect individuals in society, and whether 
the law is just.  Students, as lawyers, must also consider their professional responsibilities 
embedding a mesosystem within their ecological system.  Students therefore learn within 
clinical legal education to regulate their environment to bring alignment to their ecological 
systems.     
 
5.2 Student motivation for participating in clinical legal education 
 
Whilst educators may set out their objectives for delivering a programme,[6] it is worth 
considering whether these objectives align with the student motivations for wanting to 
participate in the programme. Perhaps unsurprisingly, students have reported a range of 
motivations for wanting to participate in a clinical legal education programme.  The reasons 
cited by students can be characterised as practical, tactical and ethical.102 Specifically clinical 
legal education can enhance legal skills, knowledge and employability, which are the practical 
motivations for participation in such programmes.103  Tactical reasons would include the 
positive promotion of the individual’s image, which again may assist their employability.104 
Practical and tactical motivations can be categorised as extrinsic motivations.  Finally, ethical 
reasons include the intrinsic motivation of a student to use their knowledge and skills to benefit 
society.105  This appears to be aligned with the perceived intent of clinical legal education. 
[6][8]  
 
                                                          
102 Stephen Parker, 'Why Lawyers Should Do Pro Bono Work' (2001) 19 Law Context: A Socio-Legal J 5; cf. 
Rachel Dunn and Paul McKeown, ‘The European Network of Clinical Legal Education: The Spring Workshop 
2015’ (2015) 22(3) Int'l J Clinical Legal Educ 312 highlighting multitude of reasons why academics participate in 
clinical legal education 
103 See Paul McKeown, 'Pro Bono: What's in It for Law Students: The Students' Perspective' (n 95); Paul 
McKeown, 'Law Student Attitudes towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience at Northumbria 
University' (n 95); Parker (n 102) 
104 See McKeown  'Pro Bono: What's in It for Law Students: The Students' Perspective' (n 95); Parker (n 102) 
105 See McKeown, 'Pro Bono: What's in It for Law Students: The Students' Perspective' (n 95); McKeown, 'Law 
Student Attitudes towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience at Northumbria University' (n 95); 
Parker (n 102) 
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Whilst some scholars are critical of the educational intent of some clinical legal education 
programmes, preferring a social justice orientated intent,106 it is important not to overlook how 
there is a social benefit in assisting students motivated by practical and/or tactical reasons. 
Students from less privileged backgrounds are disadvantaged in gaining work experience and 
therefore gaining employment in the legal profession, which is particularly seen in the post-92 
universities.107  Clinical legal education can provide students with the necessary experience, 
skills and knowledge they require in securing employment thus promoting social mobility. [9] 
 
There is little empirical research on the motivations of students for participating in clinical legal 
education and pro bono programme.  However, studies by Nicolson108 and Coombe109 both 
reported extrinsic reasons as the primary motivation for students wanting to participate in their 
clinical programmes. Coombe further reports that students responding to his study ‘would have 
been slightly more likely to have participated’ if the clinical activity was tied to an academic 
course.110  
 
The reported studies above related to voluntary clinical programmes.  In 2015, I published the 
results of a quantitative study looking at the impact of a mandatory clinical programme at 
Northumbria University.111  The study compared the perceptions of students who had yet to 
undertake the clinical legal education module with those who were undertaking the module.  
Again, the study concurred with the Nicolson and Coombe in that the extrinsic value of clinical 
legal education was more valued than an intrinsic interest in social issues. [4] 
 
The 2015 study also considered the impact of a clinical programme on students. In accordance 
with student expectations, they reported that the clinical experience improved their legal skills 
and assisted them in obtaining employment.  Students who had undertaken clinical work also 
reported an increased awareness of social and economic issues, and to a lesser extent, that their 
perception of social and economic issues had changed.  However, the clinical programme did 
                                                          
106 For example Donald Nicolson, 'Education, Education, Education: Legal, Moral and Clinical' (2008) 42 Law 
Tchr 145; Stephen Wizner, 'Beyond Skills Training' (2001) 7 Clinical L Rev 327 
107 Andrew Francis, ‘Legal Education, Social Mobility, and Employability: Possible Selves, Curriculum 
Intervention, and the Role of Legal Work Experience’ (2015) 42(2) J. Law Soc. 173 
108 Donald Nicolson, 'Calling, Character and Clinical Legal Education: A Cradle to Grave Approach to Inculcating 
a Love for Justice' (2013) 16 Legal Ethics 36 
109 Malcolm Coombe, ‘Selling Intra-Curricular Clinical Legal Education’ (2014) 48 Law Tchr. 281 
110 ibid. 291 
111 McKeown, 'Law Student Attitudes towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience at Northumbria 
University' (n 95) 
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not impact upon the likelihood of respondent students undertaking pro bono work after 
graduation.112 [4] Subsequent similar studies, citing my work, have found students expressing 
an intention to continue with pro bono work following graduation.113  However, unlike my 
study exploring the impact of a mandatory clinical programme, these studies have considered 
voluntary clinical programmes.  It is therefore possible that students undertaking such 
voluntary programmes are already inclined to participate in pro bono activity.   
 
The quantitative studies outlined above highlight a general perception that extrinsic factors are 
the primary motivation for students. A perception has pervaded the literature that extrinsic 
motivation is unsatisfactory in education.  This is epitomised by Kohn who states: 
 
‘…the more we reward people for doing something, the more likely they are to lose 
interest in whatever they had to do to get the reward.  Extrinsic motivation, in other 
words, is not only quite different from intrinsic motivation but actually tends to 
erode it.’114   
 
However, there is a more nuanced position, as illustrated in my qualitative study published in 
2017.115 Unlike other reported studies, this study did not pre-suppose or limit what motivated 
student involvement in pro bono work.  As such, this study provided student participants with 
the opportunity to articulate their motivation without encumbrance associated with either a 
quantitative study or structured interview.  The participants in this study provided mixed 
motivations for undertaking pro bono work.  The participants recognised the extrinsic value of 
participation in pro bono activity, but they also recognised the wider social benefit of such 
work.116   Students undertake clinical legal education and pro bono work for a variety of 
reasons, and their reasons may change over time.117 [8] It is therefore a misconceived notion to 
consider intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as purely exclusive concepts.  Organismic 
Integration Theory (OIT), a sub-theory of Self Determination Theory, helps explain this more 
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nuanced approach through the internalisation of an extrinsically motivated activity118 .  
Although students may initially undertake an activity for extrinsic reasons, the value of the 
work can be brought into congruence with their other values and needs, and therefore 
extrinsically motivated actions become autonomous and self-determined.119 [8] The 
participation in the work allows students the opportunity to recognise the intrinsic benefits.  In 
applying this to the student’s ecological system, there may be a disconnect between the 
student’s internal values and their appreciation of the role of a lawyer.  Until they are placed 
within a legal environment, they cannot align microsystem and mesosystem as the they may 
have no understanding of the different environments.  Conversely, there may be a value shift 
in the microsystem.  For example, if a student wishes to pursue a corporate/commercial career, 
perhaps due the financial rewards, they may not appreciate the innate satisfaction that can be 
gained in social welfare law.  The alignment shift may cause the student to consider an 
alternative career path, or increase the desire to participate in pro bono activity whilst pursuing 
a corporate/commercial career.  
 
There are a number of factors within clinical legal education which can aid or influence the 
assimilation of values such as exposure to clients; the role of the supervisor; and the role of 
other students. 
 
5.3 Exposure to clients 
 
Whilst it would be wrong to suggest the initial motivation for clinical legal education 
programme was born out of a need to help the poor, at least in the UK, clinical legal education 
has become intertwined with the concept of assisting the indigent and underrepresented. 
 
It is at this juncture that a number of assumptions must be unpacked, namely the belief that the 
indigent have no access to legal advice and representation and that law students are from a 
privileged background. 
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Legal advice and assistance can be funded in various ways.120  Whilst a client may be able to 
pay for legal advice and representation through agreement of an hourly rate or fixed fee, other 
options are available to fund a case.  For example, contingency fee arrangements, legal aid, 
before-the-event insurance, and third-party funders.  Although legal clinics will usually offer 
their services on a pro bono basis, this does not necessarily mean that the clinic is the best 
option for the client.121  For example, whilst the provision of pro bono assistance means that 
clients are not required to pay their own legal fees, they are not afforded any protection against 
their opponent’s legal costs in the event that they are unsuccessful.  Historically, the poorest in 
society were likely to be eligible for public funding and therefore, those who could not afford 
legal advice and assistance were those who had an income just above the threshold for legal 
aid eligibility. It should also be remembered that there are clients who are still eligible for 
public funding despite the reduction in the availability of legal aid.122  Typical examples of the 
types of case that present in a legal clinic would be a family matter where the client is the 
victim, or is at risk of domestic violence123 or a housing matter where the client is at risk of 
losing their home.124 [2] 
 
As to the second assumption, it is not disputed that there continues to be issues around socio-
economic status and participation in Higher Education.  However, neither can it be assumed 
that all students are from privileged backgrounds. Within the UK, clinical legal education 
programmes gained traction within the ‘new’ universities.125  Students at these universities tend 
to be from less privileged backgrounds126 and as such may be more familiar with the issues 
faced by clients presenting in the clinic. [9][10] 
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Through live client work, students gain exposure to real world problems.  Suddenly, the law 
that they have studied has practical meaning, more than mere words on a page.  The client’s 
story may cause the student to feel uncomfortable, creating the ‘disorientating moment’.127 
[3][9] In capturing this moment it is important that students reflect upon the experiences they 
have encountered. [1][9] 
 
Reflection has been defined in different ways. Boud, Keogh and Walker state that ‘[r]eflection 
is an important human activity in which people recapture their experience, think about it, mull 
it over and evaluate it’.128  Dewey defines reflection as the ‘[r]econstruction and reorganisation 
of experience which adds to the meaning of experience.’129  Moon states that ‘reflection is … 
applied to relatively complicated or unstructured ideas in learning or to problems for which 
there is not an obvious solution.’130 Whilst scholars have defined reflection in various ways, 
there are commonalities.  Reflection should be centred around an experience upon which the 
learner can analyse and evaluate. The learner then uses the product of their synthesised 
knowledge to enhance their learning and future performance.  We must therefore question how 
clinical legal education can aid the reflective process through provoking, focusing upon and 
capturing the disorientation.  This is through the process of assessment. [1] 
 
It is important to distinguish between institutional assessment (certifying the student’s level of 
knowledge) and assessment for learning (determining whether the student actually learns).131 
A student learning is improved when there is alignment between the learning outcomes, 
teaching activities and assessment, which Biggs refers to as the theory of constructive 
alignment.132  To achieve constructive alignment the intended learning outcomes must specify 
the activity that students should engage in to achieve the intended outcome.133  The teacher’s 
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role is to establish a learning environment aimed at encouraging the learning activities, and to 
assess the students’ performance against the intended learning outcomes.134     
 
If clinical legal education programmes intend to educate students, not merely in the knowledge 
and skills required of legal practice, but also instil or challenge a student’s perspective of their 
role as actor in the legal system, the relationship between their intrinsic values, morality and 
professional ethics, then the programme must be designed in such a way as to achieve this.  
Clinical legal education programmes take many forms such as live client clinics135 such as the 
Student Law Office at Northumbria University136[4] StreetLaw (or other forms of public legal 
education),137[7] as well as the emergence of programmes to assist litigants in person.138[5] 
Live client programmes expose students to the practical reality of the law.  Lundy articulates 
how the use of reflective learning journals during a clinical placement at a welfare rights 
organisation assisted the students learning by focusing on the new skills and knowledge 
acquired whilst using previous learning.139 Similarly, with clinical programmes designed to 
assist litigants in person, students are faced with the reality of a justice system in which those 
who are not skilled or experienced may struggle.140  StreetLaw programmes place the students 
within the community exposing them to legal issues experienced by certain groups and 
communities, often the most disadvantaged in society. [7] Which type of programme, or model 
adopted, the learning environment has the potential to create the ‘disorientating’ moment upon 
which to elicit reflection allowing the student to analyse and evaluate their experience and their 
perception of the law in practice.   We can therefore see that reflection is an important aspect 
of students finding alignment between their ecological systems.  Where a student’s 
microsystem is misaligned with the mesosystem, this is likely to make the student 
uncomfortable, thus creating the disorientating moment.  For example, a student may be asked 
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to represent a client who they find to be morally repugnant.  Within a clinic specialising in 
criminal appeals, students may be required to represent murderers and sex offenders.  Whilst 
each student will form their own view of the client, many students may feel uncomfortable 
given the nature of the offences.  Students must therefore reconcile their professional 
obligations to the client with their personal values regarding the offence and their judgement 
of the client.    
 
However, students will often require more than the experience, they will often require guidance 




Giddings highlights that the ‘literature relating to supervision indicates that the capacity and 
inclination of supervisors to foster student awareness of social justice has been taken for 
granted and warrants further scrutiny.’141  In considering the relationship between the clinical 
supervisor and the student, it must be recognised that the clinical supervisor has a multifaceted 
role including role model; colleague; teacher; assessor; manager and counsellor.142  Clinical 
supervisors may come from different backgrounds. Within in-house clinics, many clinical 
supervisors may have been practising lawyers whilst others have always been in academia. [1] 
If the clinical model is an externship programme, the day-to-day supervision is likely to be left 
to a practising lawyer.  Whatever the background of the clinical supervisor, the multifaceted 
role means that they must manage a complex, and sometimes conflicting relationship with their 
students. 
 
In examining the various aspects of the role, McLeod et al state that role modelling ‘is the most 
powerful teaching strategy available to clinical educators’ as ‘[s]tudents learn most from 
observing the actions and understanding the reasoning processes of their role models.’143  Wear 
and Zarconi, drawing upon the work of Coulehan, posit that such role models should be ‘full-
time faculty members who exemplify personal virtue in their interactions with patients 
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[clients], staff and trainees; who have a broad, humanistic perspective; and who are devoted to 
teaching and willing to forego high income in order to teach.’144 However, the 
‘overall…context in which students thrive or stagnate is more important than the efforts 
(however noble) of any one individual.’145 [4] 
 
Clinical teaching subscribes to a constructivist theory of education where teaching ‘is not a 
matter of transmitting but of engaging students in active learning, building their knowledge in 
terms of what they already understand’.146 Wilson sums this up referring to the clinical 
supervisor as ‘not the “sage on the stage” but the “guide on the side.”’147  This is due to the 
differences between traditional and clinical methodology in teaching law.  Students cease to be 
passive and become active learners.[9] This thesis commentary started by painting a picture of 
the traditional law student, sitting in a lecture theatre absorbing knowledge like a sponge which 
would subsequently be regurgitated in some future piece of assessment or ‘education 
banking’.148 
 
The clinical supervisor is an important factor when considering the inculcation of values within 
students. However, it is not purely the individual who is responsible for the inculcation but the 
whole environment in which the clinical supervisor and the students are working. [9] Clinical 
supervisors should lean towards Theory Y in which the aim of teaching is to support student 
learning.149 Theory X and Theory Y emanate from the work of Douglas McGregor and are 
based upon assumptions about trustworthiness.  Theory X assumes workers cannot be trusted 
whereas Theory Y assumes they can and that you achieve better results when you do.  As such, 
clinical supervisors should allow students the ‘freedom and space to use their own 
judgement’.150  If the clinical supervisor handles the matter himself or herself, minimising the 
role of the students, this is likely to retard the students’ development as practitioners and limit 
the potential for transformative experiences.151 [1] In such circumstances, student will lack 
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responsibility for the case and therefore, it is likely their microsystem will remain undisturbed.  
In essence, the students may wash their hands of responsibility.  
 
It is at this stage where there is potential conflict between the roles of the clinical supervisor.  
As a manager, and particularly if the supervisor is a lawyer, the clinical supervisor is 
responsible is ensuring the clients receive a high standard of client care.[1][9] From an 
organisational perspective, the clinical supervisor is responsible for maintaining the 
professional reputation of the university.  As such, the student’s learning may be the second 
priority.152 Within a live client clinic for example, a client may present with a problem requiring 
urgent action.  This will curtail the ability of the student spend time researching and advising 
the client.  The clinical supervisor may need to adopt a more directional with the student to 
ensure appropriate advice is provided to the client and the necessary steps are taken.  However, 
it is useful for students to be aware and understand the legal, ethical and professional priority.153 
[1]  
 
Hall illustrates the clinical supervisor/student relationship at Figure 3 drawing upon the work 
of Bernstein.  In the constructivist tradition, students should learn through having a high degree 
of autonomy whilst adopting a holistic approach.  If the clinical curriculum was designed as 
such students could explore the cases, examining many aspects of the case and therefore 
enhance their learning. However, where students are perhaps new, they may require more 
support and guidance.  Alternatively, the nature of the case may mean it is urgent or so 
specialised, the clinical supervisor is required to adopt a more directional/interventionist 
approach.  Where students do have a high level of autonomy but the problem is tightly defined, 
this may also limit the learning opportunities.  Therefore, clinical legal education programmes 
should strive to keep the curriculum and experience within the lower left quadrant. [1] 
 
 
                                                          





Figure 3: Using Bernstein to understand the supervision relationship in clinic154 
 
As an assessor, the clinical supervisor moves out of the supportive teaching/coaching role and 
is required to evaluate the student’s performance.155 [1] This evaluation can be both formative 
and summative with the former assisting students develop their learning experience to improve 
skills.156 In doing so, this will serve to assist the student in the summative assessment through 
a higher level of performance.  If the clinical curriculum is constructively aligned, as an 
assessor, the clinical supervisor should act as a conduit for assessment for learning rather than 
merely adopting the institutional assessment. [1][9]  
 
As discussed above, clinical legal education should provide students with experiences which 
may provoke complex emotions and thus engage the role of counsellor.157  Within this role, 
clinical supervisors should recognise the stress a student may be experiencing and they may 
explore their personal responses to the situation, thus the disorientating moment upon which to 
reflect.158  Where a student’s intrinsic values are challenged, they may feel uncomfortable, 
particularly if this is due to a misalignment of their professional ethics and/or societal norms 
                                                          
154 Taken from Elaine Hall, ‘Adding Value? Values as demonstrated in the ‘curriculum as experienced’’ 
(International Journal of Clinical Legal Education Conference, Melbourne, November 2018) 
155 McLeod et al, (n 142), 57 
156 ibid. 




of morality.  Through discussion with the student, the clinical supervisor can assist in bringing 
harmony to the student’s ecological system.  Returning to the example of a criminal appeals 
clinic, the supervisor can facilitate a discussion around the students personal values and 
opinions of the client who has been convicted of murder or sex offences.  This permits the 
student to articulate their opinion in a safe environment.  The supervisor can also elicit the 
student’s opinion or viewpoint regarding their professional obligations.  This discussion can 
help the student harmonise their internal values with their professional responsibilities.  A 
student may conclude that their role is not to determine the guilt or innocence of an individual.  
Alternatively, a student may find there is no resolution with which they are comfortable.  In 
such circumstance, the student may learn that criminal law is not an area in which they will 
practice.  Whilst there are no right and wrong answers, there is still a learning experience, 
 
As outlined above, if performing the role correctly, the supervisor plays an influential role in 
student development.  It is therefore necessary to emphasise a word of caution as to the extent 
of this influence.  Students may subsume the moral positioning of their supervisor.  This 
presents a particular risk where the clinical activity is assessed as students may deem their 
supervisor’s position as the ‘right’ answer.  Traditionally, legal academics teach from a ‘neutral 
and value-free perspective’ and express no opinion where moral issues arise, merely educating 
on the complexities of the various arguments.159 [9] The adoption of such a neutral position 
absolves law teacher from the moral responsibility in their teaching.  An analogy can be drawn 
with a lawyer separating their individual values with their professional responsibilities as 
discussed above.  However, it is necessary within clinical supervision to adopt a position where 
moral or ethical dilemmas arise.  From a practical perspective, if there is a case, it is necessary 
to resolve the dilemma to progress the case.  From an educational perspective, a supervisor 
may wish to share their experience to aid the student.  Alternatively, the supervisor may wish 
to guide the student with the options available to stimulate the discussion.  However, it is crucial 
within the discussion that the supervisor’s role is to inculcate the student’s ability to think, not 
what to think.160  In doing so, we must challenge the traditional hierarchical teacher/student 
relationship as the supervisor must be prepared to have their own  beliefs called into question.161 
[10]  The supervisor should articulate a rationale for their beliefs or their decisions on how to 
resolve ethical dilemmas.  At the same time, they must also be prepared to listen and consider 
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other viewpoints.  A symbiotic relationship is therefore established between supervisor and 
student, each learning from one another.  Encouraging expression of views promotes deeper 
learning by highlighting differences of opinion and engaging students in a critical analysis of 
the various opinions, as highlighted in my own research.162 [1]    
 
5.5 Working with other students 
 
Unlike many areas of academic study where students are required to work alone, particularly 
in relation to assessed work, for fear of collusion or some other form of academic misconduct, 
clinical legal education positively encourages teamwork.163  One of the benefits of this close 
working relationship with other students is the ability to debate issues amongst peers.164 Often 
these discussions will take place in small group sessions teaching sessions and include topics 
such as justice and morality.165  These small group discussions allow students to express their 
own thoughts and opinions upon a topic and then listen to what others have to say. Students 
can then reflect upon their original thoughts, having listened to other perspectives, and consider 
whether their views still stand or whether their ideas have changed or evolved.166 [1][9] 
 
As identified earlier in this thesis commentary, everyone’s moral compass will be unique based 
upon their own life experiences. Students will focus upon different aspects of the debate based 
upon their own perspective or may be able to offer a fresh perspective based upon their own 
life experience. As Kosuri highlights, ‘[m]ore varied perspectives, greater interaction, and more 
discussion, will only lead to profounder understanding of issues, people, and values.’167  For 
example, students may have had personal experience of a moral dilemma and therefore be able 
to speak from experience rather than based upon a hypothetical notions.  Abercrombie, in her 
study of medical students, found that students taught in this way made better diagnoses, based 
more firmly on evidence, and they were less dogmatic, being more open to consider alternative 
possibilities.168 [1][9]        
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Clinical legal education provides an environment for students to learn not only legal skills but 
also learn about themselves and their role within the legal system and the wider world.  As I 
state above, clinics are a chronosystem transitioning students from theoretical study to practical 
application (and consequences).  Clinical legal education is therefore a transition from student 
to lawyer.  Throughout this transition, students are exposed to various ecological systems that 
interact with one another and may even misalign causing disorientation and internal 
disharmony.  Through exposure to clients and the legal system, students have experiences upon 
which they can reflect.  It is then the role of the supervisor and other students to facilitate the 
analysis and evaluation of the experience.  Through deep reflection, the students not only learn 





The law and the legal system is a complex world, more nuanced than a set of rules that must 
be obeyed. The law is a system founded and evolved from a numerous societal norms.  
Lawyers, as custodians of the legal system, must comply with their professional obligations.  
However, as humans, lawyers will have constructed their own moral compass throughout the 
course of their life. As such, lawyers have a complex ecological system that may result in a 
conflict between personal values and professional duties. 
 
A traditional legal education in England and Wales has often failed to prepare law students in 
addressing this conflict due to the separation of the academic and vocational learning.  It is 
recognised that a legal education is more than merely teaching substantive legal knowledge 
and universities have a responsibility to teach law students ethics and values enabling them to 
discuss ethical dilemmas and make ethical decisions. 
 
Throughout this thesis commentary and the supporting published work, I have shown that 
clinical legal education can address the teaching of values to law students and the impact of 
utilising such a pedagogy.  It is important that in teaching values, the clinical programme is 
designed to provide a rich learning environment in which students can experience the law in 
practice, encounter different perspectives and feel supported by their clinical supervisor.  This 
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will facilitate reflective practice thus enhancing future learning. The publications I rely upon 
in this submission have contributed significantly to our understanding of the intent and impact 
of clinical legal education as academics and as practitioners, by contributing more, and much 
needed, empirical evidence. 
 
Clinical legal education has two intents: education of legal skills and social justice. In relation 
to which of these is the primary intent is very much a question of where the clinical legal 
education programme has been established due to the historical context in which the movement 
was born. However, even if social justice is the primary intent of the clinical programme, I 
suggest that a more nuanced perspective is required.  Whilst traditionally social justice has been 
defined within the clinical movement as assisting indigent and under-represented communities, 
social justice has a plurality of meaning and therefore the ‘social justice mission’ can be 
achieved in a variety of ways.  In particular, I suggest that the educational mission and social 
justice mission are not mutually exclusive concepts, as some scholars would suggest. 
 
My empirical research suggests that clinical legal education has an impact upon students.  In 
particular, clinical legal education has clear benefits in enhancing student skills, and 
consequentially, student employment prospects. However, there is also evidence to suggest that 
students have an increased awareness of social and economic issues within society.  The 
structure of an individual’s moral compass has evolved over the course of their life and will 
continue to evolve throughout their professional career.  It is shaped by their experiences and 
the environment in which they exist, including the clinic environment.     
 
This thesis commentary, together with the published work, reimagines and reframes the intent 
of clinical legal education. The discussion around the different streams of intent, social justice 
and education, is tired.169  Further, it is also necessary to look beyond the motivation of the 
students participating in clinical legal education.  Broadly speaking, the intent of clinical legal 
education is education as after all; it states that in the name.  However, applying a more nuanced 
perspective, the focus of the discussion should focus around the educational intent. 
 
With educational intent, there are multiple sub-streams such a legal knowledge, legal skills, 
values and ethics.  As such, there is an alignment between the aims of a law degree as set out 
                                                          
169 For discussion see McKeown (n 48); Nicolson, (n 106); Wizner, (n 106) 
 37 
 
by the QAA and the intent of clinical legal education. Through clinical legal education, students 
learn about legal practice and therefore become ‘aware of the consequences of law as a human 
creation.’170  Students are exposed to clients with legal problems and are therefore able to 
appreciate the practical implications of the law and the legal system upon people’s lives. 
Further, students also subsume the role of the lawyer, including the professional responsibilities 
of the role, within clinical legal education.  As such, they are ‘subject to the ethics and values 
of those that make and apply’ the law.171 Students must therefore appreciate what it means to 
act ethically within the legal profession.  Further, students may also need to address situations 
where their own values are challenged by their professional responsibilities and obligations. 
 
The role of the supervisor should not be under-estimated, particularly as they play a 
multifaceted role in the learning process.  It is important that supervisors provide students with 
a high level of autonomy within the learning process, enabling the exploration of issues which 
may arise and facilitating students forming their own judgement. Supervisors can therefore 
guide the student through the learning process adopting an appropriate role for the situations 
such as role model, coach or counsellor. 
 
It is also important within clinical legal education that students from a variety of backgrounds 
are taught together.  Students can learn from each other’s experiences which may challenge 
their own perceptions and values. The exchange of ideas enhances the learning process as 
students evaluate their own perceptions and values which may strengthen their beliefs, or re-
evaluate their own values and sense of morality.  The student learns about their ecological 
systems and the interaction between systems, particularly the microsystem and mesosystem.  
Through reflective process, student can learn to align systems, perhaps even shifting their 
personal values based upon the experience. 
 
The educational intent of clinical legal education is broad, my body of work suggests that the 
impact achieves that intent. Though there is evidence that students enhance their legal 
knowledge, skills and employment prospects, the body of evidence supporting the continuing 
impact upon values has been less strong.  Even studies reporting that students intend to continue 
in pro bono work have not determined whether those students have followed through on their 
                                                          




intention.  Whilst I would stop short of claiming clinical legal education transforms students 
into ‘social justice warriors’, my body of work provides evidence that students become more 
aware of societal issues through clinical legal education, thus learning about and evaluating the 
law in context. How much this extends into their practice, however, needs further research and 
exploration. In order to achieve this, students must have experience provided through exposure 
to the legal system and the stakeholders within that system.  However, this is not sufficient on 
its own and students must also have the means to reflect upon and evaluate their experience. 
As such, the role of the supervisor and other students plays a significant role within that 
reflective process.  Students can discover that legal practice can create conflict between an 
individual’s internal values and their professional obligations. Students can learn to reconcile 
conflict, or at least forge an armistice, between internal values, societally imposed morals and 
professionally imposed ethics.  
 
If clinical legal education is reimagined or reframed around educational intent, specifically 
including education of values, ethics and morality, then my published work suggests that law 
students and therefore future legal professional are more socially aware.  Whilst I would argue 
the focus of the clinic is on the student rather than the client, which some scholars would 
disagree with, the result is that we educate future lawyers to critically evaluate the role they 
play within the legal system and to resolve their own moral dilemmas in a reasoned way.  As 
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“10 lessons for new
clinicians”
Angela Macfarlane and Paul McKeown1
As a new clinician, if  you have trained as a lawyer via a traditional legal education route you
inevitably have very little experience of  clinical education to bring to the role, although you of
course have your professional and practical experience to draw on. Although many readers are
experienced clinicians, this is a timely opportunity to go back to the beginning and re-assess the
potential problems or risk areas that clinicians face at the beginning of  a new academic year, with
a new intake of  students.  Society changes continually so each year will bring new issues as well as
those well known to all clinicians.  
In clinic at Northumbria University final year students are placed in to groups of  up to six students
known as firms and each firm is allocated an area of  law such as employment or housing.   Each
firm is supervised by a qualified solicitor who allocates cases to the students. Students can work
individually or in pairs, depending on the complexity of  the case. At the end of  the academic year,
students are assessed on their practical performance using grade descriptors. They also submit
reflective pieces about their experiences in clinic. 
These “lessons” have emerged from our own first year of  transition from practising lawyer to
clinical educator. We hope some of  them ring true with other new clinicians.
1. Do not pre-judge the students
Clinic is about the student experience and therefore it should be the student who conducts a case,
not the clinician. This causes concern for the new clinician as they will be ultimately responsible
for the case. It would therefore be an easy option for the new clinician to vet the students to ensure
the more academically gifted students work on the complex and more demanding cases. However,
can this be justified; could or should a clinician pick and choose the cases each student receives?  
The simple answer to this question is no. It cannot be justified as every student must have an equal
opportunity to perform. What would be worse than being approached by a student after they have
received their results and being told, “You didn’t give me the chance!”
Furthermore, if  you vet the students and do not allow them an opportunity to perform, they may
perform below expectation. Expectancy-value theory says that if  anyone is to engage in an activity,
they need to both value the outcome and to expect success in achieving it.2 This theory supports
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the proposition that we should challenge our students and expect success. If  we do not, then the
student will be less motivated to perform, and consequently the outcome will be below
expectation.
2. Patience!
It can be frustrating how slowly the students progress in clinic which may be due to pre-
suppositions about the students’ motivation. If  you subscribe to McGregor’s (1960) theory Y
about human trustworthiness which according to Biggs3 is “…students do their best work when
given freedom and space to use their own judgement … allowing students freedom to make their
own decisions…” you might expect quicker progress. However, whilst this is congruent with
deeper levels of  learning, the students may not yet have the confidence or learning experience to
deal with the freedom.  
Furthermore, expectations of  a lawyer from private practice could be unrealistically high as the
students’ exposure to files is limited, whereas a trainee lawyer would have full time exposure to
files. This freedom inevitably increases confidence and enhances progress, which is of  course why
clinical education is so valuable. As progress is generally slower in clinic to begin with, patience
together with the clinician being able to guide the student to deep engagement by subscribing to
McGregor’s theory Y is required because “theory Y climate does not necessarily mean a
disorganised teaching/learning environment. An organised setting, with clear goals and feedback on
progress, is important for motivating students, and to the development of  deep approaches.4
Knowing where you are going, and feedback telling you how well you are progressing, heightens
expectations of  success. Driving in a thick fog is highly unpleasant and so is learning in one.”5
Getting to where you are going takes time, even without the predicament of  thick fog which is why
a clinician needs to have patience.
3. “The transition from student to professional does not always
run smoothly”
The purpose of  clinic is to enhance students’ motivation from being just to attain a reward, such
as a good grade (assessment motivated) or achievement motivated which Biggs describes as when
“Students (may) learn in order to enhance their egos by competing against other students and
beating them”6 to intrinsic motivation where “there are no outside trappings necessary to make
students feel good. They learn because they are interested in the task or activity itself.”7 Achieving
this will lead to deeper learning, as opposed to surface learning. However, there could be problems
when a student is not intrinsically motivated, who does not have commitment to their clients or
respect for the rules and policies in clinic, essentially a student who does not have the ability to
make appropriate judgements. If  it was private practice, there is the option to dismiss the trainee,
which is a strong motivation for compliance. In clinic at what point do you consider suspension or
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expulsion, or can you consider these at all? This is extremely tricky as you have to balance the
needs of  the student, the needs of  the clients, the professional conduct rules, the clinician’s
practising certificate and of  course the reputation of  the clinic. If  you do not take direct action
these competing needs could all come crashing down like a pack of  cards. In clinic at Northumbria
University in the academic year 2007–2008 direct action was taken as 2 students were suspended
for a period of  time for serious breaches of  policy and procedure. Once the students returned to
clinic it was necessary to engage teaching practices more attuned to McGregor’s (1960) theory X
which Biggs describes as “operating to produce low trust, low risk, but low value;”8 as compared
to theory Y mentioned above “ which produces  high trust, high risk and high value – if  it works”.9
When these students do go into private practice they must adhere to a professional code of
conduct. Whilst it was a harsh lesson to learn so early in their time in clinic, it had to be so even
though it tipped the balance towards a more restrictive theory X learning environment. This was
necessary due to the serious consequences of  professional misconduct and to maintain clinic’s
professional reputation.
Do not forget that not all students are the same or have the ability to make judgments and validly
evaluate situations so sadly the transition from student to professional may not always run
smoothly.
4. Whose file is it anyway?
As a practitioner, you are responsible for your own files and unfortunately old habits die hard!
Ultimately, if  a student makes a mistake on the file, then you are responsible as if  it were your own
mistake. Consequently, this may have the effect of  the clinician running the case with assistance
from the student.
To answer the question whose file it is, we must first understand the concept of  what clinic actually
is. This is summed up by Stephen Wizner when he states:
“On the most basic level, the law school clinic is a teaching office where students can engage in
faculty-supervised law practice in a setting where they are called upon to achieve excellence in
practice and to reflect upon the nature of  that practice and its relationship to the law as taught in
the class room and studied in the library. It is a method of  teaching law students to represent clients
effectively in the legal system, and at the same time to develop a critical view of  that system. Law
students in the clinic learn that legal doctrine, rules and procedure; legal theory; the planning and
execution of  legal representation of  clients; ethical considerations; and social, economic and
political implications of  legal advocacy, are all fundamentally interrelated.”10
It is essential that the file therefore belongs to the student as it is a teaching tool. To understand
the legal system which we teach, the student must do the work, not observe it being done.  As such,
the file belongs to the student, and we as clinicians will assist!




10 Stephen Wizner “The Law School Clinic: Legal
Education in the Interests of  Justice” 70 Fordham
L. Rev. (2001–2002).
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5. Answer a question with a question
If  we are therefore assisting the students with the files, how do we respond to a question; should
the clinician answer that question?  
The clinical experience is about teaching the students to be a professional. If  we always give the
students the answer, then they have not learnt and will not learn.
With acknowledgement to an experienced clinician, Professor Jay Pottenger,11 he advised that you
should answer a question with a question. The purpose of  questioning the student is to guide and
assist them in finding the right answer for themselves. If  a student continues to struggle, then still
don’t give them the answer, sit down with them and look for the answer. If  we are teaching students
to be lawyers, we must therefore teach them the skills they will need in practice, not just the law.
Once we have taught them the skills to find the answer themselves, they can apply those skills to
future problems. It becomes noticeable that students will become less reliant on the clinician over
the course of  time.  
Perkins (1991)12 characterises the difference between the study skills of  ‘going beyond the
information given’ (BIG) and ‘without the information given’ (WIG).  Conventional teaching, or
BIG teaching, usually involves direct instruction to the students followed by thought orientated
activities that challenge students so that they come to apply, generalise and refine their
understanding.  
In clinic however, we adopt the WIG approach to learning. Our students are encouraged to find
their own solution to a problem through questioning and support. In the early years of  their
education, BIG teaching forms the foundation of  knowledge of  the subject and the skills. The
students can then reconceptualise that knowledge and address the problems which arise in clinic
(WIG). In other words, our students have already been taught the skills that they need to utilise
and the legal principles which apply. They now have to apply those skills to the problem which has
been presented. 
6. Start at the end and work backwards
In private practice, in contentious matters particularly, everything that you do on the file you have
in mind how it will impact on a final hearing so you always think about the end right from the
beginning. It should also be the same as a clinician because the students are there to gain skills and
a qualification so for them to perform effectively you have to make them aware of  what is expected
of  them. Be familiar with the learning outcomes and grade descriptors or other tools that you use
to assess your students and make it clear to the students what is expected of  them. Then remind
them again and again! As for the practical work, sometimes experience is the only answer, which is
why clinic is so valuable and effective as a teaching tool. It is difficult to front load the students at
the beginning of  the year, which is why clinicians in Northumbria University are experienced
practitioners. However, when you think about the end, share your experiences with the students
and consider making a visit to the final court or tribunal mandatory for the students because as a
learning tool it is hugely effective and making it compulsory is a good balance of  McGregor’s
theory X and Y.  
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7. Encourage expression of views
A criticism of  traditional academic teaching is that students are taught how to think …well almost!
Clinic gives students much more freedom to think and encourages discussion of  their own social
views, this of  course helps with reflection, see lesson 8 below. If  freedom of  expression in a
learning environment is promoted, students learn to differentiate their role as a legal advisor and
their role in society with their own morals and views which leads to deeper learning. Clinicians will
often agree with Jarvis13 who supports Levinas’ (1991) argument that learning is achieved through
conversation. Students teaching each other is applicable to clinic because it points to the: “all-
embracing social and cultural system which we take for granted; …significance of  the other
(students) as persons (faces); importance of  the interaction; mode of  the interaction; intentions of
the participants…”   
For example within an Employment law clinic meeting, it  is also great fun to listen to the students
healthily debating issues such as whether the law was biased too much in favour of  the employer
or alternatively towards the employee. One Northumbria student was confident enough to express
her own well thought out view that employees who are dismissed should spend more time and
energy finding a new job rather than pursuing their claim, even though she knew that other
members of  the firm would be horrified at such views. However, all these students recognised that
they had put aside their own views and acted professionally when dealing with their clients. So in
summary the lesson here is that students do come from different backgrounds, are individuals and
are all part of  society where any view they hold can be expressed and can enhance their learning.
You should ensure that it does not necessarily dictate their actions with clients or other
professionals and that they appreciate there may well be differences between their own views and
their obligations as professional legal advisors.
8. Do not expect the students to understand reflection!
Reflection is an effective learning tool as it allows the students to identify any problems and
identify how they can improve. As Biggs14 says “Reflection… is rather like the mirror in Snow
White: it tells you what you might be. This mirror uses theory to enable the transformation from
the unsatisfactory what-is to the more effective what-might-be.” However, students really struggle
with reflection, one student asked, just a few weeks before hand in date, whether you “are allowed
to put down what you think.” But this lesson is a bit of  a misnomer as in fact, despite their
regularly voiced concerns of  not understanding reflection, most students were able to demonstrate
deep learning in their reflection papers, showing maturity and insight. With persistent supervisor
support students will also be able to take their reflective practice with them in their future careers
so clinic is also instrumental in engaging the students in lifelong learning so that the students have
the best opportunity possible to achieve their career goals. Reflective practice is designed, amongst
other things, to move away from assessment being just an end of  course assessment but being
incorporated into learning methods as it is done so successfully in clinic.  
“10 lessons for new clinicians”
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13 Jarvis P. (2006) The Theory & Practice of  Teaching
2nd edition , London and New York: Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group pp.49–50.
14 Biggs J, Op.cit p.7.
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9. Do not be afraid of assessment
The idea of  assessment in clinical legal education is a debate within itself. Northumbria University
assesses its clinical students and therefore we have had to address the problems which it presents.  
Clinical assessment is very difficult, particularly due to the inevitable subjectivity notwithstanding
the assessment tools to be utilised. A clinician is likely to assess work over a period of  time when
a student may have performed very well but made one very big mistake. The work produced may
be to a very high standard but the student needs to be chased for work. Alternatively a student may
not produce high quality work but try very hard and produce work in a timely fashion. There are
so many variables to take into account such as what weight should we attach to the various
elements that we are likely to look at in assessing students.
The use of  grade descriptors helped us to identify what makes a good student and what makes a
poor student. The students were provided with the grade descriptors at the beginning of  their
clinical experience and therefore knew what was required of  them. The use of  grade descriptors
assists in objectively justifying students’ performance rather than entirely relying upon the
clinician’s view of  the student. However, this does not resolve the problem of  a differentiating
between students who try but do not produce work of  the quality that may be produced by
students who needs to be chased.
10. ENJOY
Our final lesson is to enjoy life as a clinician. Whilst at times being a clinician can be a very
demanding job, it also very rewarding. Witnessing a student develop and grow in confidence is the
reward for the hard work which has been invested. Throughout a clinical career, there will be
numerous issues that arise. However, there is also an international clinical community out there
willing to share its thoughts and ideas through conferences and informal discussions. After all,
many of  the issues we face are universal.  
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Abstract 
This study considers whether participation in pro bono legal work during a 
programme of academic study at Northumbria University increases the 
likelihood of future participation in pro bono activity amongst law students. 
This was a quantitative study in which an online survey, measuring altruistic 
attitudes, was sent to students enrolled on the M Law Exempting degree 
programme at Northumbria University.    The author analysed the data by 
comparing the attitudes of those students who had engaged in pro bono 
activity during the fourth year of the programme against those students who 
had yet to engage in pro bono activity, being those students in Years 1, 2 and 
3 of the programme. 
The data suggests that whilst the students value engagement in pro bono 
activity, this is principally due to the personal benefits which they gain.  In 
particular, respondents reported improvement in legal skills and enhanced 
employability as a consequence of participation in pro bono work.  The data 
indicates that there is an increased awareness of social and economic issues 
whilst engaged in pro bono work but this does not translate into a desire to 
continue pro bono work after graduation. 
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It was therefore concluded that participation in pro bono work during the 
course of academic study does not increase the likelihood of future 
participation in pro bono activity following graduation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The availability of public funding in the UK in relation to legal disputes has 
significantly reduced following the changes to the scope of legal aid under 
the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 coming 
into force on 1 April 2013.1  As many areas of law have been taken out of the 
scope of legal aid, individuals who previously qualified for legal aid will 
either be required to represent themselves or seek an alternative source of 
funding in relation to their case. 
It has been reported that the number of UK-based universities engaging in 
pro bono work has increased. 53% of respondent law schools stated they ran 
a pro bono programme in 20062 increasing to 91% of respondent law schools 
1 The scope of legal aid was limited by the Access to Justice Act 1999.  Areas such as personal injury 
(other than clinical negligence), business cases, boundary disputes, company and trust law were 
removed from the scope of legal aid.  Despite this most areas of law remained within scope although 
funding for representation at most tribunals was not available.  The Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 reduced the scope of legal aid further with the default position 
that all areas were excluded from scope with only a limited number remaining within scope.  
2 Grimes, R. and Musgrove, J. (2006) LawWorks Students Project Pro Bono – The Next Generation. 
[Online] Available at: 
http://www.probonogroup.org.uk/lawworks/docs/Student%20report%20Final.pdf  (last accessed: 
28 January 2015) p.6 
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in 20103, and 96% of respondent law schools in 2014.4  The 2014 report 
suggests that 70% of law schools of pro bono opportunities, assuming those 
that did not respond do not offer any opportunities.5     
As more universities develop pro bono work programmes, and more law 
students have the opportunity to engage in pro bono work, it is plausible to 
suggest that future participation in pro bono activity might increase in the 
profession.    
This study will consider whether participation in pro bono activity whilst at 
law school influences future participation in pro bono activity following 
graduation and in their future careers.  The study will be in the context of the 
M Law Exempting degree programme at Northumbria University. 
 
ALTRUISM AND PRO BONO 
To understand the concept of pro bono and the motivations for individuals 
to undertake pro bono activities, it is necessary to understand the concept of 
altruism as pro bono work is a manifestation of altruism in the legal 
3 Grimes, Richard and Curtis, Martin, LawWorks Student Pro Bono Report 2011, LawWorks [online] 
Available at: 
http://lawworks.org.uk/tmp_downloads/x63c118c111s132z58f116a76p34d16m64y22v10i24l80g83/
lawworks-student-pro-bono-report-2011.pdf (last accessed: 28 January 2015) p.10 
4 Carney, D. Dignan, F, Grimes, R. Kelly, G and Parker, R (2014) The LawWorks Law School Pro Bono 
and Clinic Report 2014 [online] Available at: 
http://lawworks.org.uk/tmp_downloads/k150c69y95y80r23d40x93s30c57g25v44t110q78i113t5/10
14-033-lawworks-student-pro-bono-report-web.pdf (last accessed: 28 January 2015) p.10 
5 Ibid. 
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profession.  Pro bono, or ‘pro bono publico’, literally means ‘for the public 
good’.  However, beyond the literal translation there are many definitions.  
One definition of pro bono comes from the Pro Bono Protocol: 
‘Legal advice or representation provided by lawyers in the public 
interest including to individuals, charities and community groups 
who cannot afford to pay for that advice or representation and where 
public funding and alternative means of funding is not available. 
Legal work is Pro Bono Legal Work only if it is free to the client, 
without payment to the lawyer or law firm (regardless of the 
outcome) and provided voluntarily either by the lawyer or his or her 
firm.’6 
If we consider this definition, pro bono work requires lawyers to act without 
charge or expectation of charging their clients.  As such, it is arguable that in 
the provision of pro bono work, lawyers are displaying altruistic behaviour 
that is ‘generally understood to be behaviour that benefits others at a 
personal cost to the behaving individual.’7  Gleitman et al state that ‘[o]ne of 
our great sources of pride as a species is our ability to exhibit prosocial behav-
iors [sic], behaviors [sic] that help others – assisting them in their various 
activities, supporting and aiding them in their time of need.  But, of course, 
6 LawWorks. (2013). Protocol text. [Online] Available at: http://www.lawworks.org.uk/protocol_text  
(Last accessed: 18 January 2015) 
7 Kerr, B. Godfrey-Smith, P. Feldman, M.W. (2004). ‘What is altruism’. TRENDS in Ecology and 
Evolution. 19(3): 135-140 [Online] DOI:10.1016/j.tree.2003.10.004  (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) 
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we don’t always help.’8  When we do help, it is often based on some 
‘expectation of later reciprocation.’9 
Gleitman et al are of the opinion that true acts of altruism, those acts where 
there is no personal benefit at all, are fairly rare.10  When people are asked 
why they engage in such activities, most state that ‘altruistic actions make 
them better people’.11  It could be argued that this, in itself, could be seen as a 
benefit to the individual concerned.  
Bateson and Shaw have written that understanding altruism from a 
psychological point of view has been dominated by the ‘universal egoism 
hypothesis’, that is, persons act altruistically primarily for egotistical reasons.  
Their work suggests a complementary hypothesis, the ‘empathy-altruism 
hypothesis’ that suggests the notion that both egoism and altruism operate 
simultaneously. It is also suggested that people can act for personal benefit, 
the benefit of others or, indeed, a combination of both.12  
It must therefore be considered whether it is possible to teach or instil a sense 
of altruism through education.  
8 Gleitman, H. Gross, J. and Reisberg, D. (2011). Psychology. 8th edn. London: W.W.Norton & 
Company Ltd p.532 
9 Ibid. p.534 
10 Ibid. 
11 Piliavin & Callero, 1991; M. Snyder & Omoto, 1992 as cited in Gleitman et al, 2011 (See note 6) 
12 Ibid, pp.341-342 
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‘Where Socrates appeared to argue that no one teaches virtues, 
Protagoras argues that everyone teaches them’13  
Aristotle drew a distinction ‘between self-control and virtue applied 
primarily to moral dispositions as honesty, temperance, courage, justice, 
liberality and so on.’14 Values as principled commitments are rules which are 
followed although not wholeheartedly committed.  Values as virtues are 
exhibited and embodied as at least a matter of second nature.15  This is an 
important distinction within the context of this study.  We can teach students 
the rules, such as the professional code of conduct, but can we teach or instil 
a moral commitment to pro bono work, meaning that it becomes second 
nature to our students. 
It has been a matter of some debate as to the role of higher education in 
teaching students not just knowledge but also social virtues.  Heuser argues 
that ‘when moral and ethical considerations are built into every aspect of the 
primary activities of higher education-research, teaching and public service-
the ability of colleges and universities to create academic social cohesion is 
greatly amplified, as is their propensity to generate social cohesion in 
13 Pence, G.E. (1983) ‘Can compassion be taught’. J Med Ethics. 9(4):189-91 [Online] Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1059297/pdf/jmedeth00011-0005.pdf  
(Last accessed: 18 January 2015) p.189 
14 Carr, D. (2011), ‘Values, virtues and professional development in education and teaching’, 
International Journal of Educational Research, 50(3), pp.171-176, [Online] 
DOI:10.1016/j.ijer.2011.07.004 (Last accessed: 18 January 2015), p.172 
15 Ibid. p.173 
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society.’16  Lewis observes that ‘universities have forgotten their larger 
educational role… that the fundamental job of undergraduate education is to 
turn eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds into twenty-one- and twenty two-year-
olds, to help them grow up, to learn who they are, to search for a larger 
purpose for their lives, and to leave college as better human beings.’17  
 
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION AND PRO BONO 
There are many academic articles considering Clinical Legal Education and 
Pro Bono.  McCrimmon states that ‘while clinical courses and pro bono 
projects share common attributes, they are separate and distinct entities.’18 
McCrimmon draws upon the Association of American Law Schools Pro Bono 
Project Report, Learning to Serve, to illustrate his point.  In particular, the 
Report states: 
‘Both clinics and pro bono programs serve important educational 
values. They each provide students an opportunity to learn about the 
legal needs of people who are poor. They each provide an opportunity 
to learn about the satisfactions of serving a client. But the principal 
goal of most clinics is to teach students lawyering skills and sensitivity 
16 Heuser, B. L. (2007) ‘Academic social cohesion within higher education’, Prospects 37, pp.293-303. 
[Online] DOI 10.1007/s11125-008-9036-3 (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) 
17 Lewis, H. R. (2007) Excellence without a Soul: Does Liberal Education Have a Future? United States: 
PublicAffairs p. xiv 
18 McCrimmon, L. A. (2003) ‘Mandating a Culture of Service: Pro Bono in the Law School Curriculum’, 
LegEdRev 4 [Online] Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/LegEdRev/2003/4.html 
(Last accessed: 18 January 2015) 
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to ethical issues through structured practice experiences and 
opportunities to think about and analyze those experiences. By 
contrast, the most important single function of pro bono projects is to 
open students' eyes to the ethical responsibility of lawyers to 
contribute their services.’19 
Whilst the Report states there are similarities between clinical legal education 
and pro bono, it states that they are different in their objectives.  However, 
Bloch identifies that the ‘original “subject matter” of clinical legal education 
was essentially legal aid and public interest practice’20 whilst Ellman et al 
state that ‘one goal of clinical teaching is to foster, and to carry on, legal 
practice in the public interest.  But our understanding of this goal is 
changing, and so is our understanding of the means by which it might be 
achieved.’21  It appears the objective of clinical legal education has 
historically been public interest practice and therefore clinical legal education 
is a form of pro bono practice.  However, Bloch goes on to identify that 
‘[s]ome have felt recently that a more deliberate skills orientation is needed 
in clinical scholarship.’22  It appears that it is this focus on skills development 
that differentiates clinic from pro bono.  However, it is also arguable that 
19 Association of American Law Schools Commission on Pro Bono and Public Service Opportunities, 
(undated), ‘Learning to Serve: The Commission’s Findings and Proposed Actions’, [Online] Available 
at http://aalsfar.com/probono/report2.html#findings (Last accessed 18 January 2015) 
20 Bloch, F.S. (2004) ‘The case for clinical scholarship’ 4 Int’l J. Clinical Legal Educ. pp.7-21. HeinOnline 
[Online] Available at http://heinonline.org (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) p.12 
21 Ellmann, S. Gunning, I.R. and Hertz, R (1994), ‘Why not a clinical lawyer-journal?’, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 
pp.1-7, HeinOnline [Online] Available at: http://heinonline.org (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) 
22 Op.cit. note 18, p.13 
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individuals conduct pro bono work for reasons other than altruistic reasons 
of benefiting society. 
Setting aside the definition of clinical legal education and pro bono, clinical 
legal education has the potential to be used as a tool to increase a student’s 
sense of social awareness.  Grose identifies clinical education as having ‘three 
broad goals: providing learning for transfer; exposing students to issues of 
social jus-tice; [sic] and offering opportunities to practice lawyering skills.’23  
For the purposes of this study, it is the second goal, namely the exposure to 
social justice, which the author was interested in exploring and the extent to 
which this goal is being achieved.  However, it will be necessary to include 
the other goals in order to consider whether there is more than one 
motivating factor. 
It is suggested that ‘encouraging law students to become involved in pro 
bono work is likely to develop their commitment to, and understanding of, 
professional values, which should in turn lead to their active involvement in 
pro bono work later in their professional lives.’24 
Giddings comments that clinics ‘are often identified as important in 
enhancing the commitment of students to professional ideals and values, 
23 Grose, C. (2013) ‘Beyond Skills Training, Revisited: The Clinical Education Spiral’ Clinical L. Rev. 19, 
pp. 489-515 HeinOnline [Online]. Available at: http://heinonline.org (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) 
p. 493 
24 Op.cit. note 2 
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fostering the values that promote pro bono contributions.’25 However, 
Giddings goes on to recognise that these claims are difficult to support with 
empirical data.26 
In considering whether clinical programmes influence students’ sense of 
ethical and social awareness, Schrag and Meltsner recognise that there are no 
empirical studies that compare law graduates who took clinic with those 
who did not.27  However, they go on to state that ‘many thousands of 
lawyers have begun their careers much better able to take responsibility for 
helping clients, with much greater understanding of how social institutions 
really work, and with greatly heightened awareness of ethical issues and 
how to address them.’28 Palermo and Evans recognised this issue and stated 
‘a central motive for undertaking [their] study was the need for empirical 
information about lawyers’ responses to ethical challenge over time’.29  
Interestingly, and contrary to the stated aims of clinical legal education, 
Palermo and Evans study suggests that students who had a clinical 
experience were less interested in pro bono work over time.30 
25 Giddings, J. (2013) Promoting Justice Through Clinical Legal Education Melbourne: Justice Press, p. 
64 
26 ibid 
27 Schrag, P.G and Meltsner, M. (1998) Reflections on Clinical Legal Education Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, p.9 
28 ibid 
29 Palermo, J. and Evans, A. (2008), ‘Almost There: Empirical Insights into Clinical Method and Ethics 
Courses in Climbing the Hill towards Lawyers’ Professionalism’, 17 Griffith L. Rev., pp.252-284, 
HeinOnline [Online] Available at http://heinonline.org (Last accessed 18 January 2015) p.253 
30 Ibid. p272 
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There have also been a number of studies, conducted in the United States, 
regarding the impact of pro bono programmes at law schools. 
Granfield states that:  
‘While there has been anecdotal evidence supporting the value of law 
school pro bono, no institution has taken an empirical examination of 
the impact of pro bono participation on law school graduates.  This 
seems to suggest that many proponents of law school pro bono view 
such policies as an unqualified public good that is consistent with the 
service ideals of the legal profession.’31 
Rhode undertook what may be considered the first empirical analysis of 
lawyers and their attitudes towards pro bono work.32  Rhode reports that 
59% of the lawyers surveyed cited a desire for a financially rewarding and 
secure career as the reason for choosing a legal career.  The next most 
common motivations were finding intellectual challenges (52%) and keeping 
options open (41%).  Only 31% of the respondents indicated a desire to 
promote social justice whilst 29% stated that they wanted to prepare for 
public service.33 
Rhode goes on to state that fewer than a third of the respondents had 
changed their objective during law school.  Of the respondents who did 
31 Granfield, R. (2007). ‘Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: Results on Impact of 
Mandatory Pro Bono Programs’ Buff. L. Rev. 54: 1355-1412 Heinonline [Online] Available at: 
http://heinonline.org (Last accessed: 18 January 2015), p.1372 
32 Rhode, D L. (2003) ‘Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice’. J. Legal Educ. 53:413-464 HeinOnline 
[Online]. Available at: http://heinonline.org (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) 
33 Ibid p. 454 
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report a shift in attitude, a ‘significant number’ reported a change in attitude 
concerning pro bono and public interest work.  A fifth (22%) of these 
respondents reported that a positive law school experience had encouraged 
involvement in pro bono activity, whilst about a fifth (19%) reported a 
negative law school experience had ‘dampened’ their desire to do pro bono 
work.  Other factors steering lawyers away from public interest work 
included student loans and differential salary levels.34  Rhode states that her 
study fails to confirm the belief that a law school pro bono experience 
increases the likelihood of continued pro bono contributions.  A positive 
experience with ‘public interest work’ can have a significant impact, but such 
an experience need not come from a ‘pro bono placement’ nor does a pro 
bono placement ensure a positive experience.35 
Granfield reports that 58% of respondents to his survey believed they had 
acquired valuable legal skills from their participation in pro bono activity at 
law school whilst 28% report that their pro bono experience helped them 
acquire their initial job after graduation.36  Further, Granfield also comments 
that, ‘contrary to anecdotal evidence, half the respondents did not believe 
34 Ibid p. 455 
35 Ibid p. 457 
36 Op.cit. note 29 p.1379 
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their law school pro bono experiences made them more committed to doing 
pro bono work as a practicing attorney.’37  
Both Granfield38 and Rhode39 cite commitment to public service and a sense 
of personal satisfaction as the principle motivations for conducting pro bono 
work whilst factors such as enhancement of legal skills were of secondary 
importance. 
The data from the studies carried out by both Granfield and Rhode produce 
very similar conclusions, both casting doubt on the notion that you can 
promote pro bono work in the legal profession by exposing law students to 
pro bono during law school.  However, in Granfield’s opinion it is ‘still too 
early to perform a post-mortem on the law school pro bono movement.’40  He 
goes on to state that ‘[m]any respondents… reported that their law school 
pro bono experiences were not well integrated into their overall education… 
For the law school pro bono movement to have an impact, the pro bono 
experiences of law students must be better integrated into the general law 
school curriculum.’41 
Whilst the studies of Granfield and Rhode provide substantial evidence for 
the proposition that law school pro bono programmes do not influence the 
37 ibid 
38 Ibid p. 1399 
39 Op.cit. note 30 pp. 446-447 
40 Op.cit note 29 p. 1412 
41 ibid 
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attitudes of students in relation to their future career, it is noted that both 
studies consider data drawn from practising lawyers rather than current 
students.    It is arguable that in both studies, respondents’ answers may have 
varied had they taken the survey whilst at law school or shortly after leaving 
law school.  It is plausible to consider that their attitudes have been shaped 
by their experiences since leaving law school. 
Additionally, as Granfield recognises himself, the respondents’ attitudes 
could be shaped by their experience at law school.42  In particular, Granfield 
refers to better integrating the pro bono experience into legal education.43  
Schmedemann has also considered whether a pro bono participation in law 
schools encourages future participation whilst in practice.  This study, which 
considered a voluntary pro bono programme, found a significant correlation 
between participation in a law school pro bono programme and participation 
in practice.  A further correlation was shown between attitudinal 
dispositions related to pro social values and pro bono involvement in 
practice.44 
The research indicates that there is no definitive answer to which clinical and 
pro bono programmes enhance students.  
42 ibid 
43 ibid 
44 Schmedemann, D. (2009), ‘Priming for pro bono: The impact of Law School on Pro Bono 
Participation in Practice’ in Granfield, R. and Mather, L. (eds) Private Lawyers in the Public Interest, 
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.73-94, p.79 
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ALTRUISM AND OTHER PROFESSIONS 
It may also be useful to consider attitudes towards altruism in other 
professions as altruistic attitudes are often seen as ‘a defining characteristic of 
professionalism.’45 Of note is a study by Coulter et al that compared the 
altruistic attitudes of business, law and medical students.46  Coulter et al 
report that 3% of business students and 17% of law students felt that working 
with the poor was important to their careers.  However a significantly higher 
percentage (33% of business students and 40% of law students) ‘felt that 
doctors should be required to provide medical care to the poor.’47 
Cruess, states that altruism is thought to be a defining characteristic of 
professionalism and a key feature of medical practice.48  However, Roche et 
al, drawing upon Coulehan and Williams, state that ‘in medical education, 
students go through a maturational process that some claim undermines any 
idealism they may have had upon entering.’49  They go on to state that ‘some 
45 Cruess and Cruess, 1997 as cited in Coulter, I. D. Wilkes, M. Der-Martirosian, C. (2007). ‘Altruism 
revisitied: a comparison of medical, law and business student’ altruistic attitudes’ Medical Education. 
41: 341-345 [Online] DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-2929.2007.02716.x, (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) p.342  
46 Coulter, I. D. Wilkes, M. Der-Martirosian, C. (2007). ‘Altruism revisitied: a comparison of medical, 
law and business student’ altruistic attitudes’ Medical Education. 41: 341-345 [Online] DOI: 
10.1111/j.1365-2929.2007.02716.x (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) 
47 Ibid p. 345 
48 Ibid p. 342 
49 Roche III, W. P., Scheetz, A. P., Dane, F. C., Parish, D. C. and O’Shea, J. T. (2003). ‘Medical Students’ 
Attitudes in a PBL Curriculum: Trust, Altruism, and Cynicism’ Academic Medicine 78(4):398-402. p. 
398 
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educators note that some students who enter medical school with 
compassion and altruism become more cynical.’50  
Problem based learning and an early introduction to clinical medicine were 
considered two possible changes that could address the cynicism observed in 
medical students.51  It is reported that the effect of problem-based learning 
curriculum has been seen to prevent a more cynical or less altruistic attitude 
from developing in medical students and has in fact had a positive effect on 
their attitudes towards altruism.52  
Wear and Zarconi highlight the effect of role modelling on the attitudes of 
students.53  They draw upon the work of Coulehan that urges an 
environmental change via role modelling: 
‘The first requirement for a sea change in professionalism is to increase 
dramatically the number of role model physicians at every stage of 
medical education.  By role model physicians I mean full-time faculty 
members who exemplify personal virtue in their interactions with 
patients, staff and trainees; who have a broad, humanistic perspective; 
and who are devoted to teaching and willing to forego high income in 
order to teach….[sic] Their presence would dilute and diminish the 
conflict between tacit and explicit values, especially in the hospital 
and the clinic.  The teaching environment would contain fewer hidden 
50 ibid 
51 Ibid p. 399 
52 Ibid p. 402 
53 Wear, D and Zarconi, J. (2008) ‘Can Compassion be Taught? Let’s Ask Our Students’ J Gen Intern 
Med 23(7):948-953. [Online] DOI: 10.1007/s11606-007-0501-0 (Last accessed: 21 August 2013) 
99
messages that say “Detach” while at the same time overt messages are 
saying “Engage.”  What trainees need is time and humanism’54  
This argument puts forward the idea that students can learn virtue through 
role modelling and therefore if they are taught by individuals who 
themselves exhibit virtues, and as such are positive role models, then this 
will in turn have a positive effect on the students.  However, Wear and 
Zarconi also recognise that having ‘a few positive role models in a clinical 
setting will not do the trick.’55  Pence states: 
‘Morality is not learned the way one learns to play a flute or to do a 
tracheotomy by observing a ‘master’ proficient in a certain craft or 
technique.  Compassion similarly is not learned from a Master of 
Compassion (or the chief role-model thereof).  Instead it is developed 
or not by the ‘shape’ of the medical environment in which students 
learn medicine.  The overall medical context in which students thrive 
or stagnate is more important than the efforts (however noble) of any 
one individual.’56 
The literature above suggests that one must look at the whole educational 
institution.  Whilst the empirical evidence to date suggests that pro bono and 
clinical legal education does not instil a sense of public service, or altruism 
54 ibid 
55 ibid 
56 Op.cit note 11 p. 190 
100
within law students, there is explicit criticism of the programmes that 
students perceive as ‘not well integrated into their overall legal education.’57   
It is clear from the literature that there is little empirical evidence regarding 
the participation in pro bono and clinical legal education programmes, or 
indeed other altruistic activities, and the influence this has on students’ 
altruistic attitudes and their participation in altruistic activity during their 
career.  The literature in relation to legal education, particularly with 
reference to clinical legal education and pro bono, suggests that altruism is 
considered a key aim.  However, the empirical research by Rhode and 
Granfield does not support this assertion. 
There have been small-scale studies within medicine suggesting that altruism 
can be instilled through role modelling and the environment in which 
students learn.  The study carried out by Roche et al concludes that students 
were not any less altruistic than their junior counterparts as a consequence of 
problem-based learning.58  This study relates to retaining altruistic attitudes 
rather than instilling them. This can therefore arguably be distinguished 
from the present study on the basis that it is about instilling altruism rather 
than retaining it. Further, despite the conclusions, the authors could not 
establish whether the results were as a consequence of more women 
57 Op.cit note 29 p. 1412 
58 Op.cit note 47 p. 402 
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attending medical school rather than the introduction of problem-based 
learning into the curriculum.   
The study by Wear and Zarconi utilised a qualitative approach and as such it 
is difficult to generalise the findings.  The authors identify a limitation in 
their own research that only 46% of potential respondents gave permission to 
participate in the study.  Again, this limits the generalisation of the results.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Whilst the above-mentioned studies each have their limitations, the data 
drawn from each is useful in designing the research for this study.  The 
model of legal education at Northumbria University, and in particular the M 
Law Exempting degree is an integrated model with clinical legal education at 
its core.  The programme is described as one where ‘[s]tudents are 
introduced to legal rules and concepts on both their theoretical and practical 
contexts from day one.  They engage in clinical and experiential learning 
throughout the course culminating in full case work on behalf of real clients 
in the final year.’59 As such, it is arguable that the M Law Exempting degree 
is the integrated model described by Granfield. 
59 Northumbria University. (2012) LLB (Hons)/M Law Exempting Full-time. Available at: 
http://www.northumbria.ac.uk/sd/academic/law/courses/ug/innovative/mlawexempting/  
(Last accessed: 18 January 2015) 
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In the fourth year of the programme, students participate in the Student Law 
Office module.  This is a credit-bearing module where student advise and 
represent real clients.  Students can also participate in extra curricula 
activities such as StreetLaw throughout any year of the programme.  The 
programme integrates problem-based learning and clinical elements in 
earlier years which, as identified above, have the potential to mean students 
are less cynical and have a positive effect on their altruistic attitudes.  
The model of legal education adopted by Northumbria University also 
appears to align with the models discussed above in medical education.  
Northumbria University has arguably created an environment where 
students are taught by lawyers, from who they can model themselves.  It is 
therefore to be seen whether the Northumbria University model, integrating 
legal education and pro bono work can instil a sense of altruism in students 
and encourage participation in future pro bono activity. 
This study received ethical approval from Northumbria University. 
A questionnaire (see Annex A) was sent electronically to all students 
studying on the M Law Exempting Degree programme at Northumbria 
University in the academic year 2012/13.  Respondents to the survey were 
anonymous.   
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The survey was designed to elicit information regarding students attitudes to 
pro bono work at university, whether mandatory or voluntary.  ‘Pro bono’ 
was defined in the survey as ‘the provision of legal services without charge 
to the client’.  This is a wide definition and encompasses the clinical legal 
education module carried out in the Student Law Office as no charge is made 
to the client.  However, students were also asked about their volunteering 
outside of university.  ‘Voluntary work’ was defined as ‘work without 
reward other than expenses’.  Voluntary work could be either legal or non-
legal.  This study considers the altruistic ethos of the students and therefore, 
it does not matter whether this is manifested by legal or non-legal work.  
Voluntary work is unlikely to fall within any definition of clinical legal 
education as it is not conducted through the university.  However, it may fall 
within the definition of pro bono if the provision of legal service is not 
mandated.  The survey utilised Likert scales, rankings and free text boxes to 
elicit to attitudinal responses. 
The questionnaire was sent to a total of 1010 students. The breakdown of 
student numbers by year group: 
Year 1 – 348 students 
Year 2 – 288 students 
Year 3 – 198 students 
Year 4 – 176 students 
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A descriptive statistical analysis was used to provide a profile of the 
respondents, outlining their experiences and their attitudes towards pro 
bono and voluntary work.  A Mann-Whitney U-Test60 was conducted to 
determine statistical significance of the relationship between students’ pro 
bono experience and their altruistic attitudes as well as their attitudes 
towards future participation in pro bono activity. 
The survey had a low response rate with a total of 44 questionnaires 
returned.  7 questionnaires were returned from each of the Year 1, 2 and 3 
groups whilst 23 questionnaires were returned from Year 4.   
 
DISCUSSION   
Data analysis suggests that the primary motivation behind both pro bono 
work and voluntary work is for personal benefit.  Respondents also valued 
the skills development and enhanced employment prospects rather than the 
altruistic benefits of carrying out such work. 
60 There is debate as to whether parametric tests, such as t-tests, are appropriate for ordinal data.  
See Jamieson, S. (2004) ‘Likert scale: how to (ab)use them’ Medical Education. 38:1212-1218 [Online] 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-2929.2004.02012.x (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) and Norman, G. (2010) 
‘Likert scales, levels of measurement and the “laws” of statistics’ Adv in Health Sci Educ 15:625-632 
[Online] DOI: 10.1007//s10459-010-9222-y (Last accessed: 18 January 2015).  As the data collected 
was ordinal, it was deemed a non-parametric test was deemed the appropriate statistical test for 
this study.  
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Generally, students in Year 1 (n=6), Year 2 (n=7) and Year 3 (n=5) stated that 
they did not currently undertake any pro bono work as part of their 
programme of study.  One Year 1 (n=1) student stated that they did not know 
whether they undertook pro bono work as part of their programme of study 
whilst one Year 3 (n=1) student stated they did not know and one Year 3 
(n=1) student stated they did undertake pro bono work as part of their 
programme of study.  Nineteen Year 4 (n=19) students responded to the 
question, all of whom undertook pro bono work as part of their programme 
of study. Four Year 4 (n=4) students did not respond to this question.  
Figure 1 below illustrates the perceptions of students who had undertaken 
pro bono work as part of their programme of study compared with those 
who had not.  Students were asked whether they agreed or not with the 
following statements in relation to pro bono work as part of their programme 
of study: 
• Pro bono improves legal skills; 
• Pro bono assists in obtaining employment; 
• Pro bono work improves academic performance; 
• Pro bono work increases awareness of social and economic issues; 
• Pro bono work changes perception of social and economic issues; and 
• Pro bono work increases likelihood of continuing pro bono work after 
graduation. 
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Figure 1   
 
It can been seen that the respondents expected pro bono work to provide a 
personal benefit to them; such as improved legal skills and enhanced 
employability, and further, the respondents who have engaged in pro bono 
work perceive that they have been rewarded with these benefits.  This 
perhaps supports the educational imperative of pro bono work as part of a 
programme of study but does not assist in determining whether students are 
instilled with a sense of altruism. 
Figure 1 also suggests that there was marginally more appreciation of social 
and economic issues.  It is plausible that this is due to the fact that students 
are faced with real legal issues and therefore have a greater appreciation of 
107
the problems society faces.  However, further research of a qualitative nature 
would be required to investigate this. 
Despite an apparent greater appreciation for social and economic issues, it is 
highlighted that respondents were neutral to the statement as to whether 
they would participate in future pro bono activity following graduation.  
This may indicate that participation in pro bono activity at law school may 
not encourage future participation in pro bono activity.  Further research is 
required to establish why respondents are of this view.  
89% (n=34) of respondents reported that they undertook, or had undertaken, 
voluntary work.  Further, there appears to be no correlation between 
students participating in pro bono work at university and an undertaking of 
voluntary work outside their programme of study as 76% (n=16) of 
respondents from Years 1, 2 and 3 stated they undertook, or had undertaken, 
voluntary work whilst 78% (n=18) of respondents from Year 4 undertook 
voluntary work.  This may suggest that the respondents had an altruistic 
ethos and supports the view that individuals with an interest in the subject 
matter of the survey are inclined to respond.  This may highlight the problem 
of non-response bias, and in particular that because those responding are 
self-selecting, their views are unlikely to represent the views of the 
population as a whole.  This is particularly so given the low response rate to 
the survey. As the independent variable in this study is whether or not 
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students have participated in pro bono work at law school, it is irrelevant 
that the survey is unlikely to represent the views of the whole student cohort 
on the M Law Exempting degree.   
In any event, when the rationale behind the voluntary work is analysed, this 
suggests that respondents may not be so altruistic.  Only 26% (n=8) of the 
respondents who provided a reason for undertaking voluntary work 
reported a reason without personal benefit to themselves such as helping 
people or ‘giving something back’. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that a higher percentage did provide some 
altruistic motive, many of these respondents also provided a reason 
encompassing some personal benefit such as enhanced employability.  36% 
(n=12) of respondents did not cite any altruistic motive for undertaking 
voluntary work. 
The reasons for engaging in both pro bono and voluntary work appear to 
show that respondents generally have a desire to attain some personal gain 
from their altruistic actions, and results are therefore consistent with the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis espoused by Bateson and Shaw, as cited in 
Coulter et al.61 
61 Op.cit. note 44 
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This concept must therefore be borne in mind when considering whether 
conducting pro bono work at law school can instil an altruistic ethos in 
students.   
If we first consider the perceived benefits of undertaking pro bono by those 
students yet to undertake pro bono work against the those students who had 
undertaken pro bono work, it is apparent that the common expected benefit 
is some form of personal gain.  This includes improved legal skills, enhanced 
employability and improved academic performance.  The respondents were 
in general agreement that they do or will benefit from the pro bono 
experience. 
When considering the altruistic benefits, respondents who had not 
undertaken any pro bono work did not really consider these benefits to be an 
issue, providing neutral responses to the statements.  However, respondents 
who had undertaken pro bono work at law school did report a change in 
attitude.  They strongly agreed that pro bono work had increased their 
awareness of social and economic issues.  They also agreed that pro bono 
work had changed their perception of social and economic issues.  This is 
indicative that whilst students may not undertake pro bono work for 
altruistic reasons, the work they carry out can potentially influence their 
attitudes going forwards.  Whilst the primary motivation for engaging in pro 
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bono activity is personal, it is plausible to conclude that students, through 
exposure to social issues, do gain a degree of altruistic appreciation. 
Whilst many law schools engage primarily in clinical legal education and pro 
bono work due to the educational value, there are other benefits associated 
with the provision of pro bono work for society as a whole. 
The data suggests that it is the personal benefits of clinical legal education 
and pro bono work that students value more than any social benefit.  When 
asked to rank statements, respondents ranked enhanced employment62 and 
enhanced legal skills63 as the most important reasons to undertake pro bono 
work at law school.  Statements reflecting altruistic motives, such as 
improving awareness of social issues64 and encourage future involvement in 
pro bono activity65 were ranked lower by both groups.   
Whilst the work may increase a student’s social awareness, it may not 
influence their future behaviour.  Respondents, whether having carried out 
pro bono work or not at law school, were neutral when it came to the 
statement as to whether they would carry out pro bono work following 
graduation as shown in figure 1 above.  As such, this suggests that the benefit 
to society as a whole may be of limited value.  The provision of pro bono and 
clinical programmes at law school is unlikely to result in a generation of 
62 Both groups, Years 1, 2 and 3 and Year 4 students, gave a median rank of 2 
63 Years 1,2 and 3 gave a median rank of 2 whilst Year 4 gave a median rank of 2.5 
64 Both groups gave a median rank of 4 
65 Both groups gave a media rank of 5 
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altruistic lawyers providing free legal advice in the future.  However, by 
utilising the educational value of this activity, law schools can go some way 
towards meeting the needs of society themselves.  In essence, if more law 
schools adopt a mandatory pro bono/clinical programme, this will create 
capacity for the public to obtain free legal advice from the law school itself 
and as such go some way towards filling the legal advice gap.  
However, attitudes did differ in relation to whether law schools should offer 
mandatory or voluntary pro bono opportunities.  Respondents who had not 
undertaken mandatory pro bono work as part of their programme were 
neutral as to whether law schools should offer mandatory pro bono 
programmes.  Respondents who had undertaken pro bono work expressed a 
stronger opinion that students should undertake pro bono work as a 
mandatory part of their programme of study; the difference between the two 
groups of respondents was statistically significant.66  Whilst the median 
suggested both groups agreed that there should be voluntary pro bono 
opportunities at law school, those respondents who had not undertaken a 
mandatory programme held a stronger opinion.  However, this difference 
was not statistically significant67. The data suggests that whilst students do 
value pro bono work within their programme of study.  Students who have 
not had the opportunity to undertake pro bono work want voluntary 
66U=102.000, p=.022  
67 U=158.500 p=.534 
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opportunities to do so, whilst students who have done pro bono work state 
that students should do so.  It is likely that this is due to the personal benefits 
that the students gain as a consequence of pro bono work rather than the 
social benefit of such work. 
The data appears to be consistent with the earlier studies carried out by 
Granfield and Rhode.  In particular, it is noted that the data suggests 
students are not more inclined to engage in future pro bono work if they 
have participated in pro bono activity whilst at law school.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
The low response rate is a clear limitation in relation to this study.  The 
principle issue relates to external validity of the results as clearly it is difficult 
to generalise to results across all students enrolled on the M Law exempting 
degree.  As Norman points out, ‘[i]t is difficult to argue that 2 physicians or 3 
nursing students are representative of anything…’68  However, this study 
does not purport to generalise the views of all students on the M Law 
Exempting degree.  This study is principally concerned with establishing 
whether there is a link between pro bono engagement in law school and the 
likelihood of future pro bono activity.  As this research has elicited a similar 
68 Norman, G. (2010) ‘Likert scales, levels of measurement and the “laws” of statistics’ Adv in Health 
Sci Educ 15:625-632 [Online] DOI: 10.1007//s10459-010-9222-y (Last accessed: 18 January 2015), 
p.628 
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number of responses from those students engaged in pro bono activity, and 
those students who are yet to engage in pro bono activity, a comparative 
descriptive analysis can still be made.  Moreover, whilst it has been 
suggested that the response rate was linked to the attitudes of the student 
towards pro bono there are a number of alternate and non-exclusive 
explanations.  For example, the students may have had other commitments 
such as exams or coursework.  Alternatively there may have been survey 
fatigue as they are faced with numerous surveys at the end of the academic 
year. 
A further limitation of this study is that it relates to students studying on the 
M Law Exempting degree at Northumbria University.  The author makes no 
claims regarding the application of the data to other students or institutions 
and it is recognised that further research is required although the findings 
cannot be generalised. 
Norman also highlights a further issue with small sample sizes, namely that 
there may be concern about normal distributions.69  By utilising the Mann-
Whitney U-test, there were no presumptions that the data was normally 
distributed in the performance of the statistical analysis.  Likert scales often 
have skewed or polarised distribution70 and this was considered at the 
69 Ibid. 
70 Jamieson, S. (2004) ‘Likert scale: how to (ab)use them’ Medical Education. 38:1212-1218 [Online] 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-2929.2004.02012.x (Last accessed: 18 January 2015) p.1218 
114
design stage as outlined above.  However, by utilising the Mann-Whitney U-
test, it is acknowledged that it is not as sensitive to statistical significance and 
therefore it may be that the data has not been tested as robustly as it might 
otherwise have been.  However, for the reasons outlined above, it was 
deemed inappropriate to use alternative tests such as the t-test. 
There is a further issue relating to the internal validity of the research.  In so 
far as any causal relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables are suggested, it is noted that correlation does not necessarily mean 
causation.  This study merely aims to establish a potential relationship 
between pro bono activity at law school and the likelihood of future pro 
bono activity.  
A further limitation of this study relates to the reliability of the data, and in 
particular, reference should be made to the stability.  The author highlights 
above that identifies respondents answers can change over the course of 
time.  This is seen as an inherent issue within social research concerning 
attitudes as individual attitudes can alter over the course of time.  However, 
with this in mind, the data is consistent with the studies of Granfield (2007) 





Whilst acknowledging the limitations of this study and that there is scope for 
further research, it does suggest that participation in pro bono work whilst at 
Northumbria University is not likely to increase the likelihood of future 
participation in pro bono activity following graduation. 
The study supports the limited literature currently available indicating that 
law school pro bono programmes do little, if anything, to instil a sense of 
altruism in law students.  However, the data further suggests that students 
value pro bono programmes and it is perceived that they carry substantial 
personal benefits.  In particular, students report improved legal skills and 
enhanced employability.  It is suggested that for these reasons, pro bono 
programmes are worthwhile and it is plausible to conclude there is value to 











POLICY AND EDUCATION DEVELOPMENTS
Edited by Richard Owen
Litigants in person: is there a role for higher education?
Introduction
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO)
does not require any introduction to most, if not all readers. As of 1 April
2013, many areas of law were taken out of the scope of legal aid, meaning it
is more difficult for individuals to obtain public funding in relation to legal
disputes.
There is no statistical data available demonstrating the direct effects of
LASPO on the number of litigants in person (LiPs) within the court system.
Further, it would be difficult to collect accurate data on overall effects as it is
assumed many individuals may not commence legal proceedings due to the
unavailability of advice and representation at the outset of the case.
Conversely, some individuals may commence proceedings which they
would not have done had they received advice. However, the consensus is
that the number of LiPs within the court system has significantly increased.
There are several areas where the increasing number of LiPs has had an
impact on the court system. Whilst there will be LiPs who are competent to
represent themselves, the research indicates that LiPs will experience pro-
blems including understanding evidential requirements, difficulties with
forms and identifying the facts relevant to their case.1 As a consequence,
there are also impacts on other parties and the court. Examples of these
include the challenges faced by court staff and judges in dealing with cases
effectively but without giving advice or the appearance of bias and repre-
sentatives doing extra work to compensate for the lack of representation on
the other side.2
The Ministry of Justice, recognising the problems faced by LiPs and the
consequential problems faced by the court system, announced that it will
provide £2 million to increase the level of court-based support for LiPs. It is
anticipated that this support will enable LiPs to access practical support and
information as well providing a route to free or affordable legal advice. The
1KimWilliams, “Litigants in Person: A Literature Review” (June 2011), p. 5, available at https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217374/litigants-in-person-literature-
review.pdf (accessed 1 December 2014).
2Ibid.
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money will be divided amongst a number of organisations providing support
to litigants including the Personal Support Unit (PSU), LawWorks, Law for Life
and the RCJ Advice Bureau.3
Provision of court-based advice and support is therefore at the forefront
of efforts to address the problems raised by LiPs. This is also recognised in the
number of court-based schemes being set up across England and Wales to
provide assistance. The Personal Support Unit and RCJ Advice are arguably
the most well known of these schemes. However, other schemes have also
been established by the legal profession and universities. This article will
consider whether universities can, and perhaps more importantly should,
play a role in supporting LiPs.
Assisting LiPs in England and Wales
LiPs are not a new phenomenon within the legal system of England and
Wales. RCJ Advice Bureau was established in 1978 at the Royal Courts of
Justice (RCJ) to help LiPs navigate the court system and comply with the civil
procedure rules. Free legal advice and assistance are provided by qualified
solicitors on the procedural aspects of the case, applications to the court and
referrals to a free representation service.
The PSU was subsequently established in 2001 at the RCJ, and has
extended its service to other courts, to help people facing civil court proceed-
ings without legal representation. The assistance provided by the PSU can
vary from practical help with tasks, such as filling in forms, to the emotional
and moral support of being accompanied in hearings. It should be noted that
the PSU does not provide legal advice or act on the individual’s behalf in
proceedings.
The Civil Justice Council published a report in November 2011 entitled
Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-Represented Litigants). The
report addressed what steps could be taken to improve access to justice for
LiPs and how to prepare for an increasing number.4 The report made a
series of recommendations considering the range of people and organisa-
tions involved in the legal system and the assistance they could offer. This
included the judiciary, court staff, lawyers, advice agencies and McKenzie
friends. The report also noted the assistance that could be provided by law
students.
Law school participation in assisting individuals within the legal system is
nothing new. A survey by LawWorks states that at least 70% of all law schools
3Ministry of Justice, “More Support for Separating Couples and Parents”, 23 October 2014, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/more-support-for-separating-couples-and-parents (accessed
1 December 2014).
4Civil Justice Council, Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-Represented Litigants)
(November 2011), p. 7, available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/
report-on-access-to-justice-for-litigants-in-person-nov2011.pdf (accessed 1 December 2014).
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are now involved in pro bono and/or clinical activity.5 The range of activities
includes public legal education programmes, advice only clinics and full
representation clinics. It is apparent from the survey results that many law
schools are actively involved in assisting individuals with legal advice and/or
representation already.
However, recent years have seen a rise in the number of court-based
schemes purporting to assist LiPs.
CLOCK (Community Legal Outreach Collaboration Keele) was publicly
launched by Keele University in October 2012. By working with a number
of partner organisations, law students provide help and support to disadvan-
taged communities through legal research, policy work and community legal
education.6 A particular aspect of the scheme to note is the Community Legal
Companions where law students are trained to provide unrepresented liti-
gants with practical assistance throughout the legal process such as filling in
applications, sorting through paperwork and taking notes in proceedings.7
Sheffield Hallam University has established a helpdesk at Sheffield
Combined Court to provide advice and assistance to LiPs in small claims
matters.8 Northumbria University is working in partnership with the PSU and
has established a service at Newcastle Combined Court to assist litigants in
civil and family proceedings.9 Whilst the PSU has recruited student volunteers
for a number of years, it is understood that this is the first time it has worked
in partnership with a university to establish a service, with a memorandum of
understanding and funding.
It is noted that the practical assistance provided by students under each
of the schemes outlined above is limited. There is a potential danger in
providing incomplete or generalised information. However students, and
possibly qualified lawyers, would find it difficult to provide detailed legal
advice at the court, often needed immediately before the hearing.
Nevertheless, they are providing valuable emotional and moral support to
LiPs, and potentially identifying cases where further advice and assistance
would be available, such as those who are still eligible for legal aid.
5Damian Carney, Frank Dignan, Richard Grimes, Grace Kelly and Rebecca Parker, The LawWorks
Law School Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014, p. 4, available at http://lawworks.org.uk/tmp_downloads/
u100y141k13t43h45h133a86w90e139w117b26f142z104g117t149/1014-033-lawworks-student-pro-
bono-report-web.pdf (accessed 1 December 2014).
6Keele University, “Community Legal Outreach Collaboration Keele (CLOCK): Time for Justice”,
available at http://www.keele.ac.uk/law/legaloutreachcollaboration/ (accessed 1 December 2014).
7Keele University, “The Community Legal Companion: Assisting Access to Justice”, available at
http://www.keele.ac.uk/law/legaloutreachcollaboration/communitylegalcompanion/ (accessed 1
December 2014).
8Sheffield Hallam University, “Students Helping with Court Helpdesk”, 10 November 2014, available
at http://www.shu.ac.uk/mediacentre/students-helping-court-helpdesk (accessed 1 December
2014).
9Solicitors Journal, “News in Brief: Week Beginning 7 July 2014”, available at http://www.
solicitorsjournal.com/news/management/business-development/news-brief-week-beginning-7-
july-2014 (accessed 1 December 2014).
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Perspectives from Australia and the USA
The rising number of LiPs is not something which is unique to the UK. Other
jurisdictions, notably Australia and the USA, have experienced similar issues for
many years and have sought solutions including the development of court-
based advice and support initiatives to alleviate the issues identified above.
In Australia, notable initiatives include the self-representation services
which have been established to provide assistance to LiPs. In 2007 the
Queensland Public Interest Law Clearing House Incorporated introduced
such a service assisting litigants initially in the Queensland Supreme Court,
District Court and Court of Appeal. This was later extended to the Queensland
Civil and Administrative Tribunal and latterly the Federal Court and Federal
Circuit Court.10 Such is the strength of this scheme that it has been replicated
in other states, notably in 2014 when Justice Connect received four years of
Federal funding to offer such a service to litigants in the Federal Court and
Federal Circuit Court in NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and the Australian Capital
Territory (initially to assist in bankruptcy proceedings only with the aim of
expanding assistance to fair work proceedings).11
Modelled on RCJ Advice12 these services are designed to provide direct, task-
based assistance to LiPs such as help in preparing court documentation, provid-
ing advice in relation to court procedure and advice regarding the legal issues of
the particular case. The assistance offered may consist of a one-off appointment
or multiple appointments for those unable to afford private legal representation
but in all cases the LiP retains conduct and control of their case. Like the PSU
above, the service does not purport to provide full representation or for the
adviser to act as the lawyer “on record” but instead aims to support and assist a
litigant to more efficiently pursue their case themselves. However unlike the PSU,
the service offered includes the provision of legal advice either by legally qualified
staff employed directly by the service or, more often, by lawyers from supporting
legal firms who volunteer their time to provide this type of pro bono service.
It would appear that there is currently no formal involvement of univer-
sities within the self-representation services offered. It is arguable however
that they could play a valuable role which would serve to further the educa-
tion of law students as well as contributing to the much sought-after assis-
tance being provided to litigants.
This has been demonstrated in the USA where various models of pro se
clinics or self-help initiatives have been established to provide assistance to
LiPs often in conjunction with law schools. The services offered by these
10QPILCH, “Self Representation Service”, available at http://www.qpilch.org.au/cms/details.asp?
ID=564 (accessed 1 December 2014).
11Justice Connect, “Self Representation Service”, available at http://www.justiceconnect.org.au/
get-help/referral-service/self-representation-service (accessed 1 December 2014).
12Tony Woodyatt, Allira Thompson and Elizabeth Pendlebury, “Queensland’s Self-Representation
Services: A Model for Other Courts and Tribunals” (2011) 20 Journal of Judicial Administration
225–239, p. 225.
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clinics can be simply educational and seek to provide more generalised and
less case-specific information to LiPs for example about court procedure (such
as how to instigate or serve court proceedings) or guidance on how to
complete court forms. This information might be distributed via information
leaflets, group presentations, workshops or video/audio recordings. Whilst
helpful, there are obvious limitations to providing generic information alone
and it is noted that many courts already offer such a self-help service.
Other initiatives combine providing instructional and informational mate-
rials with offering more direct assistance to individuals similar to the self-
representation services established in Australia. This can be seen in the self-
help centres established in the Californian courts. Of particular note is the
development of the JusticeCorps programme which trains 250 undergradu-
ates and recent graduates each year to assist with the work conducted in
these centres. Their role is similar to that of the PSU volunteers and includes
providing vital access to language assistance. First launched in Los Angeles
County in 2004 this initiative was extended to San Francisco Bay Area in 2006
and San Diego in 2007.13 The Civil Justice Council noted this model for its
ambition and litigant satisfaction, and also noted that the “personal and
professional development of the students was marked”.14
Should universities be involved?
It has been argued in some quarters that the provision of pro bono work is
“replacing legal aid by the back door and giving the government a get-out-of-
jail card”.15 Therefore, it is argued, any scheme purporting to assist LiPs is
merely absolving the government of its responsibilities. Whilst there would be
little, if any, dispute that the panacea would be a state funded legal aid system
ensuring all were represented, the reality is that we will not see such a system,
at least in the foreseeable future. Whilst the effects of LASPO have highlighted
the issues experienced by LiPs, these are not new problems as there have
always been LiPs within the legal system. On this basis, we should therefore
consider whether schemes assisting LiPs are worthwhile. If not, why would any
organisation, including universities, invest valuable resources in such schemes?
Trinder et al. highlighted four areas for intervention, where LiPs felt their
case would have been assisted. These areas are more information about the
court process and procedural information; practical help, particularly with
paperwork; emotional/moral support; and tailored legal advice.16
13California Courts The Judicial Branch of California, “About JusticeCorps”, available at http://www.
courts.ca.gov/justicecorps-about.htm (accessed 1 December 2014).
14Supra n. 4, p. 56.
15John Hyde, “Is It Time to Refuse Pro Bono Work?”, Law Society Gazette, 24 October 2014,
available at http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/comment-and-opinion/is-it-time-to-refuse-pro-
bono-work/5044648.fullarticle (accessed 1 December 2014).
16Liz Trinder, Rosemary Hunter, Emma Hitchings, Joanna Miles, Richard Moorhead, Leanne Smith,
Mark Sefton, Victoria Hinchly, Kay Bader and Julie Pearce, Litigants in Person in Private Family Law
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It appears that students can play an important role in assisting LiPs
through court-based schemes. Whilst there is a limit on the legal advice
students may be able to provide, Trinder et al. state that the “informal
support from a friend, family member, a volunteer helper or McKenzie
Friend was seen as invaluable”.17 These findings appear largely consistent
with the findings of Williams in her literature review. In particular, Williams
reports that users of services such as court-based advice services, self-help
and hotlines reported high levels of satisfaction.18 However, Williams further
notes that most evidence indicated that the case outcomes were adversely
affected by the lack of representation.19
The available literature indicates that there is a role for court-based
schemes in assisting LiPs as there is general consensus that LiPs do benefit
from the emotional and moral support they receive. It is therefore necessary
to assess whether universities should be providing this service.
For students, becoming involved in a court-based advice scheme can be
extremely rewarding. It is noted above that this type of activity can aid
professional development and we would suggest that this is achieved by
exposing students to the court environment and to individuals with real legal
issues. To provide assistance students must understand court procedure and
practice as well as communicating with litigants effectively. This requires
knowledge, understanding and problem-solving skills. Students will encoun-
ter ethical issues and obtain insight into legal remedies and restrictions.
Some of the schemes we have referred to provide valuable assistance to
litigants but do not sanction students providing legal advice. It is arguable
that, in the absence of this, the activity does not fully reflect legal practice
and therefore has more limited benefit. If this is the case, it is nonetheless
undeniable that many skills can be advanced by the experience.
Also, few would dispute that lawyers have a duty to promote access to
justice and it is suggested that engagement in such an activity whilst at
university can only help to instil this public service ethos at an early stage.
There can also be a more tangible and personal reward for students who
take part. For example, many clinical programmes are credit bearing whereas
others can result in a financial award, such as JusticeCorps where volunteers
completing the programme will receive an education award.20 Not to be
underestimated is also the personal satisfaction of making a difference to
an individual.
Cases (November 2014), pp. 84–86, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/380479/litigants-in-person-in-private-family-law-cases.pdf
(accessed 1 December 2014).
17Ibid., p. 85.
18Supra n. 1, p. 7.
19Ibid., p. 6.
20Supra n. 13.
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In the current climate, opportunities such as this can only enhance
employability. Students will gain valuable first-hand experience of the court
environment as well as the opportunity to improve their soft skills by enga-
ging with real clients.
There are also several incentives for universities to become involved in
these types of initiatives. In England and Wales, the Legal Education and
Training Review21 signals an increasing drive by regulators for legal education
to include training in relation to practice-based skills. In our experience this is
matched by student enthusiasm to engage in clinical activities and, in a
competitive market, it is important that universities offer courses and extra-
curricula activities which are appealing and relevant to prospective students.
Indeed clinical legal education, in some form, is progressively becoming a
more regular component of undergraduate legal studies in the UK.
That said, this type of activity can be expensive to resource and can be
high risk. For example, an in-house clinic model often requires physical office
space, administration, high levels of student supervision and indemnity insur-
ance to name a few. However, the schemes outlined above offer students the
opportunity to engage in an alternative model of clinical activity which is
potentially less resource intensive (physical space and supervision often
being provided by the court or service although the latter will depend
upon whether student participation is credit bearing) and which carries a
lower risk (in many models the students do not directly provide legal advice
or they advise under the supervision of a qualified lawyer). As such they may
increase the capacity for universities to undertake clinical work.
It is equally important that universities actively engage and sustain the
communities in which they play a vital role. These types of initiatives provide
much needed support and assistance to members of those communities as
well as encouraging collaboration with other legal professionals, practices
and the courts.
Conclusions
The provision of court-based advice schemes is not a replacement for a fully
funded legal aid scheme. However, such schemes do provide a valuable
service to LiPs particularly in relation to the emotional and moral support
they provide. Volunteers can also assist LiPs with their paperwork and thus
assist in court proceedings running more smoothly. A significant limitation of
many schemes is the lack of legal advice although students may identify
cases where legal advice and representation may be available from another
source. Universities can play a role in supporting such schemes. These
21J. Webb, J. Ching, P. Maharg and A. Sherr, Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services
Education and Training Regulation in England and Wales (June 2013), available at http://www.
letr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/LETR-Report.pdf (accessed 1 December 2014).
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schemes provide students with valuable learning opportunities whilst offer-
ing universities a valuable community engagement opportunity.
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From the Field 
 
THE EUROPEAN NETWORK OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: 
THE SPRING WORKSHOP 2015 
Rachel Dunn and Paul McKeown1,  





The European Network for Clinical Legal Education (ENCLE) was established in 
2013 with the aim of bringing individuals and organisations together to exchange 
ideas and work collaboratively to promote justice and increase the quality of law 
teaching through clinical legal education.  According to its mission statement, 
‘ENCLE aims to support the growth and quality of [clinical legal education] 
programmes in Europe through facilitating transnational information sharing, 
fostering CLE scholarship and research, convening conferences, workshops and 
1 Rachel Dunn is a second year PhD student and Associate Lecturer and Paul McKeown is a Senior 
Lecturer in the School of Law at Northumbria University 
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training session, establishing a website as an open resource for information sharing 
and promoting collaboration between CLE programmes and legal professionals.’2 
In furtherance of the mission statement, ENCLE have organised several conferences 
and workshops.3  In April 2015, a workshop was held at Northumbria University, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK entitled ‘Preparing students for clinic’.  The aim of the 
workshop was to generate discussion, through themed sessions, as to how clinicians 
can prepare their students for the clinical experience.  Sessions were facilitated by 
experienced clinicians from around Europe who drew out ideas for best practice 
thus strengthening the abilities of attendees to prepare their students for the clinical 
experience. 
The first session, which will be the predominant focus of this article, considered 
‘Why we do clinic’.  It is important that as clinical educators we understand the 
rationale for what we do.  If we do not know where we are going, we will never get 
there, which was highlighted at the start of the first session. 
Other sessions included:  
• Establishing a legal clinic 
• Running and sustaining a legal clinic 
2 ENCLE, Mission Statement Available at: http://www.encle.org/about-encle/memorandum-of-understanding-statute-in-entirety 
(Accessed: 24 September 2015) 
3For more information on other ENCLE events please see, http://encle.org/news-and-events/past-events 
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• Standardised clients 
• Approaches to preparation: legal knowledge or problem based learning 
• Developing ethical sensitivity in clinical students 
• Ethical aspects of clinical design and management 
• Strengthening the social justice mission of clinic 
• Impact of clinic in Europe: What do we know so far and where do we go from 
here (and how)?  
The sessions covered various forms of clinical legal education, not just those 
working with live clients. However, throughout the two days other sub-themes 
started to emerge and the need to justify why we do clinic as a form of legal 
education was underlying in all sessions.  
There were approximately 42 clinicians who attended the Workshop. The first 
session of the Workshop was recorded, lasting approximately one hour. Once we 
gained ethical approval to use this recording as data for an article and it was 
transcribed and analysed in order to highlight the main themes discussed during the 
Workshop. Attendees were notified of our intention to use the recording, provided 
with a username and password to access it securely on the ENCLE website and time 
was given for them to listen to it. They could then decide if they consented to their 
comments being used and were able to exclude any comments which they did not 
want to be used in this work. The comments discussed below are only those from 
attendees who agreed for their contributions to be used.  
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 WHY WE DO CLINIC. 
The first session of the Workshop, led by Professor Kevin Kerrigan and Carol 
Boothby, asked ‘why do we do clinic’. The purpose of this session, as Professor 
Kerrigan highlighted, was to justify why we, as educators, should have law clinics in 
universities. This justification is not just to Deans or Vice Chancellors, but also to the 
wider legal profession and community. This justification, or reason for doing clinic, 
is important for the sustainability of a clinic. However, an attendee also stated that it 
is important to know why we do clinic ‘because this will then shape in what we need for 
it, how we do it, how we communicate with the students, what goals do we proceed, what we 
emphasise. So this is a really important thing to know in order to shape the teaching process 
in the right way.’ So, it is not just justifying to those outside of the clinic, but also for 
those working inside it, ensuring the clinic is pedagogically sound.  As such, the 
purpose of the clinic needs to be clear in our own minds as to achieve anything, we 
need to know what it is we are trying to achieve. 
There are various reasons why we establish clinics. Aksamovic and Genty highlight 
that it is important to distinguish between these reasons, and that two of the main 
goals of clinicians are ‘…creating social change by giving disadvantaged groups 
access to legal services; making experiential courses mandatory so that all students 
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are better prepared for the profession they will be entering…’4 However, this session 
highlighted other reasons as to why we do clinic and how we can justify it, which 
surfaced when we discussed the advantages and disadvantages, or the rewards and 
risks, of clinics. These advantages and disadvantages were to various groups, 
including the university, the community and the legal profession. Discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of clinics also brought up other areas of discussion. 
The themes of this session can be displayed visually, taken from the recording: 
 
4 Askamovic D and Genty P, 'An Examination of the Challenges, Successes and Setbacks for Clinical Legal Education in Eastern 
Europe' (2014) 20 The International Journal of Clinical Legal Education, p.437 
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The issues facing clinical programmes identified during the Workshop are 
represented above. The themes flowing from these issues are the main areas which 
were covered during the discussions, the bigger the circle the more weight placed on 
the discussion. We then have other comments flowing from these main areas, which 
attendees highlighted as advantages or disadvantages, or risks and rewards, of 
clinics. The bigger the comments the more it was discussed. Some of these issues link 
together, even though they were discussed during different themes.  Looking at the 
data from the session in this way shows how certain issues can link together, even 
though they may seem very separate in practice. Furthermore, displaying the 
weighting of the conversations outlines what was most discussed, or was more of a 
concern to the attendees of the Workshop. The issues have also been colour coded.  
Comments in red represent issues which hinder the development of clinic whilst 
comments in green can be considered to advance the clinical mission, enhancing the 
education of our students and provide legal support to our community.  Comments 
in orange could either advance or hinder the development of clinics depending upon 
their implementation in practice.  At the bottom of the diagram is a comment made 
by an attendee that did not appear to fit with the other issues discussed, but is an 
important consideration none-the-less. This attendee wanted to highlight that when 
setting up a clinic you must be prepared to fail, as so many clinics do fail when they 
are first established. Also that establishing a clinic is a slow process and that you 
must be patient. This is a valid point to make to those who are considering setting 
up a clinic, and why it has been placed at the bottom of the diagram.  
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For example, one attendee talked of the educational benefits of law clinics and how 
there ‘are certain things that a student can only learn in clinic.’ However, even though 
clinicians claim that this kind of pedagogy is beneficial to students, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence to help justify such a claim. To make such bold claims for clinics, 
which are logical to make, we must still be able to support them with evidence and 
research. These educational claims were then linked to reputation, the attendee 
advancing, ‘students want to come to our university because we have an attractive clinical 
programme.’ These claims are connected to many of the issues. Reputation links back 
to students, and ultimately their satisfaction, to the community and their views of 
the university. In order to strengthen the reputation of clinic, we need more 
evidence.  Should clinics be producing more research into their work to justify what 
they are doing? 
Something which was highlighted during the discussion, and is apparent from the 
diagram, is the conflicting perception of clinic from the legal profession. There was a 
comment about how some law firms do not like their trainees to have prior clinical 
experience and like to ‘mould’ them to their firm. This attendee stated that law firms 
can be resistant to taking on students who ‘already have a professional identity.’ 
However, when looking at benefits there is a comment that clinic is beneficial to the 
profession as they are gaining trainees who are better prepared for practice and 
would otherwise lack the skills needed if it were not for a student’s clinical 
experience. Thus, it appears that there can be confusion over the expectations of a 
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clinical programmes and what sort of position it can put students in when they have 
completed their degree. This difference of opinion is not surprising as all clinicians, 
and indeed the clinical programmes as a whole, have had different experiences with 
the legal profession and this will feed into their comments. Furthermore, different 
jurisdictions will have different experiences and relationships with the profession, 
resulting in this area of discussion not meeting a consensus.  
It was highlighted that there are many reasons of why we do clinic, and these 
reasons will vary from clinic to clinic. Whatever the reason, we must be able to 
justify our clinics and be honest about the rewards and risks of them. This 
justification will help us with our teaching and shaping the clinical programme for 
the students. Getting the attendees to think about this from the start of the 
Workshop helped during the other sessions to think about what kinds of clinic is 
best for their institution and why.   
ISSUES 
Throughout the two day workshop there were issues highlighted which made 
sustaining a successful clinical programme difficult. As the diagram above 
illustrates, the issues faced by clinical programmes are complex.  As attendees 
started to open up about this more people started to share and we realised that these 
issues are common throughout clinics in Europe. Knowing what issues there are 
assists with overcoming them and move forward with our European clinical 
movement. We will focus the discussion on two issues identified in the Workshop, 
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resistance from the legal profession and resistance from the university.  As key 
stakeholders in any clinical programme, it appears useful to address these concerns. 
Resistance/opposition from the profession 
Resistance or opposition from the profession arises from a lack of understanding of a 
clinical programme’s goals and how it operates. This opposition seems to stem from 
fear of a clinical programme taking away work from the profession. An attendee 
spoke about the opposition their programme faced when it was established, how 
local lawyers felt as though their livelihood was in trouble and they would face more 
competition for clients. The clinical programme had to ‘justify why we’re doing clinic 
and the type of clinic that we were running and ultimately, eventually, they came around 
and now they’re many of our biggest supporters in the local legal profession.’  
If the resistance from the legal profession is broken down then the support they can 
provide for a clinical programme is invaluable. Clinical programmes are operating 
all over the world and many professionals can appreciate and encourage the work 
they do. This issue is one which most clinical programme have faced in many 
countries. Even countries which now have a well established clinical presence in 
their legal education have faced this problem when setting up clinical programmes. 
For example, Giddings brings to light resistance from the profession in the early 
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Australia movement.5  Whilst this jurisdiction, and many others, have overcome 
resistance from the profession, this cannot be said of all jurisdictions, where it is still 
a major hurdle clinical programmes face. Wilson has discussed this issue in relation 
to Western Europe, in particular Germany. He states that clinical programmes, 
‘…are seen as a threat to the earnings of those lawyers who have “paid their dues” 
by going through the rigorous process of admission to the bar.’6  
This was addressed by another attendee, who stated that the work clinical 
programmes do does not really take work from the legal profession as ‘we are doing 
something else.’ This something else is arguably providing legal services to those who 
struggle for access to justice.  However, providing this service does not mean 
competition for clients, as this attendee concluded, ‘but I believe there’s no country in 
the world where the problems of access to justice would be solved in a way that we would 
really be competing to clients. We might be competing for clients in some segments, but not 
in a global way.’ This is an opinion which has been argued before, particularly by 
Wilson. From his research in Germany he provides two rebuttals to the opposition 
from the profession. Firstly, clinical programmes usually do not represent clients 
who could not otherwise afford legal services, nor would they be awarded legal aid. 
Secondly, students are limited in the extent they can represent clients, stating that 
5 Giddings J, 'Clinical Legal Education in Australia: A Historical Perspective' (2003) 2003 International Journal of Clinical Legal 
Education, pp. 9-10 
6 Wilson RJ, 'Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide Acceptance of Clinical Legal Education' (2009) 10 German Law 
Journal, p.834 
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they focus instead on ‘a narrow range of matters.’ 7  A further rebuttal is the 
availability of legal services.  For commercial reasons, the availability of legal 
services in a particular area of law may not be available.  This may be due to the fact 
a case is not financially viable for law firms to pursue, or alternatively, it is not 
financially viable for a client to pay for the case regardless of their means.  This 
would often be the case in low value disputes where the legal costs would outweigh 
the value of the claim.   
There will always be a need for legal services for those who do not have access to it, 
making the competition with the legal professions low. Whilst some clinical 
programmes may be competitive with the legal profession, this is likely to be the 
exception rather than the rule.   
An example of a potentially competitive clinical model would be the business clinic.  
It may be taking some work away from the profession as they are providing free 
services to those whose primary alternative option is to hire a lawyer. These clinical 
programmes will find it more difficult to rebut competition arguments and justify 
their programme as a need for the community. However, not all business clinics 
assist clients who can afford legal advice. There are clients in these programmes who 
cannot afford to pay heavy legal fees to help launch their business, and some 
programmes will establish this through a means test.  
7 Ibid 
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Further, some business or transactional clinics may only assist charities.  Whilst it is 
arguable that a charity, especially larger charities would pay for legal services, there 
is an argument that the wider social benefit is served by retaining money for 
charitable purposes rather than paying legal fees.  Even law firms often provide 
assistance to charities on a pro bono basis recognising these wider social benefits. 
There is also a strong argument for the pedagogical benefits this kind of clinical 
programme can give to students, allowing them to work in an area of law whereby 
they may not otherwise get an opportunity. As Campbell states, ‘It would be a shame if 
clinics focusing on transactional work had to continually fight for acceptance, as a 
consequence of a perceived detachment of that kind of work from a social justice ideology.’8 If 
a clinic is providing a sound education for students, we may ask whether we do have 
to use social justice as a justification for our clinics.  Surely a good education and an 
introduction to practice can only benefit the profession, providing them with new 
lawyers who have some experience and equipped with the necessary skills.  
It is important in growing the clinical movement to establish what resistance there is 
to clinical legal education from the profession across Europe, and the reasons for this 
resistance.  We cannot address the problem unless we know the reason for it.  
However, the anecdotal evidence suggests that measures can be taken to lessen the 
resistance.  Fundamentally, it is important to open a dialogue with the local legal 
8 Campbell E, 'A dangerous method? Defending the rise of business law clinics in the UK' (2015) 49 The Law Teacher, p.175 
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profession and be clear about what you are doing and why you are doing it.  If 
clinical programmes are seen as a benefit and not a threat, it is likely that they will 
attract support, rather than resistance.   
 
 
Resistance/opposition from the academy  
This issue is one which has surfaced in many institutions across the globe. When 
clinical programmes began to evolve there could sometimes be opposition faced 
internally as well as externally.9 This opposition seems to still be alive in some 
European clinical programmes, especially the newer programmes. One attendee 
stated that: 
‘…often academics within the faulty, within the school, can be resistant. Or, 
even if they’re not resistant, uninterested. And I think that a clinic can work 
really well when everybody’s convinced with its value, even if they don’t work 
within it. And they know what the students are doing with it because it can 
affect their own teaching.’  
9 For more information please see,  Iya, P.F. ‘Fostering a Better Interaction Between Academics and Practitioners to Promote 
Quality Clinical Legal Education with High Ethical Values’, International Journal of Clinical Legal Education, Vol.3, 2003, 
pp.41-57.  
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Bloch characterises the tension in legal education as a ‘conflict between theory and 
practice.’ 10   Whilst theoretical scholarship has an established place within the 
academy, with a clear status and role for those who engage, practice or clinical 
scholarship has struggled to establish legitimacy.  Perhaps this struggle goes to the 
core of clinical legal education, and in particular the background of many clinicians.  
Many clinicians are lawyers, not traditional academics, and see their role as teaching 
legal skills.  As such, clinicians may sense their role is practiced based, and not 
focused on publishing the theory.  Thus, it is arguable that it is clinicians who have 
established the barrier, or at least contributed to it. 
However, there are also cultural barriers to overcome if clinicians are to become an 
accepted member of the academy.  Some law schools, especially in countries such as 
Germany, prefer the traditional teaching methods and do not think there is a place 
for practical legal teaching within their schools. This is better left for after a student 
has finished their degree. 11 
It is necessary to consider that theory and practice are not mutually exclusive 
concepts.  Whilst theory leads to practice, practice also leads to theory and teaching 
at its best shapes both research and practice. 12   Boyer posits that the term 
10 Bloch F S, ‘The case for clinical scholarship’, International Journal of Clinical Legal Education, Vol.4, 2004, pp.7-21   
11 For example see Bucker A and Woodruff A, 'The Bologna Process and German Legal Education: Developing Professional 
Competence through Clinical Experiences ' (2008) 9 German Law Journal, p. 609 
12 Boyer E L, ‘Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate’, The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching, 1990 
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‘scholarship’ should have ‘a broader, more capacious meaning, one that brings 
legitimacy to the full scope of academic work.’13  In doing so, he identifies that 
academic work has four separate but overlapping functions: the scholarship of 
discovery; the scholarship of integration; the scholarship of application; and the 
scholarship of teaching.14   
The scholarship of discovery is the closest element to “research”.  Boyer states that 
the scholarship of discovery ‘contributes not only to the stock of human knowledge 
but also the intellectual climate of a college or university.’ 15   Scholarship of 
integration is connected to the scholarship of discovery but relates to the connections 
across disciplines and the knowledge is seen within a larger context.16  He goes on to 
state that the difference between “discovery” and “integration” can be understood in 
the questions asked.  Academics engaged in discovery ask, “What is to be known, 
what is yet to be found?”  However, academics engaged in integration ask, “What 
do the findings mean?”17 The third element, the scholarship of application, addresses 
how knowledge can be applied to consequential problems and help both individuals 
and institutions.18 Boyer is careful to point out that application is not a one-way 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid, p.17 
16 Ibid, pp.18-19 
17 Ibid, p.19 
18 Ibid, p.21 
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street; knowledge is not merely discovered then applied.  Indeed, new intellectual 
understanding can arise from the application of the knowledge; theory and practice 
interact so that one will renew the other.19  Finally, the scholarship of teaching is 
more than transmitting knowledge, it is “transforming” and “extending” it as well.20  
The scholarship of teaching is important as it not only educates but also entices 
future scholars.21 
Hutchings and Shulman stated that the ‘scholarship of teaching’ has three ‘central 
features of being public (“community property”), open to critique and evaluation 
and in a form that others can build on’.  They go on to state that there is a fourth 
attribute, namely ‘that it involves question-asking, inquiry and investigation, 
particularly around the issues of student learning.’22 
In applying the notion of scholarship of teaching to clinical scholarship, clinicians 
are uniquely placed to study the legal profession from a different perspective to their 
academic colleagues.  Indeed Bloch highlights that that a ‘great strength of clinical 
legal education is that it embraces its ties to the “real world” of law practice.  The 
clinical methodology gains much of its richness when student are immersed in 
19 Ibid, p.23 
20 Ibid, p.24 
21 Ibid, p.23 
22 Hutchings P and Shulman L, ‘The Scholarship of Teaching: New Elaborations, New Developments’, The Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1999 
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actual lawyer work, with all of its complexities and ambiguities.” 23   It is thus 
important that clinical work is made public allowing others to scrutinise and build 
upon the work already undertaken.  Whilst there has been an historic tendency for 
clinicians either not to engage in scholarship, or alternatively to talk over one 
another, this has hindered the development of clinical scholarship within the 
academy.  By engaging in such scholarship, arguably clinical scholarship will 
become an accepted part of the academy and thus reduce internal friction.  
However, there are also practical difficulties faced by clinicians if they are to be on 
equal footing to other academics.  As well as running the clinic they may also have 
the same responsibilities and duties as the other academics within the institution, 
but will not get paid extra for this extra work or have their other workload lessened. 
This is an issue which could have an impact on the running and sustainability of 
clinical programmes. Clinical programmes are becoming an accepted form of legal 
education and the clinicians running them should be allowed the time and support 
to do so.  
Whilst clinicians work extremely hard to make their programmes successful, there 
can be a lack of recognition. They may not be publishing as much as other members 
of academic staff or their achievements not as widely recognised. For example, 
Donnelly argues that, ‘[i]t is grossly unrealistic to hold clinicians to the same boilerplate 
23 Supra n.7 
148
standard as our colleagues when seeking promotion, especially when there is still little 
recognition granted to clinical work.’24  
The publishing element of a clinician’s work provides another issue in the argument 
of scholarship. As lawyers, and not academics, some clinicians are not provided 
with, or encouraged, to undertake training in how to conduct research and publish 
it. This makes it difficult for clinicians to produce the work they would like to and 
push them further to this scholarship status. 
Furthermore, even if this training is provided not every institution allows sufficient 
work allocation to conduct and write up research. If a clinician wishes to write 
research for publication this comes out of their own time, which they do not seem to 
have a lot of when running a clinic.  
If clinicians are to have equal status within the academy, it is important that they 
undertake research or, clinical scholarship.  As the clinical movement it growing it is 
imperative that we gather evidence as to the effectiveness of our practice and that 
we are sharing our experiences. By making our work public, we allow others to learn 
from our experience and build upon our work, thus improving the quality of the 
educational experience.    
Considering these differences, clinicians have a choice as to whether they argue their 
work is different to that of traditional academics, or whether to argue it has the same 
24 Donnelly L, 'Clinical Legal Education in Ireland: Some Transatlantic Musings' (2010-2011) 4 Phoenix Law Review, p.15 
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status.  Bloch states that if the distinction is rejected, this can result in ‘a “blood bath” 
at the time of promotion or tenure.’25  However, acceptance of the distinction creates 
‘an almost unavoidable second-class status for the clinical program and its faculty.’26  
It seems that if clinicians wish to establish their equal status within the academy, 
their work must be held as equivalent to that of traditional academics.  If clinicians 
are engaged in scholarship, then this must surely have the same standing as others 
engaged in scholarship. 
Further, it is only through engagement in clinical scholarship that clinicians can 
address the issues identified above.  Examples include evidencing the benefits of 
clinical programmes, identifying and tackling the barriers to the clinical mission and 
enhancing the quality of the programme for the students.  These are important 
issues when we ask why we do clinic. 
As clinical programmes grow within Europe and with the knowledge that they can 
provide students with a rich legal education, we should consider whether there is a 
divide between academics and clinicians.  There should be a mutual appreciation 
between academics and clinicians of the work done and the value it holds to a 
25 Supra n.7 
26 Ibid 
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university. Arguably with the recent educational reforms in Europe and the 
introduction of the Bologna Process27 clinic will help with implementation of this.28 
 
WHERE DO WE GO NEXT? 
As the European clinical movement develops, it is clear that there are challenges 
ahead.  In addressing these challenges, clinicians need to reflect upon their own 
practice and establish their own identity.   
This article merely highlights issues raised throughout the two days of the 
Workshop.  We must establish a clear vision of the next steps to take and to keep the 
European clinical movement pushing forward. However, during the discussion 
there was not a consensus reached on certain issues, different attendees haven 
different experiences in their clinics.  This may suggest that it is not possible to 
establish a single identity for a European clinical movement with each jurisdiction 
facing its own challenges.  We cannot treat all jurisdictions in the same way, but it 
may be possible to establish a common thread or adapt the model as and when 
necessary.  
27 For more information  on the Bologna Process and its implementation please see 
http://www.ehea.info/Uploads/SubmitedFiles/5_2015/132824.pdf  
28 Supra n.6 
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Research in clinic should now be a leading agenda throughout Europe. We learnt 
during the last session of the Workshop that the amount of peer reviewed articles 
published in clinical legal education is vast. However, Europe does not produce as 
much as other continents. In order for our movement to keep growing we must 
share experiences, failures and successes. Publishing research is a great way to do 
this. Furthermore, the research we can produce will help to justify why we do clinic. 
As Tomoszek states: 
 ‘The positive contribution of clinical legal education towards the overall 
outcome of legal education system still has not been proven by a rigorous 
empirical evidence-based study – it is mostly based on belief of clinical teachers 
and clinical students.29’  
ENCLE provides the network to support and facilitate this agenda across Europe.  
Supporting the growth and quality of clinical legal education through, amongst 
other things, research and scholarship is at the core of the ENCLE mission. 
Whilst this belief is strong and the claims of the benefits of clinical legal education 
are logical to make, there is still a need for the rigorous and empirical research to be 
conducted. This will help to make our argument and justifications even stronger.  
29 Tomoszek M, 'The Growth of Legal Clinics in Europe - Faith and Hope, or Evidence and Hard Work?' (2014) 21 International 
Journal of Clinical Legal Education, pp. 99-100 
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With sharing these experiences comes the opportunity to help develop clinical 
programmes throughout Europe. The opposition faced by clinical programmes is 
sometimes great and with help from other established programmes, and experienced 




Further Developing Street 
Law
SARAH MORSE AND PAUL MCKEOWN
Street Law began in 1972 at Georgetown University Law Center when a group of 
students developed an experiential curriculum to teach high school students about law 
and the legal system (Street Law INC no date). It has been described as ‘a powerful 
tool for social change, promoting greater awareness of civic rights and encouraging 
participation in the democratic process’ (Grimes et al. 2011). Street Law is a form 
of public legal education that aims to educate the public on their legal rights and 
 responsibilities. It involves students going into the community to provide informa-
tion about the law and how it affects particular groups or individuals. Street Law 
programmes can be delivered to a variety of groups, including schools, prisons, tenant 
federations and other community organisations.
Grimes et al. (2011) identifies various models of Street Law that include:
 ! The credit-bearing or integrated model
 ! The nonclinical or pro bono model
 ! The law student organisations model
The differences between these models of Street Law generally relate to whether stu-
dents gain academic credit for their participation and who takes responsibility for 
the organisation of the Street Law programme. Academics are usually involved in the 
credit-bearing or integrated model although they may also be responsible for organis-
ing a Street Law programme on an extra curricula basis.
A Street Law programme can involve students engaging in a one-off activity (such 
as delivering a presentation on welfare rights to a homeless charity) or alternatively 
require a more regular, sustained contribution (such as preparing and running a mock 
trial with high school students). The activity developed by students ought to be engag-
ing and relevant to the group and can take any form such as a debate, case study, mock 
trial or workshop. There is a great deal of flexibility within a Street Law programme to 
allow students to work in a self-directed way or instead for it to form part of a more 
supported learning activity with greater academic involvement.
Following the success of the law clinic, the institution is also keen to develop a street 
law programme.
154
Sarah Morse and Paul McKeown 85
As an academic responsible for a Street Law programme, you are likely to engage 
with a number of stakeholder groups including students, third party partners (such as 
lawyers) and community groups. The programme will provide a number of benefits to 
each of these groups and to you and your institution.
The benefit of Street Law for students is that it allows them to connect their aca-
demic understanding of the law to the practise of law. Numerous lawyering skills are 
utilised throughout the course of preparing and delivering a Street Law activity includ-
ing research, problem solving, and communication. Students also have the opportu-
nity to develop and demonstrate a real understanding and knowledge of legal issues 
through the requirement to explain these in layman’s terms to the community groups. 
As part of the programme, students will often also work in a group thus encouraging 
teamwork and collaboration.
Street Law also connects law students to social issues and engages them in aspects 
of society that they may not have previously experienced thus providing a valuable 
encounter with political, social and economic issues. MacDowell (2008) states that
The Street Law program appealed to [her] because [she] thought it would provide a 
powerful reality check in terms of connecting as a law student with a community far 
from the law school classroom. It also fit with [her] conception of one of the mean-
ingful things [she] could do as a lawyer: obtain important, specialized knowledge, 
associated with power, and make it available to people who otherwise lacked access.
Activities such as this provide opportunities for students to develop practise-based 
skills and therefore arguably better prepare them to enter the legal profession. Street 
Law programmes may also enhance the employability of students and facilitate the 
development of transferable skills. The importance of Law Schools advancing both 
theoretical and practical knowledge is highlighted by the Carnegie Report (concerning 
teaching in American and Canadian law schools) and the Legal Education and Train-
ing Review (a review of education and training in England and Wales).
For the university, a Street Law programme presents a valuable clinical experience but 
is lower risk and far less resource intensive than other forms of clinical legal  education. 
It does not require any form of professional indemnity insurance as legal advice is not 
being provided to an individual client. Nor does it require a physical space within the 
law school to store files and for students to carry out casework. The level of academic 
supervision required is also far lower than a casework clinical model and indeed some 
models are solely student-led. Offering practical, clinical opportunities to students can 
be a valuable marketing tool to assist in the recruitment of prospective students.
There is also potential for third parties, such as lawyers and non-governmental organ-
isations, to become involved in Street Law programmes. These partners can support 
the students and add their own knowledge and experience to the programme. Pinder 
(1998) states that ‘Street Law allows lawyers and judges to connect with law students 
and the community with a much more flexible time commitment than many other pro 
bono service.’ Many lawyers and organisations want to engage in pro bono work and 
recognise they have a responsibility to society. However, many pro bono opportunities 
can be demanding and therefore dissuade participation. These issues can be addressed 
in a Street Law programme, allowing flexibility in the commitment they give.
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Street Law also has the potential to provide a valuable service to the community. 
Universities sit at the heart of the community with many adopting this notion as part of 
their mission statement or ethos. Whilst it is recognised by McQuoid-Mason (2008) that 
most of the evidence concerning the impact of Street Law programmes is quantitative 
and anecdotal, groups are empowered by knowledge. Grimes et al. (2011) highlights 
the example of South Africa and how Street Law helped to break down the apartheid 
racial barriers by enabling black and white school children to share their experiences 
and debate important societal issues. In many jurisdictions, where access to justice is 
restricted, increasing knowledge about legal rights and responsibilities is vital.
For all of these reasons, academics may wish to become involved in developing a 
Street Law programme. These programmes can be both innovative and rewarding. 
A successful programme can afford you networking opportunities (in the wider com-
munity and with third party partners), enhance career prospects through forward-
thinking teaching methods and enhanced student satisfaction. It can also be an 
enjoyable experience for you.
The key messages for Anton and other academics considering developing a Street Law 
programme:
1. It provides an opportunity to engage in innovative teaching.
2. It is a flexible and less resource-intensive clinical teaching method.
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PRO BONO: WHAT’S IN IT FOR LAW STUDENTS? THE STUDENTS’ 
PERSPECTIVE 
Paul McKeown1  
Northumbria University, UK 
Abstract 
In England and Wales, there is an increasing need for the provision of pro bono legal 
services.  Law students may be a resource that can help fill the access to justice gap, 
whilst at university and onwards in their future careers.  Whilst some students are 
intrinsically motivated towards altruistic behaviour, many are not.  This article will 
consider what motivates students to undertake pro bono work whilst at law school. 
The article will explore the range of intrinsic and extrinsic motivating factors for 
student participation in pro bono programmes and consider how students can be 
encouraged to engage in such activities.  The article will also consider whether 
exposure to pro bono experience can instil a public service ethos in students. 
In conclusion, the article will highlight experience as an influential factor in 
encouraging initial participation in pro bono work but also instilling a willingness to 
undertake pro bono work in the future.  
 
Introduction 
Many would argue that lawyers have a moral obligation to promote access to justice.2  
It is also arguable that it is more than a moral obligation and is in fact a professional 
                                                          
1 Paul McKeown is an Associate Professor and the Director of the Student Law Office at Northumbria 
University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK 
2 For discussion on the role of lawyers in promoting access to justice, see Alice Woolley, ‘Imperfect Duty: 
Lawyers' Obligation to Foster Access to Justice’ (2008) 45:5 Alberta Law Review 107 
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obligation.  The International Bar Association states that a lawyer is ‘an indispensable 
participant in the fair administration of justice.’3 Further, the United Nations also 
recognise this duty stating that ‘[l]awyers shall at all times maintain the honour and 
dignity of their profession as essential agents of the administration of justice.’4 Pro 
bono work may be considered as one of the methods for fulfilling this obligation.5 
The Law Society of England and Wales reports that 63% of solicitors had conducted 
pro bono work (undefined6) at some point in their career.7  In 2015, 37% of solicitors 
reported that they had undertaken at least one hour of pro bono work (as defined by 
                                                          
3 International Bar Association, ‘International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession’ (2011) 
Available at 
file:///C:/Users/intel_000/Downloads/IBA_International_Principles_on_Conduct_for_the_legal_prof%2
0(4).pdf (accessed 10 October 2016) 
4 OHCHR, ‘Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers’ (1990) Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RoleOfLawyers.aspx (accessed 10 October 2016)  
5 See Debra D. Burke; George W. Mechling; James W. Pearce, ‘Mandatory Pro Bono: Cui Bono’ (1996) 
25:4 Stetson Law Review 983; Deborah L. Rhode, ‘The Pro Bono Responsibilities of Lawyers and Law 
Students’ (2000) 27:2 William Mitchell Law Review 1201; Douglas L. Colbert, ‘Clinical Professors' 
Professional Responsibility: Preparing Law Students to Embrace Pro Bono’ (2011) 18:3 Georgetown 
Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 309    
6 There is no universally accepted definition of ‘pro bono’.  Evans highlights that ‘some lawyers 
consider work done for legal aid as pro bono because of the low level of remuneration, while other 
would also include matters in which that have substantially reduced, but not waived, their fees.’ 
(Adrian Evans, ‘Recognising the Conditional Nature of Pro Bono Motivation: Avoiding ‘Aspirational’ 
Compulsion and Developing an Appropriate Pro Bono Ethic in New Lawyers’ Available at 
http://www.nationalprobono.org.au/conference/pdf/2003_papers/3a_evans.pdf (accessed 23 
September 2016))    
7 The Law Society of England and Wales, ‘The pro bono work of solicitors: PC Holder Survey 2015’ 
Available at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/research-trends/solicitors-pro-bono-
work-2015/ (accessed 23 September 2016) 
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the Pro Bono Protocol8) in the preceding 12 months.9  This is a statistically significant 
decline on the 42% reported in the 2014 survey.10  Interestingly, 43% of solicitors who 
did not provide pro bono services suggested that there were not adequate 
opportunities to do so.11  Unfortunately, it is not clear what is meant by the lack of 
opportunities.  This phrase could be interpreted to mean that solicitors did not believe 
there was a need for pro bono work which seems unlikely.  An alternative 
interpretation for this phrase is that their firm did not support pro bono opportunities.  
Reasons cited for not undertaking pro bono work include transactional lawyers stating 
that they are not litigators, lack of time, cost to the firm in terms of time and money, 
lack of knowledge in relation to relevant laws affecting the indigent, and not knowing 
how to get involved in an area of pro bono that interests the individual.12  Some 
lawyers also express concern about a perceived conflict of interest.13  All these reasons 
have been recognised as barriers to solicitors undertaking pro bono in England and 
                                                          
8 The Pro Bono Protocol defines pro bono as ‘legal advice or representation provided by lawyers in the 
public interest including to individuals, charities and community groups who cannot afford to pay for 
that advice or representation and where public and alternative means of funding are not available.’  
Further, ‘[l]egal work is pro bono legal work only if it is free to the client, without payment to the lawyer 
or law firm (regardless of the outcome) and provided voluntarily either by the lawyer or his or her 
firm.’ The Joint Pro Bono Protocol for Legal Work available at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/Support-




12 Robert S. Gerber, ‘The Top Five Excuses for Not Doing Pro Bono Work, and Why They’re All Bad’ 
San Diego Daily Transcript 4 May 2005 Available at 
https://www.sheppardmullin.com/media/article/324_pub388.pdf (accessed 2 December 2016)  
13 For example, see Elisabeth Wentworth, ‘Barriers to Pro Bono: Commercial Conflicts of Interest 
Reconsidered’ (2001) 19 Law in Context: A Socio-Legal Journal 166 
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Wales.14  Kutik however identifies one of the biggest barriers preventing pro bono 
work as ‘inertia’, explaining that lawyers ‘haven’t done it, [they] don’t know how to 
do it, and [they] won’t make the effort to learn.’15    
Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 made 
significant cuts to the scope of legal aid in England and Wales as of 1 April 2013.  As a 
consequence of these cuts, the number of unrepresented individuals in the family 
courts has increased.  The National Audit Office reports an increase of 30% of family 
court cases in which neither party had legal representation in 2013-14 compared with 
2012-13.16  The number of litigants in person appearing before the civil courts is also 
likely to have increased but there is not sufficient data in relation to this.17  The Master 
of the Rolls, Lord Dyson, in giving evidence to the House of Commons Justice 
Committee summed up the issue stating:  
“It is impossible to prove but it would be extraordinary, frankly, if there were not some 
cases that are decided adversely to a litigant in person which would have been decided 
the other way had that litigant in person been represented by a competent lawyer.  It is 
inevitable.”18 
                                                          
14 LawWorks, ‘The Case for Pro Bono and Getting Started’ Available at 
file:///C:/Users/intel/Downloads/lawworks-pro-bono-mini-guide-the-case-for-pro-bono-and-getting-
started.pdf (accessed 2 December 2016) 
15 David A. Kutik, ‘Pro Bono: Why Bother’(2005) 22:7 GPSolo 44, 46   
16 National Audit Office, ‘Implementing reforms to civil legal aid’ (2014) HC 784, Session 14-15 para. 
1.25 Available at https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Implementing-reforms-to-
civil-legal-aid1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2016) 
17 Ibid, para. 1.24 
18 House of Commons Justice Committee, ‘Eighth Report of Session 2014-15, 4 March 2015: Impact of 
the changes to civil legal aid under Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
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A further issue, as noted by Steven Matthews of the Magistrates’ Association, was: 
“[individuals would be] put off making what may be a legitimate application because of 
the fact that they cannot get legal representation, have been unable to get advice and are 
put off by the forms and the process and so on.”19 
It is difficult to quantify the numbers of individuals who decide not to pursue a 
legitimate legal claim because they are put off by the process.  However, one 
Australian report estimated that not knowing what to do was cited as the reason for 
inaction in 30% of substantial civil legal problems not acted upon in 2008.20 
A depressing picture is therefore emerging that at a time when demand, or at least a 
need, for pro bono legal services is increasing, the percentage of solicitors providing 
such services is decreasing.  There is perhaps a need to consider what steps can be 
taken to increase the provision of pro bono services by the legal profession, or indeed 
whether the provision of pro bono should be increased.  It has been argued that 
increasing the provision of pro bono encourages more legal aid cuts.21  However, these 
                                                          
Act 2012’, para.137 Available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmjust/311/31102.htm  (accessed 23 
September 2016) 
19 Ibid 
20 Productivity Commission, ‘Access to Justice Arrangements’ Volume 1, 133 Available at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/access-justice/report/access-justice-volume1.pdf (accessed 
29 June 2017)   
21 For example, Michael Gove MP stated that ‘[w]hen it comes to investing in access to justice then it is 
clear to me that it is fairer to ask our most successful legal professionals to contribute a little more 
rather than taking more rather than taking more in tax from someone on the minimum wage.’ (The Rt 
Hon Michael Gove MP, ‘What does a one nation justice policy look like? 23 June 2015 Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/what-does-a-one-nation-justice-policy-look-like (accessed 
6 March 2017)).  The Law Society of England and Wales maintains that  ‘pro bono is never a substitute 
for a properly funded system of legal aid, which needs skilled and experienced solicitors to provide 
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issues are beyond the scope of this article which will focus upon the provision of pro 
bono services by law students. 
The opportunities for students to undertake pro bono work at law school in the UK is 
good with at least 70% of all law schools offering pro bono opportunities to their 
students.22  However, the evidence as to whether participation in pro bono 
programmes impacts upon a student’s desire to undertake public service work in their 
future career is somewhat mixed.  Some quantitative studies show little or no impact 
of clinical and pro bono programmes on students’ desire to continue in pro 
bono/public service work in their future careers23 whilst other studies suggest clinical 
                                                          
expert legal advice to those who need it.’ (The Law Society, ‘Law Society statement on ‘one nation 
justice system’ 23 June 2015 Available at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/news/press-releases/law-
society-statement-on-one-nation-justice-system/ (accessed 6 March 2017)).  See also Richard Abel, ‘The 
Paradoxes of Pro Bono’ (2010) 78:5 Fordham Law Review 2443    
22 Damian Carney, Frank Dignan, Richard Grimes, Grace Kelly and Rebecca Parker, ‘The LawWorks 
Law School Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014’ Available at 
https://www.lawworks.org.uk/sites/default/files/LawWorks-student-pro-bono-report%202014.pdf 
(accessed 23 September 2016).  It should be noted that ‘pro bono work’ was defined as ‘an activity 
organised and/or delivered by a law school that provides a legal service to an individual, group or 
organisation without charge’.  This is a wide definition and encompasses mandatory and voluntary 
activities as well as credit and non-credit bearing activities.  There has been discussion as to what 
work is included within the meaning of ‘student pro bono’ (for example, Dina R. Merrell, ‘Pro Bono, 
Pro You’ (2001) 29:7 Student Law. 39; Tracey Booth, ‘Student Pro Bono’ (2004) 29:6 Alternative L.J. 
280).  For a general discussion on the definition of ‘pro bono’ and ‘clinical legal education’ see Kevin 
Kerrigan, ‘What is Clinical Legal Education and Pro Bono?’ in A Student Guide to Clinical Legal 
Education and Pro Bono (Kevin Kerrigan and Victoria Murray eds. 2011)   
23 See Deborah L. Rhode, ‘Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice’ (2003) 53:3 Journal of Legal Education 
413; Robert Granfield, ‘Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: Results on the Impact of 
Mandatory Pro Bono Programs’ (2007) 54 Buffalo Law Review 1355; Paul McKeown, ‘Law Student 
Attitudes towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience at Northumbria University’ (2015) 
22:1 International Journal of Clinical Legal Education [vi] 
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legal education and pro bono work can have a positive impact upon students and their 
willingness to undertake public service work.24     
 
Why Should Students do Pro Bono? 
If a law student were to carry out a simple Google search asking ‘Why should students 
do pro bono’ it elicits pages of results from various professional bodies, universities 
and the wider media extoling the benefits of such work.  Academic literature 
addressing this issue tends to encompass conceptual articles citing reasons why the 
authors believe students should engage in pro bono activities.25  Surprisingly there has 
been little empirical research reporting the reasons students cite as motivating them 
into carrying out pro bono work.   
The reasons for undertaking pro bono work can broadly be categorised as practical, 
tactical and ethical.26  Practical reasons include enhanced legal skills, broader legal 
knowledge, experience, employability and increased job satisfaction.  Tactical reasons 
include promoting the image of the individual, the organisation and the legal 
                                                          
24 See Sally Maresh, ‘The Impact of Clinical Legal Education on Decisions of Law Students to Practice 
Public Interest Law’ in Educating for Justice: Social Values and Legal Education (Jeremy Cooper and 
Louise G. Trubek eds. 1997); Deborah A. Schmedemann, ‘Priming for Pro Bono Publico: The Impact of 
the Law School on Pro Bono Participation in Practice’, in Private Lawyers and the Public Interest: The 
Evolving Role of Pro Bono in the Legal Profession (Robert Granfield and Lynn Mather eds. 2009)  
25 For example, Howard Lesnick, ‘Why Pro Bono in Law Schools’ (1994) 13:1 Law and Inequality 25; 
Di Mari Ricker, ‘Pro Bono Pays’ (1997) 26:3 Student Law 30; Deborah L. Rhode, ‘The Pro Bono 
Responsibilities of Lawyers and Law Students’ (2000) 27:2 William Mitchell Law Review 1201; Craig 
Linder, ‘Student-Lawyer Partnerships for Pro Bono’ (2007) 35:7 Student Law 29    
26 Stephen Parker, ‘Why Lawyers Should Do Pro Bono Work’ (2001) 19 Law in Context: A Socio-Legal 
Journal 5 
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profession as a whole.  From an ethical perspective, it has been argued that lawyers 
should undertake pro bono work because they are under a moral obligation to do so 
due to the privileged position the legal profession occupies in society.27  
Further, the motivating factors to undertake pro bono work may also be categorised 
as intrinsic or extrinsic.  Intrinsic motivation can ‘be defined as the doing an activity 
for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence.’28  Within the 
context of pro bono work, those who undertake such work due to their own ‘personal 
characteristics, values and attitudes’29 are intrinsically motivated.  Extrinsic motivation 
‘is a construct that pertains whenever an activity is done in order to attain some 
separable outcome.’30  If pro bono work is carried out to improve skills, enhance 
reputation or for some other reward, this is extrinsically motivated behaviour.  
Alternatively, extrinsic motivation also encompasses behaviour motivated to avoid 
adverse consequences such as failing a programme of study if a pro bono requirement 
is mandated. 
Extrinsic motivation has been criticised within education as: 
‘the more we reward people for doing something, the more likely they are to 
lose interest in whatever they had to do to get the reward.  Extrinsic motivation, 
                                                          
27 See Parker n.26; Deborah Rhode, ‘Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law 
Students’ (1999) 67 Fordham Law Review 2415, 2419 
28 Richard M Ryan and Edward L Deci, ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and 
New Directions’ (2000) Contemporary Educational Psychology 54, 56 
29 Rhode, n.27, 2427 
30 Ibid. 60 
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in other words, is not only quite different from intrinsic motivation but actually 
tends to erode it.’31 
Within clinical legal education it has been argued that extrinsic motivation is ‘less 
effective than, and may actually erode, intrinsic motivation.’32  However, the 
fundamental problem is that ‘intrinsic motivation will occur only for activities that 
hold intrinsic interest for an individual’33 and therefore if a student has not previously 
experienced any form of voluntary work, they may hold no interest in the subject 
matter.  If it is envisaged that law schools can instil a pro bono ethos in students then 
it is necessary to look beyond intrinsic and towards extrinsic motivation to attract and 
encourage students to participate and value the activity. 
Ryan and Deci posit that ‘[t]his problem is described within [Self-Determination 
Theory (SDT)] in terms of fostering the [internalisation] and integration of values and 
behavioural regulations.’34 [original emphasis]  Organismic Integration Theory, a sub-
theory of SDT, was ‘introduced to detail the different forms of extrinsic motivation 
and the contextual factors that either promote or hinder [internalisation] and 
integration of the regulation for these [behaviours].’35  The OIT taxonomy can be 
visualised at Fig.1 below.  
                                                          
31 Alfie Kohn, ‘How Not to Teach Values: A Critical Look at Character Education’ (1997) Phi Delta 
Kappan Available at http://www.alfiekohn.org/article/teach-values/?print=pdf  
32 Donald Nicolson, ‘Education, Education, Education: Legal, Moral and Clinical’ (2008) 42:2 Law 
Teacher 145, 154 
33 Ryan and Deci, n.28, 59 
34 Ibid, 60 
35 Ibid, 61 
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Fig.1  A taxonomy of human motivations36 
 
Extrinsic motivation can be categorised as: 
 External regulation 
Action performed due to an external demand or to obtain an external reward37 
 Introjected regulation 
Actions performed with a feeling of pressure in order to avoid guilt or anxiety 
or to attain ego-enhancements or pride38 
 Identification 
Person identifies the personal importance of the regulation and therefore 
accepts it as their own39 
 Integrated regulation 
Fully assimilate identified regulations to the self through self-examination and 
alignment with other values and needs40  
                                                          
36 Drawn from Ryan and Deci, n.28, 61 
37 Ryan and Deci, n.28, 61 
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Within the context of pro bono work, as identified earlier, students may be motivated 
to undertake such work for a variety of reasons.  If students conduct mandatory pro 
bono work, or if the work is performed for assessment purposes, this is an example of 
external regulation and therefore the behaviour is perceived as controlled and lacking 
autonomy.  However, if students engage in pro bono work because they recognise it 
will enhance their legal skills and improve their employability, they will identify with 
the value of the activity in relation to their own career objectives.  If this is taken a step 
further, and through reflection, the value of pro bono work is brought into congruence 
with the student’s other values and needs, then the pro bono work becomes 
assimilated and extrinsically motivated actions become autonomous and self-
determined.  Whilst the student may originally become exposed to pro bono work 
because it is mandated, or they wish to achieve a good grade, they may then 
experience the intrinsic value of the work in itself thus shifting their own values.  For 
example, Quigley, drawing upon the work of Mezirow, posits that educators can 
utilise the phenomenon known as the ‘disorientating moment’ where the student is 
exposed to a disorientating or disturbing experience to transform their ‘societal and 
personal beliefs, values and norms.’41 
There are very few reported empirical studies asking students what motivates them 
to conduct pro bono.  Combe, with reference to the Aberdeen Law Project, reports that 
‘[t]he highest ranking reason for joining was for experience, followed by social justice 
                                                          
41 Fran Quigley, ‘Seizing the Disorientating Moment: Adult Learning Theory and Teaching Social 
Justice in Law School Clinics’ (1995) 2 Clinical Law Review 37, 51-56 
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and skills development…social justice was not the primary factor in their joining the 
volunteer activity.’42  Nicolson, with reference to the Law Clinic at the University of 
Strathclyde, reports that ‘self-centred reasons’ (‘To gain useful skills’ and ‘To put into 
practice theoretical knowledge’) ranked higher than ‘altruistic reasons’ (‘To help 
others’ and ‘To increase access to justice’) as the reason for wanting to join the clinic.43  
However, those students ‘who successfully completed the rigorous selection process 
seemed far more motivated by altruism in their decision to apply for membership 
compared to general Clinic applicants.’44  This is probably explained by the fact 
students are selected on the basis of their commitment to social justice.45   
A study by Evans and Palermo into Australian lawyers’ values considered pro bono 
in the context of professional responsibility.46  Respondents were fairly equally 
divided as to whether they would agree to pursue a hypothetical pro bono case.47  Of 
those respondents who would accept the pro bono case, access to justice was ranked 
as the most important motivating factor for taking on the case.  However, this is 
qualified as ‘participants clearly expressed this issue in relation to personal interests 
                                                          
42 Malcolm M. Combe, ‘Selling intra-curricular clinical legal education’ (2014) 48:3 The Law Teacher 
281, 290 DOI: 10.1080/03069400.2014.965950; See also ‘Student Attitudes to Clinical Legal Education’ 
Available at https://basedrones.wordpress.com/student-attitudes-to-clinical-legal-education/ (accessed 
22 September 2016)  
43 Donald Nicolson, ‘Calling, Character and Clinical Legal Education: A Cradle to Grave Approach to 
Inculcating a Love for Justice’ (2013) 16:1 Legal Ethics 36, 43 
44 Ibid 
45 Donald Nicolson, ‘”Our roots began in (South) Africa”: Modelling law clinics to maximise social 
justice ends’ (2016) 23:3 International Journal of Clinical Legal Education 87, 106 
46 Adrian Evans and Josephine Palermo, ‘Zero Impact: Are Lawyers’ Values Affected by Law School’ 
(2005) 8:2 Legal Ethics 240 
47 Ibid, 249 
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and desires rather than mentioning any professional ethics’.48  Other motivating 
factors determining how respondents would act include professional ambition 
(relating to the high profile nature of the case), employer loyalty (prioritise work for 
employer) and employment security (if they pursued a case against the will of their 
employer).49 
An interesting qualitative study was conduct by Behre into student motivations for 
pro bono following a tornado that devastated Tuscaloosa, Alabama in April 2011.50  
Whilst the circumstances of this study are very specific to the events at the time, the 
findings are useful.  Behre reports that students were initially motivated through the 
‘need to help’ and ‘as a natural response to the shock of witnessing the tornado’s 
destruction.’51  ‘[S]urvivor guilt’ and the ‘need to give back to the community’ were 
also cited as initial motivating factors to volunteering.52  These motivating factors are 
intrinsic and ‘as a direct response to witnessing a natural disaster.’53  However, the 
student’s rationale for their continued volunteer effort provides a good level of insight 
into student motivation.  ‘Meaningful volunteer experiences’ such as ‘personal, 
meaningful interaction with strangers’,54 organisation,55 ‘opportunities for students to 
                                                          
48 Ibid, 250 
49 Ibid 
50 Kelly Alison Behre, ‘Motivations for Law Student Pro Bono: Lessons Learned from the Tuscaloosa 
Tornado’ (2012-2013) 31 Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal 1  
51 Ibid, 28 
52 Ibid, 29 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid, 30 
55 Ibid, 31 
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use their professional training’,56 and the opportunity to gain ‘new legal knowledge 
and skills’57 were all cited as motivating factors.  Behre however notes that ‘[s]tudents 
in general were more concerned about how they could help people and less concerned 
about how the experience would benefit them.’58  Finally, ‘membership in the 
community’ was also cited as a motivating factor for volunteering and the students 
‘valued the experiences they had connecting to people from diverse backgrounds.’59 
 
Methodology 
Law students at Northumbria University were invited to enter an essay competition 
entitled ‘Pro Bono: What’s in it for law students?’  The writer of the winning essay was 
awarded £125 voucher and the publication of their essay in the International Journal 
of Clinical Legal Education.60  A representative of the International Journal of Clinical 
Legal Education adjudicated the competition.  The students were not provided with 
any guidance as to the definition of ‘pro bono’ and therefore the essays reflect the 
students’ own interpretation of this term.  Further, the competition was open to all law 
students at Northumbria University regardless of whether they had any pro bono or 
clinical legal education experience.  This is not a comparative study, merely a study 
considering the student perspective.  The essays were analysed using NVivo software. 
                                                          
56 Ibid, 34 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid, 34-38 
60 The decision was also taken to publish three High Commended essays at the conclusion of the 
competition.  The writers of these essays also received a voucher to the value of £25. 
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The competition was arguably subjective; no criteria was set to determine the winning 
essay.  This was deliberate to encourage honest views as to the motivating factor for 
undertaking pro bono work.  The decision was taken to avoid pre-defined criteria as 
this may have resulted in essays becoming formulaic.   
 
What the students say: 
The essays reveal that the reasons students believe they should undertake pro bono 
work are varied. 
The article will explore the various reasons and motivations for undertaking pro bono 
work in more detail below.  Before these reasons and motivations are considered, I 
will first look at the students’ understanding of pro bono.  
 
Understanding Pro Bono 
As stated above, there is no settled definition of pro bono work and this article is not 
intended to consider what type of work should or should not be included.  Further, it 
is beyond the scope of this article to consider whether clinical type activities fall within 
the definition.  Pro bono is shortened from the Latin term ‘pro bono publico’ meaning 
‘for the public good’.  There is no requirement, at face value, for the work to be carried 
out for a particular group or individual, or indeed without charge, for it to be classified 
as pro bono.  However, it is typically expected that work will only qualify as pro bono 
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work if it is carried out for free and on behalf of individuals, charities and community 
groups who cannot afford to pay for advice and representation.61   
The consensus amongst the students is that pro bono work should be carried out for 
low income and vulnerable members of society with statements such as: 
“at its most primal level pro bono work protects those who do not have the financial means 
to benefit from the legal system.”62 
and 
“[p]ro bono operates with the aim of protecting those who are most vulnerable in society, 
whom are in need of legal representation and cannot afford it.”63  
Further, it is also apparent that the students recognise pro bono work as an innate part 
of the legal profession stating: 
“As future custodians of the legal profession, law students should embark on pro bono as 
it reflects the core values of justice.”64  
One student however recognised that there is a conflict within the legal profession 
between the Government (or the State) and the profession’s responsibility to ensure 
access to justice stating: 
                                                          
61 See for example The Law Society, The Joint Pro Bono Protocol for Legal Work Available at 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/practice-management/pro-bono/the-pro-bono-
protocol/ (accessed 15 September 2016); 61 American Bar Association, ABA Model Rule 6.1 Available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono_public_service/policy/aba_model_rule_6_1.html 
(accessed 15 September 2016) 
62 Essay 4 
63 Essay 2 
64 Essay 5 
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“the Government proposed that pro bono could fill the void left by the withdrawal of 
funding. Many in the profession attacked this notion as fanciful. However, to ignore such 
a notion would be ultimately unwise. It is clear there is mounting pressure on all entering 
the profession to complete their fair share of pro bono work.”65 
There is also explicit recognition that pro bono work is carried out for reputational 
advantage, in other words, for tactical reasons.   
“[Pro bono] also operates to support the reputation of the profession overall. Lawyers are 
required to uphold public confidence in the [profession] and pro bono work works to dispel 
the stereotypes which plague lawyers. It promotes the idea that [lawyers] are not here to 
charge extortionate fees, but are actually here to provide a public service. Pro bono work 
shows a clear dedication to the law for the right reasons, a desire to help people and an 
interest in the law, regardless of the time or effort they may have to expel in the process.”66 
The essays suggest that students understand pro bono to be an important aspect of the 
legal profession and further, it involves working for the benefit of vulnerable and 
indigent clients thus supporting access to justice.  The students demonstrate that 
whilst there are conflicts arising as to where the responsibility lies for ensuring access 
to justice, there is recognition that the legal profession shares that responsibility.  
                                                          
65 Essay 4 
66 Essay 6 
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Further, the legal profession as a whole benefits from pro bono work due to the 
positive image it portrays.67  
 
Why should students undertake pro bono? 
We can broadly categorise the reasons cited by the students for undertaking pro bono 
as: 






There are areas of natural overlap in the reasons cited by the student.  For example, 
enhancing skills and experience are likely to improve employability.  However, within 
the analysis, the focus has been on the primary motivating factor. 
 
 Public Service 
Public service was the only reason cited by every student as a reason to undertake pro 
bono work.  However the weight given to public service among the essays varied 
                                                          
67 Although see Gary A. Hengstler, ‘Vox Populi - The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll’ (1993) 
79 A.B.A. Journal 60, 62 which reports that ‘minorities, the unemployed, members of low-income 
households, and adults under 30 were the most likely to feel favourably towards lawyers’ 
68 The reasons cited by the students for undertaking pro bono work accord with reasons cited by 
Parker.  See n.26 
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considerably.  Whilst one student devoted over half their essay to public service, other 
students merely acknowledges the public service ethos and instead concentrates their 
essay on the benefits to the individual: 
“Whilst the case for the utility of pro bono for the aggrieved has been made extensively, 
this essay considers how the volunteers may benefit themselves in the process.”69 
The essays support the notion that law students see themselves as part of the wider 
community saying, for example, that: 
“by participating in pro bono work, law students contribute constructively to the 
community around them in a most unique way.”70 
It may be questioned as to how engagement with the wider community is a benefit to 
the student.  In response to this question, the law school is about more than teaching 
students’ knowledge and skills; indeed it is a ‘professional socialization experience’.71  
This wider role is also recognised by The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education (QAA) in the United Kingdom in setting out benchmark standards to 
describe a law student’s skills and qualities of mind.  The QAA states that a graduate 
of law with honours is expected to have demonstrated, amongst other things, an 
‘awareness of principles and values of law and justice, and of ethics’ and a ‘knowledge 
and understanding of theories, concepts, values, principles and rules of public and 
                                                          
69 Essay 8 
70 Essay 4 
71 James L. Baillie and Judith Bernstein-Baker, ‘In the Spirit of Public Service: Model Rule 6.1, the 
Profession and Legal Education’ (1995) 13:1 Law & Inequality 51, 67 
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private laws within an institutional, social, national and global context’.72  Engagement 
with the wider community fulfils this wider role for the law school by providing the 
student with a ‘professional socialization experience’ and facilitating their 
understanding of the role of law within the ‘institutional, social, national and global 
context’. 
Through exposure to a wide variety of people, especially those from backgrounds that 
the students may not have ordinarily been exposed to, the student becomes a more 
rounded individual and thus develops as a professional.  This is explained by one 
student as follows: 
“Clients that students experience in [p]ro [b]ono work tend to come from a variety of 
social backgrounds. This helps to break down any unconscious social bias they may have, 
to ensure that in practice they approach each case with an open mind and with the 
necessary social awareness and empathy required of a lawyer. Working in [p]ro [b]ono 
work prior to going in[to] practice helps students to develop as lawyers whose primary 
concern is to help their clients rather than being purely motivated by money and career 
advancement.”73 
There is further recognition within the essays that this engagement with the 
community can place the law into context for the student and add perspective to their 
aspirations as a lawyer that is unachievable in the classroom environment.  For 
                                                          
72 QAA, ‘Subject Benchmark Statement: Law’ (2015) Available at 
http://www.qaa.ac.uk/en/Publications/Documents/SBS-Law-15.pdf (accessed 28 June 2017) 
73 Essay 12 
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example, Baillie and Bernstein-Baker considered a number of studies and concluded 
that merely including discussions on the need for pro bono in a classroom setting 
would not have an effect on student attitudes.74  It is therefore important for students 
to experience pro bono so they can therefore feel the intrinsic benefit of pro bono work, 
a notion summarised as follows:  
“It is imperative to understand that the benefits of [p]ro [b]ono are not limited to 
professional applications; legal involvement within the community allows one to make 
meaningful contributions to those in need, and in doing so allows the student to 
appreciate the “vital role the law plays.”  Legal [s]ervice has been denoted as being 
“unaffordable and out of reach.”  The common view held is that “one of the most 
perplexing facts about our perplexing legal market is its failure to provide affordable 
services for just about anyone but the rich and corporations.” Thus, by providing legal 
aid to those who lack financial stability, the student is able to experience “intrinsic 
morale” and self-worth, something that all lawyers must be familiar with, and something 
that extends beyond the walls of the classroom.”75 
The students’ also demonstrated awareness that the altruistic value of pro bono work 
also improved the often-tarnished reputation of lawyers and therefore whilst the work 
                                                          
74 Baillie and Bernstein-Baker, n.71, 64 
75 Essay 11 
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is of benefit to the wider community, it is also of benefit to the legal profession as a 
whole.76  This is illustrated as follows:  
“Lawyers are often branded with a reputation of arrogance and elitism. However, this 
does not stead well when those who are in need of legal help cannot access it, when [l]egal 
[a]id has been cut so drastically in the last 3 years. Therefore, the English [l]egal[s]ystem 
relies upon [pro bono] work to not only erode this stereotype, but to show that lawyers 
and law students alike, can show compassion by working on cases for free.”77 
 
 Skills 
Ten of the students referred to skills development within their essays as a reason to 
undertake pro bono work.78  Both legal and personal skills can be developed as 
summarised below: 
“It allows [students] to develop vital, practical legal skills (eg. advocacy, legal research, 
interviewing), as well as other relevant ones such as personal organisation, presentation 
and teamwork (useful in a legal working environment)”79 
There is also a distinct overlap between the development of skills through pro bono 
work and other motivating factors.  Through the utilisation of lawyering skills, 
                                                          
76 For example, the Australian Pro Bono Manual explicitly cites ‘reputation’ as a benefit of pro bono 
work. (Australian Pro Bono Centre and Victoria Law Foundation, ‘The Australian Pro Bono Manual’ 
(2005) 1.4) 
77 Essay 2 
78 Earlier research suggests that students valued the personal benefits of pro bono such as skills 
development. See McKeown, n.23, xxvii 
79 Essay 3 
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students are able to experience what it is like to work as a lawyer in practice,80 to gain 
confidence that they have the requisite ability and provided validation for their chosen 
career path: 
“The skills developed in [p]ro [b]ono legal practice are invaluable to the pursuit of a career 
as a practicing lawyer. Almost every role within the front line services of the legal 
profession requires basic abilities in client and case management. The focus on techniques 
such as interviewing, legal writing, organisation, and management of the expectations of 
client qualify students perfectly to move forward in their legal career. Not only does the 
development of such skills help undoubtedly benefit students going into practice, but in 
my own experience provides the confidence to embark on that course. I for one can say 
that prior to my experience in [p]ro [b]ono legal work [I] certainly [was not] confident in 
pursuing a career as a lawyer. However in developing these skills and confidence, and 
engaging in [first-hand] experience working as a trainee solicitor, albeit in a [p]ro [b]ono 
setting, verified the enjoyable and exciting nature a career as a lawyer presents.”81 
It is important that we do not under-estimate the role of the supervisor within the 
learning process.  Within the context of clinical legal education, Cozens states that the 
‘supervisor is possessed with the ability to place the student’s experiences into a 
                                                          
80 See also Pam Feinstein, ‘Gain Experience through Pro Bono’ (2012) 29:1 GPSolo 17; Dina R. 
Merrell, ‘Pro Bono, Pro You’ (2001) 29:7 Student Lawyer 39 
81 Essay 12 
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coherent learning structure so that they make sense to the student.’82  There is an 
appreciation of this from one student who states: 
 “Pro bono volunteers are generally supported and supervised throughout their 
volunteering enabling them to receive feedback for self-development.”83 
This is further supported through students reflecting as an important part of this 
development: 
“[U]ltimately it provides an opportunity for students of law to reflect upon their own 
weaknesses and strengths, to better their own legal skills, to engage with real clients”84 
In enabling this self-development, there must be clear boundaries as to the role of the 
supervisor.  Cozens sets out two levels of supervisor intervention; the first is guidance 
thus allowing the student to act in the role of the lawyer and accept responsibility for 
that role; the second is direct intervention whereby the supervisor will replace the 
student’s control of the situation.85  The latter intervention meant there is little 
educational value in the experience.86  Whilst the supervisor is important within the 




                                                          
82 Michael Cozens, ‘Clinical Legal Education: A Student Perspective’ (1993) 2 Dalhouise Journal of Legal 
Studies 201, 226 
83 Essay 5 
84 Essay 9 
85 Cozens, n.82, 231-232 
86 Ibid, 233 
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As cited earlier, a significant motivating factor to undertake pro bono work is the 
experience of practise.87 
“The ideals of [pro bono] give students the fundamental opportunity to experience the 
expectations of a prospective lawyer”88 
There is also a perception that the experience afforded by pro bono work is different 
to any other experience a law student may have through their university career.  The 
students stated that the practise of law is different to how it is taught in the classroom.  
Further, the experience is more beneficial than work experience within a law firm as 
it is hands on. 
“There is a definitive difference between being taught the law and practicing the law. 
Any opportunity in which you can use the knowledge you have been taught, and putting 
this in to practice, will always be beneficial. Working on a [pro bono] basis is unlike any 
mini-pupillage or vacation scheme. You are not pushed aside and left to shadow the 
lawyers that are working on the case, but you yourself are involved. You have a legal duty 
to your client. You are responsible for your client. Working a case on a [pro bono] basis 
creates a strong platform for a future legal career.”89 
 
                                                          
87 See n.80 
88 Essay 11 
89 Essay 2 
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“The bridge between the way the law is taught at an academic level and the way the law 
works in reality is a very important distinction for students. Pro bono provides a degree 
of realism that no work experience can replicate, and is arguably a better introduction 
than anything preceding a [t]raining [c]ontract or [p]upillage.”90 
Further, the students also perceive that pro bono work will help them stand out from 
the crowd. 
“To the careerist, it offers necessary work experience to compliment applications for 
training contracts and pupillages.  With attrition rates for career progression being as 
gruelling as ever (most notably in the case of the bar), pro bono work offers the aspiring 
lawyer a chance to apply their academics to real problems. In the current recruitment 
climate, work experience and a commitment to the legal profession has become a pre-
requisite, not a bonus. Fortunately, pro bono work offers both, and is a valuable asset to 
any pragmatic law student.”91 
On a final note regarding experience, some of the students cited personal experience 
of engaging in pro bono work and the effect it has had on them.  For example, one 
student stated: 
 “having engaged with my [University’s] [pro bono] clinic…alongside volunteering at 
the Citizens Advice Bureau, the importance and value of [pro bono] work for the modern 
day law student cannot be stressed enough. The benefits are two-fold, first and foremost, 
the wealth of experience that a student can gain through practical work is incomparable 
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to that of regular modular studies, secondly, engaging with [pro bono] work whether 
through a clinic or indeed volunteering, not only has the ability to give a law student a 
humbling experience, but also an appreciation for the legal sector and perhaps further 
motivation for the students own career.”92 
The student goes on to state: 
“Aside from the practical experience that [pro bono] work can provide, I believe it a great 
way in which to instil a sense of ethics and appreciation of the client-solicitor relationship 
from an early stage. Both the [pro bono] clinic and the Citizens Advice Bureau allowed 
me to engage with those who would not normally be able to receive legal advice and as a 
result, I was fortunate enough to experience the appreciation projected from those that I 
was helping.”93 
It is possible that this experience can be created through the provision of a university 
based law clinic as summarised by another student: 
“Speaking as a product of Northumbria University’s Exempting Law Degree and 
[having] worked in their prestigious Student Law Office the benefits of [p]ro [b]ono are 
benefits that I have experienced personally. My resounding support for [p]ro [b]ono legal 
work therefore comes from experience.”94 
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As discussed above, experience through pro bono work can also enhance 
employability.  Students made frequent references to the opportunity to build their 
CV: 
“Pro bono work is invaluable to the CV of any law student, and is quickly becoming a 
necessity rather than an addition. It is not difficult to see why. Pro bono work provides 
hands-on experience with real life clients, cases and legal processes. If a candidate can 
demonstrate a proven ability for the kind of tasks which would be assigned to them during 
employment, then half the battle is already won.”95 
Further, another student considered the issue of pro bono from the perspective of 
potential employers and satisfying their own pro bono initiatives: 
“More and more law firms see the need for pro bono work and expect their lawyers to 
contribute. Why wait until it’s expected of you? Impress them by having made a start on 
your own initiative” 
Whilst the students suggest that pro bono will assist them in securing employment, 
interestingly, graduate recruitment is also cited as a reason for law firms to have pro 
bono programmes.  The Law Society of England and Wales report that:  
‘New graduates expect much more than just a healthy remuneration package and good 
career prospects; many law firms report that students being interviewed for vacation 
                                                          
95 Essay 1 
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schemes ask detailed questions about their firm’s pro bono programme and the 
opportunities available to them.’96 
It appears that law firms, in part, will offer a pro bono programme to attract high-
calibre graduates while students will undertake pro bono opportunities to secure 
employment.  This suggests that pro bono capacity is potentially increased by both law 
firms and students desire to stand out to each other. 
 
 Academic 
Four of the students identified enhancing a student’s academic understanding of the 
law as a motivating factor to undertake pro bono work.97  The theme of this motivation 
is that pro bono work improves their academic understanding of the law by placing it 
into context as shown in the quote below: 
“Academics have long discussed the ramifications of graduates that are technically sound 
in knowledge of the law itself and the procedural steps that accompany statute, but could 
not begin to understand the effects on a client of the application of said statute. For 
example, you may understand that an application can be made under Section 33 of the 
Family Law Act 1996 for an Occupation Order but until you have met the client who 
happens to be a victim of domestic violence, who fears for the safety of her children and 
                                                          
96 The Law Society of England and Wales, ‘Pro Bono Manual: A practical guide and resource kit for 
solicitors’ (2016); See also Australian Pro Bono Centre, n.76  
97 See McKeown, n.23, xxix.  Students also reported benefiting from a better academic understanding 
of the law 
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understood how this application will affect this whole [family’s] life you cannot truly 
believe yourself to be educated in that area of law.”98 
There was also an appreciation from these students that the academic law can be 
different to the practical law with one student stating: 
“[Although] it’s easy to get lost in the intricacies of implied terms and the construction 
of contracts, practical law is often very different to academic law. Therefore, for the 
enthusiast, exposure to real cases and the ability to assist and advise both collaboratively 
and autonomously is an excellent learning tool and will invariably help cement essential 
legal principles in the context of tangible problems.”99 
 
 Satisfaction 
Personal and job satisfaction is often cited as a reason to undertake pro bono work.  
There is an inherent satisfaction in doing a good deed and doing a good job for 
someone.  Dinovitzer and Garth report that engaging in some pro bono work provided 
a sense of satisfaction for respondents although more pro bono hours significantly 
decreased satisfaction.100  This supports the notion that doing some altruistic work is 
beneficial but doing too much may have a negative impact on the individual.  It is 
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100 Ronit Dinovitzer and Bryant G. Garth, ‘Pro Bono as an Elite Strategy in Early Lawyer Careers’ in 
Private Lawyers and the Public Interest: The evolving role of pro bono in the legal profession (Robert 
Granfield and Lynn Mather eds. 2009), 
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suggested that this negative impact may be as a result of too little paying work within 
the law firm or a ‘lack of fit’ between the pro bono and the business.101  
Satisfaction was also cited and appeared to be a strong motivating factor by six of the 
students in their essays with one student saying: 
“Law students are rewarded and paid in the sense of job satisfaction. The payment is the 
feeling you get knowing that you have been able to help someone. Knowing that you are 
able to put what you have learnt in to practice. Knowing that if you can successfully 
handle a [pro bono] case, you can be successful when you graduate”102 
Further, one student reflects upon the often-perceived burden of pro bono work and 
the hardships faced by law students stating: 
“For those that live and love the law, pro bono does not burden the volunteer with having 
to work; it gifts them with getting to work. It allows the long hours spent in the library, 
the years of debt following extortionate professional qualification fees, and the mountain 
of extra-curricular obligations required to succeed as a lawyer to be mere afterthoughts 
for the student.”103 
Whilst personal satisfaction may be a highly influential factor motiving students to 
undertake pro bono, the impact of the work must also be borne in mind.  It must be 
remembered that students have other commitments, whether this be on their 
programme of study or outside of the university.  Further, any pro bono programme 
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to complement the students’ studies and thus provide a fit and therefore maintain 
anticipated satisfaction.   
 
 Networking/Professional Relationships 
Pro bono programmes will often bring students into contact with other members of 
the legal profession.  This contact can be categorised as a benefit to the student.104  This 
may be due to collaboration between the university and an external law firm.  
Alternatively, students may liaise with opposing lawyers in relation to their case.  Two 
students highlighted that pro bono work can result in the development of professional 
relationships although the perception was be of personal benefit to the student.  Whilst 
not explicit in the comment below, it is likely to mean that the student can utilise the 
contact to enhance future employment prospects for example:  
“[L]inks can be established with important legal organisations. As a law student, it is 
important to establish as many contacts as possible and pro bono work provides a fantastic 
opportunity to create meaningful relationships which may prove useful in the future.”105 
 
  
                                                          
104 Harry S. Margolis, ‘The Elder Law Clinic’ in The ElderLaw Portfolio Series Release #43 (Harry S. 
Margolis, Christine J. Vincent. Esq, and Daniel Waltz eds 2013) 1B-13  
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As with all studies, the conclusions of this study are subject to its limitations.  In 
particular, this was a small-scale study considering the opinions of students based at 
a one university.  It is likely that the students who participated in the study had a 
predisposition to pro bono and altruistic behaviour, thus were interested in the subject 
matter of the study.  However, the incentive of a prize may have mitigated this factor 
and attracted the views of those individuals who are more extrinsically motivated.  
However, I suggest we can learn from the students and assist in the development of 
future pro bono programmes.   
 
Student Motivations 
The students who participated in this study clearly demonstrated mixed motivations 
for undertaking pro bono work.  Whilst many of the motivations were for personal 
benefit such as enhancing their skills, knowledge and employability, there was also 
recognition amongst all the students that pro bono work has wider social benefits 
including the promotion of access to justice and enhancing the community in which 
they live.  One student expressed this as follows: 
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“Pro Bono work operates to defend the vulnerable in society…[t]his alone means pro bono 
is well worth the time and effort for students, regardless of the useful personal skills and 
confidence they will also develop in the process.”106 
Whilst another student stated: 
“You may be able to do some good, and that will be of benefit to you as well as society: we 
all have to play in social responsibility”107 
There is a link between the students cited motivations for undertaking pro bono work 
and Adult Learning Theory.  As such, there is a theoretical basis as to why the 
provision of pro bono opportunities in law schools will enhance student skills, legal 
knowledge and consequentially, employability.  Pro bono work is therefore an 
educational experience for the students.   
Firstly, it is necessary to engage the students in the culture of pro bono work, 
recognising that the motivation for each student will be different.  As such, perhaps 
there we should not isolate individual motivators but instead recognise the holistic 
nature of motivation.  The Andragogical Model assumes that adults, when 
undertaking to learn something on their own, will invest considerable time into 
investigating the benefits of the activity.108  As educators, we can draw the student’s 
                                                          
106 Essay 6 
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108 Malcolm S. Knowles, Elwood F. Holton and Richard A. Swanson, ‘The Adult Learner: The 
Definitive Classic in Adult Education and Human Resource Development’ (2012) 7th Edn Routledge 
Oxon 63; see also Frank S. Bloch, ‘The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education’ (1982) 35:2 
Vanderbilt Law Review 321 for discussion on application of Adult Learning Theory to clinical legal 
education 
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attention to an array of benefits that they can evaluate and align with their own 
objectives.  Further, if a student opts to undertake pro bono work, they will feel a sense 
of autonomy thus aligning with the notion of ‘self-concept’.109  Knowles at al. state that 
‘[t]he minute adults walk into an activity labelled “education,” “training,” or anything 
synonymous, they hark back to their conditioning in their previous school experience, 
put on their dunce hats of dependency, fold their arms, sit back, and say “teach me.”’110  
Through engagement in pro bono activity, students are engaged in self-directed 
learning and less likely to resent or resist the learning activity. 
The pro bono experience in itself aligns with the Androgogical Model as the emphasis 
‘is on experiential techniques – techniques that tap into the experience of the 
learners.’111  Students also develop a ‘readiness to learn’112 because they are dealing 
with real life legal problems that require them to seek out and assimilate the relevant 
knowledge and skills. 
Adults also have a life-centred orientation to learning and therefore learn ‘new 
knowledge, understanding, skills, values and attitudes most effectively when they are 
presented in the context of application to real-life situations.’113  Assisting a pro bono 
client with a real legal problem will therefore assist student in acquiring legal 
                                                          
109 Ibid 
110 Ibid, 64 
111 Ibid 
112 Ibid, 65 
113 Ibid, 66 
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knowledge and skill but also will influence their values and attitudes through 
exposure to new people and situations.114   
Finally, the most important motivators for adult learning are ‘internal pressures’ such 
as a desire for increased job satisfaction and self-esteem.115  We can see that the 
students are exhibiting such motivation.116  
The question then becomes how we capitalise on these motivations to instil a culture 
of pro bono and volunteering within the law school whilst providing a rewarding 
educational experience for the students. 
 
Pro bono in law school 
As outlined above, Adult Learning Theory means there is an educational basis for 
incorporating pro bono programmes in law schools.  However, it is important that 
such programmes are well designed to engage students and achieve the desired 
outcomes. 
Extrinsic motivation means that students are likely to engage with the programmes.  
The students value the skills development, the experience that they will acquire and, 
as a consequence the enhanced employability.  The supervision of the programme and 
the students are important to ensure that students achieve the learning outcomes, and 
                                                          
114 For example, Behre, n.50; Maresh, n.24; Schmedemann, n.24 
115 Knowles, n.108, 67 
116 See n.102 and n.103 
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do not become merely observers but are responsible within the role of a lawyer 
creating an environment of autonomy and self-directed learning. 
It is also important that pro bono programmes expose students to new people from 
different backgrounds.  Intrinsically, students often value meeting strangers and this 
has the potential to create the ‘disorientating moment’.  Again, through guidance from 
their supervisor, students can reflect upon the situation, challenging their own 
perceptions of the world.  Through such self-examination, students can achieve 
‘integration’ on the ‘taxonomy of human motivation’ and internalise thus an 
extrinsically motivated experience will hold intrinsic interest.   
 
Conclusion 
We do not have the necessary evidence to draw any conclusions as to whether 
students will become intrinsically motivated to engage in public service after 
university as a longitudinal study would be required.  However, on a theoretical basis, 
there is evidence to suggest that students can be extrinsically motivated to engage.  
Through mere experience, some students may experience the inherent satisfaction of 
pro bono activity and therefore wish to continue.  Others however may ‘identify’ the 
personal importance of the activity through an appreciation of its application to their 
own life and career goals, thus beginning the process of internalisation.  As educators 
we can guide our students through the reflective process, help them make sense of 
their experiences and integrate the pro bono experience with their sense of self.  Whilst 
the students are still extrinsically motivated, the perceived locus of causality will 
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become more internalised thus, hopefully, instilling a continuing commitment to pro 
bono work in the future.  
There are numerous reasons why students may wish to undertake pro bono work 
whilst at law school.  Of these, experience is a highly influential factor as it not only 
provides a strong extrinsic motivation to participate in pro bono work initially, but the 
pro bono experience may also facilitate a deep intrinsic motivation to continue with 
the work into the future.  Through experience, students can develop skills and 
improve their employability but they can also feel the inherent satisfaction of helping 
others and making a difference.   
The development of pro bono initiatives in law schools benefits students personally 
and the students recognise this.  Pro bono schemes will also benefit the community 
through the assistance offered by the students whilst engaging in the programme.  As 
such, the University may also benefit from an enhanced reputation amongst the 
student body and the wider community. 
As a consequence of providing pro bono programmes, students may reflect upon their 
experience and assess their own values and attitudes towards society, which may have 
a transformative impact upon their lives and their continuing participation in such as 
activity.  However, to achieve this, the students must be provided with not only the 
experience but also the ability to reflect upon that experience.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CAN SOCIAL JUSTICE VALUES BE TAUGHT 






This chapter will explore whether we can teach students the value of social 
justice through clinical methodology. It is important to understand where 
people have come from and where they are going. With this is mind, this 
chapter will consider how an individual’s values are moulded, as well as 
explore the institutional values of the legal profession.  
 
The definition of social justice has been explored elsewhere in this book. 
As a term, it is often used within education without definition, with a sense 
that the definition is obvious. Social justice has been defined as “equality 
of rights for all peoples and the possibility for all human beings, without 
discrimination, to benefit from the economic and social progress 
disseminated and secured through international cooperation”.1 
 
This definition encompasses common conceptions of social justice 
espoused by Rawls’ Principles of Justice: Equal Liberties; Equal 
Opportunity and the Difference Principle.2 This can be contrasted with the 
elements of social justice espoused by Miller, namely: need (referring to 
1  United Nations, “Social Justice in an Open World: The Role of the United 
Nations.” 2006. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/ifsd/SocialJustice.pdf 
accessed 15 March 2016.  
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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the basic necessities), desert (referring to reward); and equality (the notion 
that citizens are equal).3  
 
It has been argued that social justice is a value of the legal profession and 
therefore lawyers should seek to promote and attain social justice through 
their work. It is sometimes difficult to reconcile the abstract theories with 
the practical application of the law. However, these theories can be utilized 
to critically analyse and evaluate policy, legal processes and the law to 
determine whether they are consistent with the notion of social justice.  
 
This chapter will consider this perceived value and surrounding issues 
primarily from the context of the legal profession and legal education 
within England and Wales. In particular, the chapter will explore whether 
clinical legal education can be used to teach students the value of social 
justice. Reference will be made to other jurisdictions and many of the 
issues considered will be universal. 
Values and the Individual 
It is necessary to understand the notion of values in order to discuss the 
issues concerned in this chapter. This is a difficult task given the volume 
of literature across a range of disciplines. A starting point is a layman’s 
understanding of values as defined in the Oxford Dictionary as “principles 
or standards of behaviour; one’s judgement of what is important in life”.4 
  
From this definition, we get a sense of the personal nature of values. An 
individual’s values are a culmination of their own life experience. Family, 
social and economic background, religion, and relationships are all 
prevalent in forming values. Socialization theory usually stresses the 
family as the most important mechanism for the transmission of values, 
although the influence of peers, school and sociohistorical events have also 
been recognized.5 Webb states that whilst we draw on “many familial and 
3 David Miller, Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999. 
4  See http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/value accessed 30 
August 2016. 
5 Dean R. Hoge, Gregory H. Petrillo and Ella I. Smith, “Transmission of Religious 
and Social Values from Parents to Teenage Children.” Journal of Marriage and 
Family 44, no. 3 (1982): 569. 
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wider cultural influences to help shape our value system, the ultimate 
construct is our own, and each of us builds our own set of value priorities 
out of our life experience.”6 
 
It is therefore important to recognize that each person will have their own 
value system, even where they have shared similar experiences. 
Values in Legal Education 
There is a fundamental question as to the extent of the role played by 
institutions of higher education in educating students in relation to values. 
We can question whether these institutions teach knowledge or whether 
they have a broader remit. 
 
It has been argued that teachers in higher education can do two things:  
 
(1) introduce students to bodies of knowledge and traditions of inquiry that 
had not previously been part of their experience; and (2) equip those same 
students with the analytical skills – of argument, statistical modelling, 
laboratory procedure – that will enable them to move confidently within 
those traditions and to engage in independent research after a course is 
over.7 
 
However, it has also been argued that institutions of higher education have 
a broader role for their students. Lewis argues that 
 
universities have forgotten their larger educational role for college 
students. They succeed, better than ever, as creators and repositories of 
knowledge. But they have forgotten that the fundamental job of 
undergraduate education is to turn eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds into 
twenty-one- and twenty-two-year-olds, to help them grow up, to learn who 
they are, to search for a larger purpose for their lives, and to leave college 
as better human beings.8  
 
6  Julian Webb, “Taking Values Seriously.” In The Ethics Project in Legal 
Education, edited by Michael Robertson, Lillian Corbin, Kieran Tranter and 
Francesca Bartlett. London: Routledge, 2011. 
7 Stanley Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008: 12–13. 
8 Harry R. Lewis, Excellence Without a Soul: Does Liberal Education Have a 
Future? New York: Public Affairs, 2007: xiv. 
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There is also an argument that “[c]reating and imbuing knowledge is a 
process that has to be accompanied by the cultivation of ethical standards 
that guide the application of that knowledge”.9 In essence, with knowledge 
comes power and with power comes responsibility. If institutions of higher 
education provide students with knowledge they also have the 
responsibility to equip their students with the ability to use that 
knowledge. 
 
Further, Heuser suggests that “the role of tertiary education serves as the 
foundation for expanding social and economic development”. 10  If we 
consider the mission statements of universities, it is clear that their remit is 
broader than teaching knowledge and skills. For example, Newcastle 
University aims to “play a leading role in the economic, social and cultural 
development of the North East of England”. 11  Northumbria University 
states that it “will have a strong national and international presence, while 
continuing to play a leading role in the North East, contributing to its 
business and economy and its culture and success as a civil society”.12 
Both these statements recognize that the universities are part of the wider 
community and therefore have a broader social remit. 
 
The consensus is that universities do have a broader remit to engage in 
ethical and values education. If this argument is accepted, we should then 
consider how this broader remit is relevant to legal education. 
 
Duhaime asks “why did the student go to law school?” and answers, “[t]o 
become a lawyer”.13 If we are teaching students to become lawyers, we 
must consider whether we are teaching them the values of the legal 
profession, or broader societal values.  
 
It is arguable that a traditional legal education in England and Wales does 
not teach values. This was identified in the Legal Education and Training 
9  Brian L. Heuser, “Academic Social Cohesion within Higher Education.” 
Prospects 37 (2007): 299. 
10 Ibid.: 294. 
11 See http://www.ncl.ac.uk/about/vision/mission/ accessed 29 March 2016. 
12  See https://intranet.northumbria.ac.uk/vision2025/vision2025/ accessed 29 
March 2016. 
13 Gretchen Duhaime, “Practicing on Purpose: Promoting Personal Wellness and 
Professional Values in Legal Education.” Touro Law Review 28, no. 4 (2012): 
1207. 
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Review (hereafter LETR) that highlighted professional ethics and legal 
values as a gap, or at least an area where something more or better could 
be done in legal education.14  
 
In England and Wales, legal education has traditionally been divided into 
stages: academic, vocational and training. 15  The academic stage has 
traditionally been taught through a three-year Qualifying Law Degree or, 
for those who have not obtained a Qualifying Law Degree, a one-year 
Graduate Diploma in Law. The vocational stage of qualification requires 
students to complete the Legal Practice Course if they wish to qualify as a 
solicitor or the Bar Professional Training Course if they wish to qualify as 
a barrister. Before admission to the profession, students wishing to qualify 
as solicitors must complete a two-year training contract whilst barristers 
must complete a one-year pupillage. Both the training contract and the 
pupillage are completed in practice.16  
 
This separation of the stages of qualification has meant legal ethics has not 
traditionally featured at the academic stage although the Law Society of 
England and Wales has contended that legal ethics should be a core area of 
a Qualifying Law Degree.17 Further, legal ethics is regarded as one of the 
most important areas of knowledge by members of the legal profession.18 
 
However, it is not universally accepted that ethics and values should be 
taught at undergraduate level. Legal academics have taught from a “neutral 
and value-free perspective” and, where moral issues are raised, the 
14 LETR: Legal Education and Training Review. “Setting Standards: The Future of 
Legal Services Education and Training Regulation in England and Wales” 2013: 
para 2.101. http://letr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/LETR-Report.pdf accessed 30 
August 2016. 
15  Some universities, such as Northumbria University, have integrated the 
academic and vocational stages of qualification. A list of institutions offering 
integrated programmes is available at http://www.sra.org.uk/students/exempting-
law-degrees.page accessed 30 August 2016.  
16 Please note that at the time of writing the Solicitors Regulation Authority is 
reviewing the approach to qualification as a solicitor. Further details can be 
obtained at https://www.sra.org.uk/t4t/ accessed 29 March 2016. The Bar 
Standards Board are also reviewing the route to qualification as a barrister. Further 
details can be found at https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/qualifying-as-a-
barrister/future-bar-training/ accessed 29 March 2016. 
17 LETR (n14): para. 2.57. 
18 Ibid.: para. 2.68. 
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academic’s role is to educate the students about the complexities of the 
argument but express no opinion as to the relative merits of the various 
possible moral positions in relation to the issues raised.19 It is of note that 
one academic is quoted in the LETR report as saying: 
 
And I can see that the more you start incorporating these skills into the 
degree within our sort of timetable, things like communication and 
mooting and legal skills and presentations and group work and possibly 
ethics – the more you start getting these skills in, the less room you have to 
teach philosophy, theory, rights, justice, the liberal arts kind of side of it.20 
 
The LETR report recommended that Qualifying Law Degrees and the 
Graduate Diploma in Law should embed an awareness and understanding 
of legal ethics and professional values.21 However, as the comment above 
suggests, there is not universal agreement within higher education as to 
whether professional ethics should be incorporated at undergraduate level. 
This raises the question as to whether a law degree is a professional 
degree. Again, referring back to the separation of the stages of 
qualification in the English and Welsh legal system, it is perhaps easier to 
reconcile that professional ethics are embodied within the Legal Practice 
Course or the Bar Professional Training Course, being the vocational 
stages of qualification. After all, not every entrant to an undergraduate law 
programme will pursue a career in the law, whilst it is likely those 
enrolling on a vocational programme at least set out to pursue such a 
career. 
 
The Law Society of England and Wales states that 31,800 people applied 
to study law at undergraduate level in 2014 of which 21,775 were accepted 
on to courses. In the year ending 31 July 2014 there were 5,001 new 
traineeships registered.22 The Bar Standards Board states that there were 
397 new pupillages registered in the year 2013/14.23 Whilst we must be 
19 Fiona Cownie, “Alternative Values in Legal Education.” Legal Ethics 6, no. 2 
(2003): 179. 
20 LETR (n14): para. 2.103. 
21 Ibid.: para. 4.104. 
22  See https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/Law-careers/Becoming-a-solicitor/Entry-
trends/ accessed 29 March 2016. 
23  See https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media-centre/research-and-statistics/ 
statistics/pupillage-statistics/ accessed 29 March 2016. Please note that in the year 
2012/13 there was a rise in the number of pupillages registered to 514. This is 
explained by a change from a shared recruitment timetable where all pupillages 
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careful about looking at statistics in isolation, these figures support the 
anecdotal evidence that the majority of those studying law at an 
undergraduate level will not pursue a career as a solicitor or a barrister. It 
is therefore questionable whether we need to teach professional ethics and 
values at an undergraduate level. 
 
As entrants to the legal profession in England and Wales are required to 
possess a Qualifying Law Degree or Graduate Diploma in Law, these are 
professional programmes of study with the curriculum set by professional 
bodies.24 Where a programme of study is required to enter a particular 
profession, this should be regarded as a professional degree. It is however 
possible to obtain a law degree which is not a Qualifying Law Degree and 
therefore such a programme may be regarded as a liberal arts degree. 
 
“[P]rofessional education aims to initiate novice practitioners to think, to 
perform, and to conduct themselves (that is, to act morally and ethically) 
like professionals.” 25  Sullivan et al. stated that professional education 
involved six tasks: 
 
1. Developing in students the fundamental knowledge and skill, 
especially an academic knowledge base and research 
2. Providing students with the capacity to engage in complex practice 
3. Enabling students to make judgments under conditions of uncertainty 
4. Teaching students to learn from experience 
5. Introducing students to the disciplines of creating and participating in a 
responsible and effective community 
6. Forming students able and willing to join an enterprise of public 
service.26 
 
were registered at the start of the legal year, beginning in October, to a system 
whereby organizations offering pupillage recruit to their own timetable. This meant 
that pupillages registered in 2012/13 would previously have been included in the 
2013/14 statistics.  
24 The foundations of legal knowledge subjects for a Qualifying Law Degree are 
contract, tort, constitutional and administrative law, criminal law, property, equity 
and trusts and law of the European Union 
25 William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond and Lee 
S. Schulman, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law. Jossey-
Bass, 2007: 22. 
26 Ibid. 
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The LETR report made a number of recommendations as to the future of 
legal education in England and Wales. It has been recognized that: 
 
The learning outcomes at initial stages of [legal services education and 
training] should include reference (as appropriate to the individual 
practitioner’s role) to an understanding of the relationship between 
morality and law, the values underpinning the legal system, and the role of 
lawyers in relation to those values.27 
 
Further support for the importance of teaching ethics and values can be 
found in the Subject Benchmark Statement for Law published by the 
Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (hereafter QAA).28 The 
Subject Benchmark Statement was revised to reflect “that a law graduate is 
far more than the sum of their knowledge and understanding, and is a well 
skilled graduate with considerable transferable generic and subject-specific 
knowledge, skills and attributes”.29 The QAA expects that: 
 
At undergraduate level students are aware of the consequences of law as a 
human creation and that it is subject to the ethics and values of those that 
make and apply it. The implications of this in the context of securing 
justice and the public interest is considered as part of legal study . . . it is 
expected that students will have opportunities to discuss ethical questions 
and dilemmas that arise in law and to consider the features of ethical 
decision making.30 
 
In the UK, it is expected that a graduate of law with honours should 
demonstrate “awareness of principles and values of law and justice, and of 
ethics” as well as “knowledge and understanding of theories, concepts, 
values, principles and rules of public and private laws within an 
institutional, social, national and global context”.31 
 
27 LETR (n14): xiv. 
28 “Subject Benchmark Statements form part of the UK Quality Code for Higher 
Education . . . which sets out the Expectations that all providers for UK higher 
education . . . are required to meet” QAA. “Subject Benchmark Statement: Law.” 
(2015): 2, http://qaa.ac.uk/en/Publications/Documents/SBS-Law-15.pdf accessed 
30 August 2016. 
29 QAA (n28): 4. 
30 Ibid.: 6. 
31 Ibid.: 7. 
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The literature suggests that law schools should certainly be engaging in 
education of professional ethics and values. However, as many law 
graduates will not pursue a legal career, it is also important that students 
have an ability to apply these values, as well as their ability to engage in 
critical analysis and evaluation to wider societal values. 
Values and the Profession 
If, as stated above, it is a university’s role to educate students in relation to 
professional values, it is important to identify what we mean by these 
professional values. Professional ethics can be seen as “a critical defining 
feature of professional service”.32 There is an innate conflict between the 
roles of a legal educator, and at the heart of that conflict is determining 
what we are trying to achieve. On one hand, we are providing a 
professional education to students, teaching them the knowledge and skills 
to be lawyers. On the other, we are required to teach our students the 
values of that profession. The legal profession spans numerous 
jurisdictions, and we must therefore question whether it is possible to 
identify a set of core values for a global legal profession. 
 
The International Bar Association describes the lawyer’s role as 
 
the client’s trusted advisor and representative, as a professional respected 
by third parties, and as an indispensable participant in the fair 
administration of justice. By embodying all these elements, the lawyer, 
who faithfully serves a client’s interests and protects the client’s rights, 
also fulfils the functions of the lawyer in society – which are to forestall 
and prevent conflicts, to ensure that conflicts are resolved in accordance 
with recognised principles of civil, public or criminal law and with due 
account of the rights and interests, to negotiate and draft agreements and 
other transactional necessities, to further the development of the law, and 
to defend liberty, justice and the rule of law.33  
 
This description sees the lawyer’s role as multifaceted, with obligations to 
individual clients and wider obligations to society. The International Bar 
Association has identified ten principles to “promote and foster the ideals 
32 LETR (n14): para 2.71. 
33 International Bar Association, “IBA International Principles on Conduct for the 
Legal Profession” (2011): 10. 
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of the legal profession”. 34  The principles are independence; honesty, 
integrity and fairness; conflicts of interest; confidentiality/professional 
secrecy; clients’ interest; lawyers’ undertaking; clients’ freedom; property 
of clients and third parties; competence; and fees.35 The Council of Bars 
and Law Societies of Europe (hereafter CCBE) have also set out a list of 
core principles, which are “essential for the proper administration of 
justice, access to justice and the right to a fair trial”.36 The core principles 
demonstrate a remarkable similarity to those identified by the International 
Bar Association. 
 
It is perhaps worth a look at the language used by the International Bar 
Association and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe. They 
have used the term “principles” which is arguably different from “values” 
and “rules”. Webb describes values as “highly abstract, pervasive and 
aspirational”. Rules are “concrete, highly situational and deontological”. 
Principles however sit somewhere between “sharing the deontological 
character of rules, but tend to be more abstract than rules”.37 It is therefore 
a question as to whether principles can be said to represent the values of 
the legal profession. The Macrate Report identifies four fundamental 
values of the profession: provision of competent representation; striving to 
promote justice, fairness and morality; striving to improve the profession 
and professional self-development.38 The ACLEC Report identifies legal 
values as “a commitment to the rule of law, to justice, fairness and high 
ethical standards, to acquiring and improving professional skills, to 
representing clients without fear or favour, to promoting equality of 
opportunity, and to ensuring that adequate legal services are provided to 
those who cannot afford to pay for them”.39 Other values cited in literature 
“include loyalty to one’s client, social justice, fidelity to a set of legal 
norms, or most recently, interpersonal consideration such as care, mercy 
34 Ibid.: 5. 
35 Ibid.: 5–6. 
36 CCBE, “Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code 
of Conduct” (2013): 5. 
37 Webb (n6): 13. 
38 American Bar Association, Legal Education and Professional Development – An 
Education Continuum: Report of The Task Force on Law Schools and the 
Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992: 140–141.  
39 The Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct, 
First Report on Legal Education and Training, (1996): para 2.4. 
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and connectedness”.40 Whilst it is clear that there are perhaps differing 
views as to the values of the legal profession, there is also a significant 
level of consensus even if expressed in slightly different ways. The 
principles identified by the International Bar Association appear to reflect 
these values and provide the necessary framework upon which build a 
code of conduct reflecting those values. It is worth noting the words of 
The Hon. Justice Susan Kiefel of the High Court of Australia as regards 
the Rules of Professional Conduct: 
 
The Rules reflect the profession’s thinking and identify standards of 
conduct for disciplinary purposes and serve as guides to practitioners. They 
cannot provide the answer to every ethical and moral question which a 
lawyer may face; for that a lawyer needs his or her own moral compass. A 
lawyer also needs a clear and firm understanding of what it is to be a 
member of the legal profession. It is in this regard that the profession’s 
Code of Conduct may offer valuable guidance.41 
 
One area of debate relates to whether a lawyer can, or indeed should, 
decline or cease to act where the client’s case conflicts with the lawyer’s 
personal values. Nicolson and Webb speculate on the “standard 
conception” meaning that “lawyers are expected zealously to represent the 
interests of anyone who is prepared to pay their fees, or qualifies for a state 
legal aid scheme, irrespective of the morality of the client’s objectives or 
the most effective means of achieving such objective”.42 With this in mind, 
the starting point is to consider the relevant codes of conduct. In England 
and Wales, the relevant codes are set out in the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority’s (hereafter SRA) Code of Conduct43 for solicitors or the Bar 
40 W. Bradley Wendel, “Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics.” Washington University 
Law Review 78, no. 1 (2000): 114. 
41 Hon. Justice Susan Keifel, “Ethics and the Profession of the Lawyer.” Paper 
from Queensland Law Society, The Vincents’ 48th annual Symposium, 2010, 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-
justices/kiefelj/kiefelj-2010-03-26.pdf accessed 24 August 2016. 
42  Donald Nicolson Julian Webb, “Lawyers’ Duties, Adversarialism and 
Partisanship in UK Legal Ethics.” Legal Ethics 7, no. 2 (2004): 134. 
43 The SRA is the regulatory body of the solicitor’s profession in England and 
Wales. The Code of Conduct is available at  
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page accessed 30 August 
2016. 
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Standards Board Handbook44 for barristers. The SRA Code of Conduct 
sets out 10 mandatory principles and states that solicitors must: 
 
1. uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice; 
2. act with integrity; 
3. not allow your independence to be compromised; 
4. act in the best interests of each client; 
5. provide a proper standard of service to your clients; 
6. behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in you 
and in the provision of legal services; 
7. comply with your legal and regulatory obligations and deal with 
your regulators and ombudsman in an open, timely and co-
operative manner; 
8. run your business or carry out your role in the business effectively 
and in accordance with proper governance and sound financial and 
risk management principles; 
9. run your business or carry out your role in the business in a way 
that encourages equality of opportunity and respect for diversity; 
and 
10. protect client money and assets.45  
 
The BSB set out similar obligations as core duties. The mandatory 
principles and core duties share the vision of the International Bar 
Association and CCBE principles for the legal profession. Thus, it appears 
to reflect the values of the profession.  
 
Solicitors are able to decline instructions from clients, or indeed terminate 
instructions, so long as they comply with the law and the Code of 
Conduct.46 In essence, a solicitor can decline instructions so long as the 
reason for doing so does not constitute unlawful discrimination. That said, 
in practice, a solicitors’ firm is a commercial undertaking and therefore it 
is questionable how many solicitors would decline to act in an area where 
they are competent to do so. This is particularly important in an era where 
44  The BSB is the regulatory body of barristers in England and Wales. The 
Handbook setting out the Code of Conduct is available at  
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1731225/bsb_handbook_sept_2015.p
df accessed 30 August 2016. 
45 SRA. “SRA Code of Conduct 2011.” (2016). Available at  
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page  
46 SRA (n45): O(1.3). 
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the traditional legal profession in England and Wales is under threat 
following the advent of alternative business structures,47 the decline of 
legal aid48 and changes to civil litigation.49 As a consequence of these 
threats law firms must, more than ever, commercialize their practice. With 
increasing levels of commercialization, and the need to do more at a 
cheaper cost, there is a threat to the “moral compass” of the profession.50 
Goldsmith recounts a conversation with a lawyer that appears to highlight 
this issue: 
 
There is no more idea of service to a client. . . . It is all just billable hours. 
We are machines making money for the firm. We use precedents that have 
been agreed at head office, different precedents for different kinds of 
circumstances. Who cares how much money we make as individuals, even 
if it is a lot? The values have gone out of our lives.51 
 
These comments demonstrate the importance of values, personal and 
professional, as the individual appears to have lost the notion of being a 
professional and instead describes himself as a “machine”. This supports a 
notion that once values are lost, individuals lose job satisfaction. 
 
However, whilst in theory solicitors are entitled to decline instructions, 
one rule in the barrister’s code of conduct of particular note is known as 
the “cab-rank” rule and states: 
47 An alternative business structure, an entity created by the Legal Service Act 
2007, allows non-lawyers to own and invest in law firms. 
48 Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(LASPO) significantly reduced the scope of civil legal aid in England and Wales. 
Prior to LASPO, the Access to Justice Act 1999 provided that all areas were in 
scope unless specifically excluded in Schedule 2 of that Act. However, LASPO 
amended the scope rules so the all areas were out of scope unless provided for 
within Schedule 1 of that Act. Section 10 of LASPO provides for exceptional case 
funding but a detailed consideration of the provisions is beyond this chapter.  
49  Part 2 of LAPSO implemented reforms to the funding of civil litigation in 
England and Wales such as changes to conditional fee agreements and the 
extension of the availability of Damages Based Agreements. Further reforms 
included the increase in the small claims limit from £5,000 to £10,000 for non-
personal injury claims and significant increases to court fees. 
50 LETR (n14): para 2.71. 
51 Jonathan Goldsmith, “The Core Values of the Legal Profession for Lawyers 
Today and Tomorrow.” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 28, 
no. 3 (2008): 445. 
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If you receive instructions from a professional client . . . and the 
instructions are appropriate taking into account the experience, seniority 
and/or field of practice of yourself . . . you must . . . accept the instructions 
addressed specifically to you, irrespective of: 
a. the identity of the client; 
b. the nature of the case to which the instructions relate; 
c. whether the client is paying privately or is publicly funded; and 
d. any belief or opinion which you may have formed as to the character, 
reputation, cause, conduct, guilt or innocence of the client.52 
 
With the “cab-rank” rule the BSB explicitly state that a barrister cannot 
decline instructions on behalf of a client based upon their “belief or 
opinion” or in other words, their own moral perspective. Whilst it would 
be naïve to believe all barristers in practice will accept all instructions in 
which they are competent to act,53 nevertheless it is enshrined within the 
professional code of conduct that instructions cannot be declined merely 
because their client’s instructions conflict with the barrister’s personal 
values.  
 
Nicolson argues for the notion of moral activism in lawyers stating that 
“depending on the particular practice context and all the unique 
circumstances of each individual case, lawyers may be justified in refusing 
to represent particular individuals or (after moral dialogue) to do 
everything legal and not prohibited by professional rules for them”.54 It 
appears this argument fails to consider the position of the barrister, whose 
professional code of conduct prohibits the refusal of instructions. Further, 
it is arguable that the cab-rank rule promotes access to justice as it ensures 
representation for all clients “no matter how repugnant or ill founded” 
their cause.55 
 
However, an analysis beyond the professional obligations of barristers is 
warranted in light of the fact that solicitors, and lawyers in other 
jurisdictions, are not bound by the same professional code of conduct and 
52 BSB. The Bar Standards Board Handbook. (2015): 44, rC29,  
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1731225/bsb_handbook_sept_2015.p
df.  
53 For further commentary see Duncan Webb, “Civil Advocacy and the Dogma of 
Adversarialism.” Legal Ethics 7, no. 2 (2004): 213–215. 
54Donald Nicolson, “In Defense of Contextually Sensitive Moral Activism.”" Legal 
Ethics 7, no. 2 (2004): 269. 
55 Webb (n53), 214. 
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are therefore free to decline instructions. Dare argues that the role of law 
“in Western democracies is to mediate between reasonable but inconsistent 
views of what we should do as a community”.56 Dare considers a lawyer’s 
duty is to act in accordance with the principles of neutrality, non-
accountability and partisanship. If lawyers allow their own view of the 
good to influence their actions, they “‘privilege’ the view they favour and 
disenfranchise the view of the client”. 57  The principle of neutrality 
therefore serves an important function in ensuring someone has access to 
their legal rights regardless of how morally objectionable those rights may 
be. Further, the lawyer is not judged by the moral status of their client’s 
project and therefore the principle of non-accountability provides a 
defence for those who act for clients in unpopular cases. 58  Drawing a 
distinction between “mere-zeal” and “hyper-zeal”, Dare states that the 
principle of partisanship requires a lawyer to act with “mere-zeal”, that is 
“to zealously pursue the client’s legal rights. He is to be partisan in the 
sense that he must bring all his professional skills to bear upon the task of 
securing his client’s rights. But he is under no obligation to pursue 
interests that go beyond the law.”59 
 
Nicolson is critical of Dare’s contention, arguing that “[t]he idea that the 
law naturally mediates between competing interests ignores the unequal 
access of different social groups to the making and application of law, and 
the fact that law is already imbued with the values and interests of those 
who historically have held power in society”.60 Further, Nicolson argues 
against the proposition that lawyers should strive for legal reform rather 
than impose their personal morality on clients whose cause is unjust. He 
poses two problems, namely that the professional norms and practice 
context which discourages moral engagement is also likely to discourage 
lawyers from seeking law reform. Further, the institutions of government 
do not work sufficiently efficiently, fairly and democratically to justify 
lawyers being required to leave all moral and political decisions to the 
holders of formal power. 
 
56 Tim Dare, “Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers.” 
Legal Ethics 7, no. 1 (2004): 27.  
57 Ibid.: 28. 
58 Ibid.: 29. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Nicolson (n54), 270. 
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It appears, if I have understood the arguments correctly, that arguments for 
moral activism in lawyers undermine the democratic state, the rule of law 
and the administration of justice. It is the role of Parliament to make and 
repeal laws; a body elected based upon the manifesto promises of the 
various political parties and therefore, in theory, reflects the will of the 
people. It is the role of courts to apply the law as Parliament had intended. 
It is a lawyer’s role to apply those laws and advocate on behalf of their 
clients. If we accept the proposition that lawyers act as gatekeepers to the 
legal system, then it is not the role of a lawyer to deny access as to do so 
would be to deny justice. Sharwood summed this up when he stated, “[t]he 
lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in his judgment 
the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the function of both judge and 
jury”.61 Whilst some members of society are denied access to justice, due 
to the cost or other reasons, it seems illogical to suggest that lawyers 
address this balance by potentially depriving others of their legal rights. 
 
If we are teaching students to be lawyers, it is incumbent upon us to work 
within the ethical rules of the profession. However, as highlighted, the 
rules do not provide all the answers and therefore we must educate 
students on exercising their own moral compass. It is difficult to establish 
the extent of the role of lawyers in determining the relationship between 
morality and the law, and it is the topic of significant academic debate. 
However, I would contend that the base line for teaching professional 
ethics and values must be the relevant codes of conduct. However, should 
institutions of higher education, and therefore law schools, go beyond 
merely teaching professional ethics? This issue will be explored below 
within the context of clinical legal education. 
Values and Clinical Legal Education 
There is no universally accepted definition of clinical legal education. 
Kerrigan defines clinical legal education “as learning through participation 
in real or realistic legal interactions coupled with reflection on this 
experience”.62 If we consider social justice, clinical legal education has 
61  Editors, “‘Sharwood’s Professional Ethics.” University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 3 (1855): 193–203. 
62 Kevin Kerrigan, “What is Clinical Legal Education and Pro Bono.” In A Student 
Guide to Clinical Legal Education and Pro Bono, edited by Kevin Kerrigan and 
Victoria Murray. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011: 5. 
210
been particularly susceptible to this value. The central goal of clinical legal 
education is the engagement of students in the pursuit of social justice 
through the provision of legal services to the poor and others who lack 
access to legal services.63 Wizner contends that students are motivated to 
learn by being given the responsibility to handle real client cases. As the 
student gains a feeling of personal responsibility, so they grow a feeling of 
social responsibility for the provision of legal services to the poor. This 
sense of social responsibility occurs when representing those on a low 
income. Kerrigan deliberately avoids using social justice within the 
definition of clinical legal education. His rationale for doing so is that 
social justice should “be viewed as part of the culture of clinical legal 
education as opposed to its meaning”.64 
 
In understanding the social justice mission of clinical legal education, we 
must consider the history of the movement. In the United States, “the 
major social issues of the 1960s and 1970s – poverty and civil rights, the 
women’s movement, the Vietnam War – had a profound influence on the 
direction of clinical programmes, leading to greater student demand and 
more specific focus on providing legal services in areas such as poverty 
law, civil rights, women’s rights, consumer rights, and environmental 
protection”. 65  Within this environment students were critical of law 
schools, believing they “supported and perpetuated an unjust status quo”.66 
 
The development of clinical legal education in the UK was somewhat 
different and therefore we must consider this within the context of publicly 
funded litigation. The system of state funded litigation that we understand 
to be legal aid was introduced by the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949. At 
its inception, it was available to 80% of the adult population and was at 
63 Stephen Wizner, “Is Social Justice Still Relevant?” Boston College Journal of 
Law & Social Justice 32, no. 2 (2012): 345. 
64 Kerrigan (n62): 16. 
65 Jeff Giddings, Roger Burridge, Shelly A. M. Gavigan and Catherine F. Klein, 
“The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia.” In The Global Clinical Movement: Educating Lawyers for 
Social Justice edited by Frank S. Bloch, Oxford Scholarship, 2010 DOI: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381146.001.000193/acprof:oso/9780195381146.001.0
001 accessed 31 August 2016. 
66 Wizner (n63): 347. 
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least as comprehensive as any in the developed world.67 It is against this 
backdrop that access to justice was not a significant issue within the UK 
for the latter part of the twentieth century. There were a number of reforms 
to the legal aid system, notably the Legal Aid Act 1988 and the Access to 
Justice Act 1999. By 2009, the percentage of people eligible for publicly 
funded advice had fallen to 29%.68 However, the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 reduced the scope of legal aid with 
a view to saving the public purse an estimated £350 million in 2014/15 
annually over the longer term against a scheme which cost over £2 billion 
each year.69 Following the implementation of the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 in April 2013 there were large 
reductions in Legal Help70 workload and expenditure – around one-third of 
pre-LASPO levels as well as a substantial fall in civil representation71 and 
around two-thirds of pre-LASPO levels.72 
 
Further, it has been argued that clinical legal education exposes privileged 
students to social issues for the first time. For example, students coming 
from privileged and wealthy backgrounds are unaware of the needs of the 
67 Richard I. Morgan, “The Introduction of Civil Legal Aid in England and Wales, 
1914–1949.” Twentieth Century British History 5, no. 1 (1994): 73.  
68 Jon Robins, “Legal aid in 21st-century Britain.” The Guardian, 12 March 2009,  
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2009/mar/11/legal-aid-justice-gap accessed 30 
August 2016. 
69  Ministry of Justice, “Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales: the 
Government Response” (2011): 7,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228
890/8072.pdf  accessed 31 August 2016. 
70 “A form of civil legal service which includes advice and assistance about a legal 
problem, but does not include representation or advocacy in proceedings”. 
Ministry of Justice, A Guide to Legal Aid Statistics in England and Wales (2016): 
21, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
486060/a-guide-to-legal-aid-statistics-in-england-and-wales.pdf accessed 31 
August 2016. 
71 “Representation by solicitors and barristers for civil cases which could go to 
court.” Ministry of Justice (n70): 19.  
72 Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid Statistics in England and Wales July to September 
2015 (2015): 5. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486
034/legal-aid-statistics-bulletin-jul-to-sep-15.pdf accessed 31 August 2016. 
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poor. 73  Whilst this may be true in some countries, the arguments are 
perhaps weaker in the UK context. In the academic year 2014/15, 33% of 
young full-time first degree entrants in the UK were from a lower socio-
economic class.74 The percentage of UK domiciled young entrants to full-
time first degree courses in law from lower socio-economic classes was 
35.4%.75 Historically, live client clinics in the UK have been concentrated 
in new universities (former polytechnics and colleges of higher education 
that were given university status after 1992) with a 1996 study reporting 
that 23% of new universities offered a live client clinical programme in 
contrast to 5% of old universities (pre-1992 universities).76 Grimes states 
that activity on the clinical front “‘was led by [Northumbria University] 
and followed by Sheffield Hallam University”.77 Both institutions cited by 
Grimes are new universities and continue to have active live client clinical 
programmes. The percentage of young full-time first degree entrants from 
a lower socio-economic class in 2014/15 at Northumbria University was 
37.2% whilst Sheffield Hallam University has 40.8%.78 
 
As there is no data regarding the socio-economic class of students 
undertaking clinical programmes, no conclusions can be drawn. However, 
the data above suggests in a UK context that a significant proportion of 
students from less economically privileged backgrounds would have the 
opportunity to participate in clinical legal education programmes. It 
therefore does not support a general assertion that the student’s first 
73 For example see Jane Harris Aiken, “Striving to Teach Justice, Fairness, and 
Morality.” Clinical Law Review 4, no. 1 (1997): 1–64: 7; Pamela N. Phan, 
“Clinical Legal Education in China: In Pursuit of a Culture of Law and a Mission 
of Social Justice.” Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 8 (2005): 117–
152, at 126. 
74  HESA, “Table T1a –Participation of under-represented groups in higher 
education: UK domiciled young full-time first degree entrants 2014/15.” 
https://www.hesa.ac.uk/pis/urg accessed 31 August 2016. 
75 HESA, “Table SP5 – Percentage of UK domiciled young entrants to full-time 
first degree courses from NS-SEC Classes 4, 5, 6 and 7 by subject and entry 
qualification 2014/15.” https://www.hesa.ac.uk/pis/urg accessed 31 August 2016. 
76 Richard Grimes, Joel Klaff and Colleen Smith, “Legal Skills and Clinical Legal 
Education – A Survey of Undergraduate Law School Practice." Law Teacher 30, 
no.1 (1996): 63. 
77  Richard Grimes, “Learning Law by Doing Law in the UK.” International 
Journal of Clinical Legal Education 1 (2000): 55. 
78 Ibid. 
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exposure to the problems of the poor are during a clinical programme as 
many students may be from such a background. 
 
If the aim of a clinical programme is to inculcate a sense of public service 
in students, we must consider the evidence as to whether this aim is being 
met. Whilst you will hear numerous anecdotal accounts of the impact of 
clinical programmes on students, the empirical evidence is mixed. 
Quantitative studies suggest law school pro bono programmes have little 
or no impact on students and their willingness to undertake pro bono in the 
future.79 However, a study by Schmedemann reports that participation in a 
non-mandatory pro bono programme at law school correlated with pro 
bono participation by new lawyers.80 
 
A key aspect appears to relate to whether the law school pro bono activity 
was mandatory or voluntary. This is an important point in relation to the 
evidence as those who participate in voluntary pro bono activity at law 
school may already have a greater inclination to participate in pro bono 
work. In other words, participation in clinical programmes and pro bono 
work at law school arguably does not have any impact upon whether a 
student participates in their future career as they are already inclined to 
participate.  
 
Within clinical legal education programmes, the supervisor will play an 
important role, not least because they are responsible for the student’s 
work. The role of the clinical supervisor has been described as “training 
law students in lawyering skills, introducing students to the full scope of 
79 See Deboarh L. Rhode, “Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice.” Journal of 
Legal Education 53, no. 3 (2003): 413–464; Robert Granfield, “Institutionalizing 
Public Service in Law School: Results on the Impact of Mandatory Pro Bono 
Programs.” Buffalo Law Review 54, no. 5 (2007): 1355–1412; Josephine Palermo 
and Adrian Evans, “Almost There – Empirical Insights into Clinical Method and 
Ethics Courses in Climbing the Hill towards Lawyers’ Professionalism.” Griffith 
Law Review 17, no. 1 (2008): 252–284; Paul McKeown, “Law Student Attitudes 
towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience at Northumbria 
University.” International Journal of Clinical Legal Education 22, no. 1 (2015): 
[vi]-[xlv]. 
80  Deborah A. Schmedemann, “The Impact of Law School on Pro Bono 
Participation in Practice.” In Private Lawyers and the Public Interest: The 
Evolving Role of Pro Bono in the Legal Profession edited by Robert Granfield and 
Lynn Mather. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
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the legal system and its actors, and developing in students an 
understanding and appreciation of professional responsibility issues”.81 It 
is the latter role that may prove controversial with the notion of 
professional responsibility, incorporating professional values, being 
somewhat of a grey area. 
 
Many clinical supervisors have argued that law school clinics should seek 
social justice as their primary mission.82 Further, clinical legal education 
organizations such as the European Network for Clinical Legal Education 
(ENCLE) cite the pursuit of social justice as a specific objective.83 As 
such, many clinical legal education programmes expressly adopt a value 
orientated perspective such as social justice. Alternatively, there are 
clinical legal education programmes that prioritize the education of the 
students. These clinical models have been labelled social justice orientated 
clinics and educational orientated clinics. 84  Whilst the goals of social 
justice and education are not mutually exclusive, there has been academic 
debate over which should take precedence. Nicolson, a fierce advocate for 
social justice orientated clinics, argues that clinics should prioritise the 
social justice mission. “Otherwise, they risk being seen as practising law 
on the poor rather than for the poor, and implicitly conveying to students 
that their interests – now educational, later commercial – trump those of 
clients and the community.”85 In contrast, Wilson argues: 
 
81Frank S. Bloch, “Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education.” Vanderbilt 
Law Review 35, no. 2 (1982): 321–354.  
82 See M. A. Du Plessis, “Clinical Legal Education: Determining the Mission and 
Focus of a University Law Clinic and Required Outcomes, Skills & Values.” De 
Jure 48, no. 2 (2015): 312–327; Donald Nicolson, “Education, Education, 
Education: Legal, Moral and Clinical.” Law Teacher 42, no. 2 (2008): 145–172; 
Stephen Wizner and Jane Aiken, “Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School 
Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice.” Fordham Law Review 73, no. 3 (2004–
2005): 997–1012; Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin and Peter A. Joy, “Clinical 
Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave." Clinical Law Review 7, no. 1 
(2000–2001): 1–76; Jon C. Dubin, “Clinical Design for Social Justice 
Imperatives.” SMU Law Review 51, no. 5 (1997–1998): 1461–1506.  
83  See http://www.encle.org/about-encle/what-are-our-goals accessed 25 August 
2016. 
84 Donald Nicolson, “‘Our Roots Began In (South) Africa”: Modelling Law Clinics 
To Maximise Social Justice Ends.” International Journal of Clinical Legal 
Education 23, no. 3 (2016): 100. 
85 Ibid.: 99. 
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The mission of clinical programmes within law schools should properly be 
pedagogically driven, not service driven. Loading students down with too 
many cases of poor clients is a disservice to both student learning and 
client service, and even the most accomplished clinical supervisor cannot 
provide quality oversight with an excessive number of clients served by 
large numbers of students.”86 
 
Ferris recognizes that social justice orientated clinics have played an 
important role and fit the broader role of universities, but ultimately states 
“it is not appropriate to place community justice above the educational 
interests of the students, and whilst a commitment to some form of social 
altruism might inform an academic in her life and practice this is not a 
legitimate reason to impose this value choice upon students”.87  
 
A further argument is that the aim of a law school “is first and foremost 
about educating students . . . without students, there are no law schools”.88 
Kosuri contends that clinics should base their client selection on their 
teaching goals rather than the reverse.89 Further, students should not be 
dissuaded from working in the clinic merely because they do not share the 
ideology.90 By increasing the variety of perspectives, this will enhance the 
learning experience for everyone and lead to a “profounder understanding 
of issues, people and values”.91 
 
Whatever the orientation of the clinical programme, be it social justice or 
educational, it is possible to explore values with the students. To 
understand values, we must understand moral behaviour. Rest identifies 
four components of effective moral or ethical actions; moral sensitivity; 
moral judgement; moral motivation; and moral character. 92  Moral 
86  Richard J. Wilson, “Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide 
Acceptance of Clinical Legal Education.” German Law Journal 10, issues 6/7 
(2009): 835. 
87 G. Ferris, Uses of Values in Legal Education. Intersentia, 2015: 235. 
88 Praveen Kosuri, “Losing My Religion: The Place of Social Justice in Clinical 
Legal Education.” Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice 32, no. 2 
(2012): 336. 
89 Ibid.: 337. 
90 Ibid.: 338. 
91 Ibid. 
92 James R. Rest, “Background: Theory and Research.” In Moral Development in 
the Profession: Psychology and Applied Ethics edited by James R Rest and Darcia 
Narvaez. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994. 
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sensitivity involves the recognition or awareness of moral or ethical issues 
in any given situation. Moral judgement (or moral reasoning) concerns 
how people think about the ethical aspects of life. Moral motivation relates 
to a person’s desire to act morally or ethically. Finally, moral character 
relates to the person’s ability to see the moral action through. 
 
Clinical legal education provides an environment in which students can 
develop moral behaviour, particularly live-client clinics where students are 
faced with real clients and real legal problems. As students are exposed to 
real clients, they are provided with an opportunity to develop moral 
sensitivity. This may include the recognition of professional conduct 
issues such as conflict of interest or confidentiality. Students may also 
encounter social issues for the first time such as poverty, homelessness and 
access to justice. Clinical legal education may also assist in the 
development of moral reasoning. As discussed above, an essential element 
of clinical legal education is the reflective practice. Students will think 
about their cases and issues which arose in those cases. Small group 
discussions between students, supported by staff, exploring ethical 
dilemmas has been effective and powerful in developing moral reasoning 
although it is unknown how and why. 93  The issue then becomes how 
clinical legal education develops moral motivation and moral character.  
 
In addressing this issue, it is necessary to consider the underpinning 
educational theory. Andragogy (Adult Education Theory) was introduced 
by Malcolm S. Knowles who developed a model based upon several 
assumptions different from a pedagogical model: 
 
1. The need to know – adults need to know why they need to learn 
something before undertaking to learn it. 94 
2. The learners’ self-concept – adults develop a self-concept of being 
responsible for making their own decisions and will resent and 
resist others imposing their will.95 
3. The role of learners’ experiences – adults come into education with 
a greater volume and quality of life experience. Emphasis should be 
93 Ferris (n87), 192. 
94  M. S. Knowles, E. F. Holton and R. A. Swanson, The Adult Learner The 
Definitive Classic in Adult Education and Human Resource Development. London: 
Routledge, 2012: 63. 
95 Ibid.: 63–64. 
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placed on individualising the teaching and learning strategy to as 
each individual will draw upon their own life experience, greater 
use of experiential learning making use of the learners’ 
experiences. However, it should be noted that adults, unlike 
children, define themselves by their experiences. As such, if an 
adult’s experiences are ignored or devalued, this will be perceived 
as rejecting them as person.96 
4. Readiness to learn – adults will become ready to learn those things 
that they need to know to deal with real life situations.97 
5. Orientation to learning – adults are motivated to learn to the extent 
that they perceive it will help assist with real life tasks or problems. 
Knowledge, understanding, skills, values and attitudes are learnt 
most effectively in real life situations.98 
6. Motivation – adults are responsive to external motivators such as 
better jobs and higher salaries, but the most potent motivators are 
internal pressures such as increased job satisfaction, self-esteem 
and quality of life.99 
 
Andragogy “shows how and why clinical legal education meets the needs 
of adult law students at the threshold of their professional careers”.100 In 
particular, clinical legal education focuses on experiential learning 
methods and places the individual learner at the heart of the learning 
experience. Quigley posits that clinical legal education, designing a 
methodology around Adult Learning Theory, can be used to teach social 
justice using the opportunities provided by the programme.101 Drawing 
upon the work of Mezirow, Quigley argues that clinicians should utilize 
the “disorientating moment” when the student experiences an event that is 
disorientating or even disturbing because it cannot be explained by 
reference to the student’s previous experience and understanding.102 By 
reflecting on the event, and engaging in “critical thinking focusing on re-
assessment of societal and personal beliefs, values and norms” the student 
96 Ibid.: 64–65. 
97 Ibid.: 65–66. 
98 Ibid.: 66–67. 
99 Ibid.: 67. 
100 Bloch (n80): 337. 
101 Fran Quigley, “Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and 
the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics.” Clinical Law Review 2, no. 
1 (1995–1996): 38. 
102 Ibid.: 51. 
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can have a “transformative” learning experience as they re-orientate and 
perceive the world in a different way.103 Quigley proposes a three-stage 
method; first to facilitate the occurrence of a disorientating event through 
live clients and focusing on social justice issues; secondly, facilitate work 
on making sense of the experience through reflection and discussion; and 
thirdly, allow the student to give effect to their value re-orientation by 
making choices or otherwise acting upon their new understanding.104 
 
Ferris applauds the approach taken by Quigley stating: 
 
This model, of using clinical education to facilitate the re-evaluation by the 
student of previous uniformed value positions is not objectionable. The 
learning model places agency in the student. The method is one that is fully 
open, and relies for effectiveness upon the heightened consciousness and 
awareness of the student to the values being re-evaluated. This use of clinic 
must be considered a valid and appropriate one in trying to facilitate the 
development of salience for moral motivations in law students.105  
 
The role of the clinical supervisor is important within this process as their 
function is to facilitate the transformative experience. Often, there is a low 
supervisor/supervisee ratio in clinical programmes 106  thus allowing the 
supervisor time to embark on the journey with the student. It should be 
noted that the purpose “is not to proselytize law students into accepting the 
law teacher’s personal vision of justice but to assist students, in fact to 
demand that students become aware of their responsibility to do justice 
and the need to develop their own reflective system of justice”.107 As noted 
above, there is no accepted definition of social justice and therefore the 
student may disagree with the clinical supervisor’s notion of social justice. 
For example, an environmental law clinic may represent an action group 
opposed to the building of a factory in a Green Belt zone.108 From an 
103 Ibid.: 52. 
104 Ibid.: 53–56. 
105 Ferris (n87): 239. 
106 Nicolson (n84): 100–101. 
107 David Barnhizer, “University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education.” New York 
Law School Law Review 35, no. 1 (1990): 112. 
108 A Green Belt zone is a designated area to prevent urban sprawl. The Green Belt 
serves five purposes: to check the unrestricted sprawl of large built-up areas; to 
prevent neighbouring towns merging into one another; to assist in safeguarding the 
countryside from encroachment; to preserve the setting and special character of 
219
environmental perspective it appears that there is value in preventing the 
factory. However, if it is proposed that the factory be built in an area of 
social deprivation and high unemployment, then it is arguable that society 
would benefit from it construction. Alternatively, a clinic representing a 
tenant facing eviction for the non-payment of rent may be applauded for 
maintaining someone’s home. However, what if the non-payment of rent 
meant the landlord could not pay their mortgage and thus faced their 
property being repossessed? Both scenarios raise issues relating to fairness 
and opinions may differ as to the fair result. 
 
If we return to the assumptions of andragogy set out above, to impose 
personal views would violate the student’s self-concept, ignore or devalue 
the student’s own life experiences, and violate the principle that Higher 
Education should be aligned with the student’s own interest. This is not to 
say that clinical supervisors should be value neutral. It has been argued 
that clinical supervisors “can avoid indoctrination only by identifying and 
discussing non-coercively the value preferences implicit in his teaching; 
this action put the student on notice that he must provide an argument and 
evidence that the teacher will not”.109 Further, clinical supervisors should 
“be far more willing than they have been to explore competing concepts of 
practical justice, often calling into question the legitimacy of their own 
beliefs”.110 Clinical legal education should be about exposing the students 
to the issues and allowing them to consider the situation and make their 
own judgement on each case. The role of the clinical supervisor is “not the 
‘sage on the stage’ but the ‘guide on the side’.”111 
 
Clinical legal education affords students with the opportunity to gain 
practical experience and engage in reflection on that experience. The 
clinical supervisor can guide the student through that experience, 
historic towns; and to assist in urban regeneration, by encouraging the recycling of 
derelict and other urban land. (Department for Communities & Local Government,  
National Planning Policy Framework, Planning Practice Guidance, 
http://planningguidance.communities.gov.uk/blog/policy/achieving-sustainable-
development/delivering-sustainable-development/9-protecting-green-belt-land/ 
accessed 31 August 2016. 
109  Robert J. Condlin, “Socrates’ New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for 
Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction.” Maryland Law Review 40, no. 2 (1981): 
280. 
110 Barnhizer (n107): 111. 
111 Wilson (n86): 829. 
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challenging the student’s perception of events, guiding the student to 
identify issues raised. This experience and reflection may transform the 
student’s perception, or indeed may validate their previously held 
perception. Either way, the student is better equipped to critically analyse 
and evaluate the world around them. As such, they have the ability to use 
their own moral compass when making judgements in their professional 
and wider life.  
Conclusion 
There is no consensus as to what we mean by social justice and thus it has 
an individual meaning to each person formed by their own life 
experiences. Whilst we can teach professional codes of conduct, espousing 
professional values, there are still grey areas requiring the use of a moral 
compass. In answering the title question, clinical legal education cannot 
teach values, such as social justice per se, as it is for each student to 
construct their own values. Law schools, and clinical legal education 
programmes, can provide a framework for the construction of their value 
system such as teaching students the relevant laws, legal systems and 
codes of conduct governing behaviour. Clinical legal education also 
provides a basis for discussion of societal norms which also influence how 
individuals think. Finally, law schools can teach the students the theories 
upon which values such as social justice can be measured against. 
Educating students in the skill of critical analysis and evaluation, through 
reflective practice, may influence, shape and sometimes define values and 
therefore impact on the values system. However, it is unlikely, and 
arguably should not, dictate what those values should be. Clinical legal 
education can however provide the environment for this construction to 
take place. The role of clinical supervisors is to facilitate the students 
learning through the provision of experiential learning opportunities and 
provide guidance whilst the student reflects upon and (re)constructs their 
value system. This may or may not result in a transformative experience. 
The student may or may not be instilled with a sense of altruism and 
public service. However, the student should have a better understanding of 
the world and a basis for that understanding.  
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Abstract: Universities are more than just institutions for the transfer of 
knowledge; they are institutions where students learn about the world and how 
it works, and in clinical legal education, there is a long and persistent tradition 
of seeing the formation of “social justice” clinicians as a principal educational 
goal. This article covers three areas: we ask “Why do we believe values are 
formed in clinic?” and in Section II “Do values change at university and if so, 
how?”, examining what evidence there is for a suffi cient degree of plasticity 
in undergraduate populations so that values might change over a module or a 
year and what evidence there is that changes to values at university (if any) 
persist into later life. Section III takes a broader philosophical position in 
relation to legal education and the ethical imperatives of the teacher, asking 
“if we can make students believe something, is this a good thing?”
Keywords: clinical legal education; values and virtue education; personal 
and psychological development; evidence-based pedagogy; ethical and 
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Universities are more than just institutions for the transfer of knowledge; they are 
institutions where students learn about the world and how it works. Within the 
discipline of law, the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) states 
that students graduating from an undergraduate degree should be “aware of the 
consequences of the law as a human creation and that it is subject to the ethics and 
values of those that make and apply it”,1 and in clinical legal education, there is a 
long and persistent tradition (exemplifi ed most recently in the study by Nicholson2) 
of seeing the formation of “social justice” clinicians as a principal educational goal. 
This article covers three areas: we ask “why do we believe values are formed in 
clinic?” through a geographical/historical analysis of the culture of clinical legal 
education in the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Europe, Africa and 
* Director of the Student Law Offi ce, Northumbria University Law School, Newcastle, United Kingdom.
** Professor of Legal Education Research, Northumbria University Law School, Newcastle, United 
Kingdom.
1 Quality Assurance Agency, “Subject Benchmark Statement: Law (2015)” (The Quality Assurance Agency 
for Higher Education, July 2015) 6, available at www.qaa.ac.uk/publications/information-and-guidance/
publication?PubID=2966#.WsYstkxFw2w (visited 20 March 2018).
2 Donald Nicholson, “Our Roots Began in (South) Africa: Modeling Law Clinics to Maximize Social 
Justice Ends” (2016) 23(3) Int’l J Clinical Legal Educ 87.
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Asia, noting in particular the elements that have transcended context and those 
which have been particularly shaped by local circumstances. Section II explores the 
question “do values change at university and if so, how?” using the latest research 
from neuroscience and education to assess how we currently understand the 
development of personal and professional values. In particular, what evidence there 
is for a suffi cient degree of plasticity in undergraduate populations so that values 
might change over a module or a year and what evidence there is that changes 
to values at university (if any) persist into later life? Section III takes a broader 
philosophical position in relation to legal education and the ethical imperatives 
of the teacher, asking “if we can make students believe something, is this a good 
thing?”. Taking the position that our role is primarily to develop students’ ability to 
think rather than telling them what to think in order to “develop their own refl ective 
system of justice”,3 we problematise the transmission of values through direct 
pedagogy, modelling and the unconscious curriculum.
I. Why Do We Believe Values Are Formed in Clinic?
In understanding why we believe values are formulated in clinic, it is important to 
consider the history of the clinical legal education movement from its inception to 
its gradual spread across the globe.
Scholars have spilt much ink setting out the history of clinical legal education.4 
We can trace the genesis of the clinical legal education movement to Jerome 
Frank’s seminal paper, “Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?”.5 In his critique of 
legal education in American law schools, Frank posited that law schools should 
“get in intimate contact with what clients need and with what courts and lawyers 
actually do”.6 Of particular note is that Frank’s conceptualisation for a legal clinic:
“would not confi ne their activities to such as are now undertaken by the 
Legal Aid Society. They could take on important work for governmental 
3 David Barnhizer, “The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education” (1990) 35(1) N Y L Sch L Rev 87, 
112.
4 See generally Frank S Bloch (ed), The Global Clinical Movement: Educating Lawyers for Social Justice 
(Oxford: OUP, Oxford Scholarship Online Edition, 2011); Stephen Wizner, “Is Social Justice Still Relevant” 
(2012) 32(2) BC J L & Soc Just 345, 356; Bruce Lasky and Shuvro Prosun Saker, “Introduction: Clinical 
Legal Education and Its Asian Characteristics” in Shuvro Prosun Saker (ed), Clinical Legal Education and 
Asia: Accessing Justice for the Underprivileged (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Stephen Wizner, 
“Beyond Skills Training” (2001) 7 Clinical L Rev 327, 340; Margaret Martin Barry et al, “Clinical Education 
for This Millennium: The Third Wave” (2000) 7(1) Clinical L Rev 1, 76; Jon Dubin, “Clinical Design for 
Social Justice Imperatives” (1998) 51 SMU L Rev 1461; Phillip Schrag and Michael Meltsner, “Refl ections 
on Clinical Legal Education” (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998); George Grossman, “Clinical 
Legal Education: History and Diagnosis” (1973) 26(2) Journal of Legal Education 162.
5 Jerome Frank, “Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?” (1933) 81(8) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 907.
6 Ibid., p.913.
JICL-5(1)-3. Hey Teacher by Paul McKeown.indd   2 18/05/18   1:59 PM
223
 Social Justice Values through Clinical Legal Education 3
agencies or other quasi-public bodies. The professional work they would 
do would include virtually every kind of service rendered by law offi ces”.7
The clinical legal education movement boom began during the mid-20th century 
in the United States.8 This was an era of social upheaval including the civil rights 
movement, women’s rights and the Vietnam War. There were also issues around 
poverty with governmental measures for the “provision of legal services for both 
civil and criminal legal problems of those unable to afford legal counsel”.9 With the 
increased demand for legal services:
“[i]t became a standard motto of the times that professional responsibility 
applies not only to the ethics involving the individual attorney’s relationship 
with his client, but also to the responsibility of the profession as a whole to 
see to it that legal services are made available to all segments of society”.10
At this time, the Ford Foundation “became interested advancing the cause of 
practical law training for the sake of professional responsibility”.11 With this in 
mind, the Ford Foundation established and funded the Council on Legal Education 
and Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) in 1967, which would be the “leading 
force behind the widespread movement toward clinical legal education”.12 Nearly 
half of the existing law schools in the United States received funding from CLEPR 
to establish clinical programmes.13 Other law schools, inspired by the success of 
CLEPR funded programmes, started their own.14
The MacCrate Report, published in 1992, supported the use of clinical 
legal education as a methodology for teaching legal skills and professional 
responsibility.15 In response to the MacCrate Report, the American Bar Association 
amended its accreditation standards in 1996 requiring all accredited law schools 
to offer live-client or other real-life practice experiences.16 This rule persists, and 
all accredited law schools are required to “provide substantial opportunities to 
 7 Ibid., p.918.
 8 Jeff Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” in Bloch (ed), The Global Clinical Movement: Educating Lawyers for Social 
Justice (Oxford: OUP, Oxford Scholarship Online Edition, 2011); see Grossman, “Clinical Legal 
Education: History and Diagnosis” (n.4).




13 See Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” (n.8).
14 See Schrag and Meltsner, “Refl ections on Clinical Legal Education” (n.4).
15 American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and 
Professional Development — An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and 
the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (“MacCrate Report”) (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 1992) pp.234–235.
16 Peter Joy, “The Cost of Clinical Legal Education” (2012) 32(2) BC J L & Soc Just 309, 325.
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students for: (1) law clinics or fi eld placement(s); and (2) student participation in 
pro bono legal services, including law-related public service activities”.17
The notion of public service and professional responsibility are embedded 
within the origins and development of clinical legal education in the United States. 
However, the clinical movement in the United Kingdom was somewhat different.
The clinical movement in the United Kingdom started in the 1970s. The 
University of Kent was the fi rst to establish a clinic incorporated into the curriculum 
in 1973. This was followed by the establishment of other clinical programmes 
including the Warwick Legal Practice Programme with the main objective of 
providing “a special form of legal education to law students”.18 By the mid-1990s, 
eight universities reported running a live-client clinical programme.19 Only two 
of these programmes offered a full representation service to clients, while other 
programmes limited their work to advice or representation before the county 
court or tribunal.20 It is worth noting that six of the universities that offered a live-
client clinical programme were “new universities”.21 A review of legal education 
and the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct 
(ACLEC) Report conducted during this period, published in 1996, supported the 
use of clinical methods to integrate theory and practice.22 Since this period, clinical 
legal education has seen continued growth in the United Kingdom with at least 70 
per cent of law schools offering pro bono opportunities to students.23
Since the early days of clinical activity in the United Kingdom, the educational 
value of clinical legal education has been the primary driving force behind the 
movement although there have be some advocates, such as Donald Nicholson, 
for putting the social justice mission at the forefront of the clinical movement.24 
17 American Bar Association, ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016–
17 (ABA, 2016) Standard 303, available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/
legal_education/Standards/2016_2017_aba_standards_and_rules_of_procedure.authcheckdam.pdf 
(visited 10 March 2018).
18 See Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” (n.8).
19 Richard Grimes et al, “Legal Skills and Clinical Legal Education — A Survey of Undergraduate Law 
School Practice” (1996) 30(1) Law Teacher 44, 64.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct, First Report on Legal Education 
and Training (HMSO, 1996).
23 Damien Carney et al, “The LawWorks Law School Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014” (LawWorks, 
2014) 10, available at www.lawworks.org.uk/sites/default/fi les/LawWorks-student-pro-bono-report%20
2014.pdf (visited 10 March 2018); clinical legal education and pro bono are widely regarded as different 
concepts. However, the report defi ned “pro bono” as “an activity organised and/or delivered by a 
law school that provides a legal service to an individual, group or organisation without charge”, thus 
encompassing clinical activities.
24 See Nicholson, “Our Roots Began in (South) Africa: Modeling Law Clinics to Maximize Social Justice 
Ends” (n.2); Donald Nicholson, “Calling, Character and Clinical Legal Education: A Cradle to Grave 
Approach to Inculcating a Love for Justice” (2013) 16 Legal Ethics 36; Donald Nicolson, “Education, 
Education, Education: Legal, Moral and Clinical” (2008) 42(2) Law Tchr 145; Donald Nicholson, “Legal 
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The LawWorks Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014 cited “educational value” as 
the most important reason for respondents to undertake pro bono activities and 
“social justice” as the second most important reason.25 It is likely that the reason the 
United Kingdom has pursued clinical activities primarily for educational reasons 
rather than social justice reasons is the historical availability of legal aid. Under the 
Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949, legal aid was available to everyone of “small and 
moderate means” and “in all courts and tribunals where lawyers normally appears 
for private clients”.26 In the 1970s, the Green Form scheme facilitated the provision 
of advice and assistance “on any matter of English law on the basis of a simplifi ed 
test of income and expenditure”.27 From 1979 and throughout the early 1980s, 79 
per cent of the population were eligible for legal aid.28
Unfortunately, and largely as a consequence of cost to the public purse, cuts 
were made in terms of eligibility which meant that the percentage of households 
eligible for civil legal aid fell from 77 per cent in 1979–1980 to 47 per cent in 
1994–1995.29 The availability of legal aid was further eroded as Sch.2 of the Access 
to Justice Act 1999 removed a number of areas from the scope of civil legal aid.30 
This meant that even those who were fi nancially eligible could not receive public 
funding if their case was out of scope. By 2007, the percentage of the population 
eligible for civil legal aid had fallen to 29 per cent. Throughout this period, the 
number of private practice solicitors engaged in legal aid work was falling with 
the not-for-profi t sector providing an increased proportion of legal help in social 
welfare law.31 The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(LASPO), often heralded as the death knell of legal aid, saw vast areas of law 
removed from the scope of legal aid with only those areas listed in Sch.1 of the Act 
falling within scope.
While the last 30 years has seen an erosion of legal aid, the poorest were 
still eligible to receive assistance. Therefore, the use of clinical legal education 
as a vehicle to provide legal assistance to the poor was not a signifi cant factor in 
its development in the United Kingdom. It was not until the implementation of 
LASPO in April 2013 that the number of individuals unable to obtain advice and 
Education or Community Service? The Extra-Curricular Student Law Clinic” (2006) 3 Web Journal 
of Current Legal Issues, available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/2006/issue3/
nicolson3.html (visited 10 March 2018).
25 See Carney et al, “The LawWorks Law School Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014” (n.23) p.39.
26 Sir Henry Brooke, “The History of Legal Aid 1945–2010” (Bach Commission on Access to Justice — 
Appendix 6, 2017), available at www.fabians.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Bach-Commission-




30 For example, personal injury other than clinical negligence, conveyancing, wills and defamation.
31 See Brooke, “The History of Legal Aid 1945–2010” (n.26) p.23.
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assistance became a signifi cant issue.32 This has seen some calls to utilise clinical 
legal education to fi ll the access to justice gap.33
In Australia, the clinical movement can be traced back to the establishment of 
clinical programmes at Monash University, La Trobe University and the University 
of New South Wales by “young academics and socially active students” in the mid-
1970s and early 1980s.34 Following reforms to the university sector in Australia, the 
number of law schools expanded and clinic was seen as a way for new law schools 
to differentiate themselves in an increasingly competitive market.35 The Australian 
clinics have benefi ted from key members of academic staff remaining involved 
with their programmes for more than 20 years.36 People with a strong commitment 
to access to justice issues staff the clinics, bringing an emphasis on community 
service and using the law and legal system to achieve community development 
objectives.
In Africa, law clinics were established for two purposes: “to provide legal 
services and access to justice, and to teach law students practical skills”.37 Live-
client clinics are the accepted norm in Africa with universities “surrounded by 
seas of poverty and often the services provided by national legal aid schemes 
are minimal”.38 The fi rst clinical programme established in South Africa was in 
1972 by law students from the University of Cape Town.39 This programme was 
managed entirely by students, under supervision by external legal practitioners, 
32 While it is accepted that the number of litigants in person have increased, it is diffi cult, if not 
impossible, to fi nd reliable data regarding the number of individuals impacted by the reduction in legal 
aid. For example, there are no available data regarding the number of individuals who choose not to 
pursue a matter because they cannot fi nd legal assistance. Further, civil courts and tribunals do not 
collate records on the number of litigants represented. However, the National Audit Offi ce reported 
that the number of family cases in which neither party was represented had increased by 30 per cent. 
See, House of Commons Justice Committee, Impact of Changes to Civil Legal Aid under Part 1 of the 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: Eighth Report of Session 2014–15 (HC 
311, 2015) p.36.
33 Civil Justice Council, Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-represented Litigants): A Report 
and Series of Recommendations to the Lord Chancellor and to the Lord Chief Justice (2011) p.55. Victoria 
Murray, “The Rise and Fall of Social Justice within Clinical Legal Education” in Chris Ashford and Paul 
McKeown (eds), Social Justice and Legal Education (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2018).
34 See Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” (n.8); see also Jeff Giddings, “Clinical Legal Education in Australia: A Historical 
Perspective” (2003) 3 Int’l J Clinical Legal Educ 7.
35 See Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” (n.8).
36 Ibid.
37 David McQuoid-Mason et al, “Clinical Legal Education in Africa: Legal Education and Community 
Service” in Bloch (ed), The Global Clinical Movement: Educating Lawyers for Social Justice (Oxford: 
OUP, Oxford Scholarship Online Edition, 2011).
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.; see also Peggy Maisel, “Expanding and Sustaining Clinical Legal Education in Developing 
Countries: What We Can Learn from South Africa” (2007) 30(2) Fordham Int’l LJ 374.
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without support from the faculty.40 In 1973, the Ford Foundation funded a legal 
aid conference in South Africa resulting in the establishment of fi ve clinical 
programmes within two years. The clinical movement developed in South Africa 
throughout the apartheid era. The liberal universities primarily tried to assist the 
victims of apartheid, while those universities that supported the apartheid regime 
focused on practical skills.41 Throughout the 1980s, the clinical movement spread 
throughout southern Africa to countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana. It has 
continued to progress and includes clinics in many countries throughout the region. 
Often referred to as “legal aid clinics”, the service element rather than the learning 
and teaching aspect is emphasised.42
In East Africa, there were a number of clinics established in the early 1970s such 
as the clinic at the University of Dar-Es-Salaam in Tanzania.43 Other clinics, such as 
the one at University of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Makerere University, Uganda, 
were set up but did not survive the political turmoil of the time.44 Throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, law clinics have been established in countries such as Kenya, 
Rwanda and Somaliland.45 The law clinics were established “principally to bridge 
the gap between imparting practical legal skills and theory”.46 The clinics also 
responded to a “growing need for basic legal advice by indigent populations”.47
The clinical movement in West Africa has developed differently, partly due to 
the differences between anglophone and francophone countries. While there were 
some early initiatives in Nigeria during the 1980s, the clinical movement really 
began following the First All-Africa Colloquium on Clinical Legal Education 
in 2003, the establishment of the Network of University Legal Aid Institutions 
(NULAI) in 2003 and the fi rst Nigerian Clinical Legal Education Colloquium in 
2004.48 Financial support was received from international agencies including the 
Open Society Institute and the MacArthur Foundation.49 The law teachers who 
founded NULAI recognised:
“that law degree programmes and teaching methods in Nigerian Universities 









48 Ibid.; further, for a history of clinical legal education in Nigeria, see generally Gbenga Oke-Samuel, 
“Clinical Legal Education in Nigeria — Developments and Challenges” (2008) 17(1) Griffi th L Rev 139; 
Ndubuisi Madubuike-Ekwe, “Challenges and Prospects of Legal Education in Nigeria: An Overview” 
(2017) 8(1) Nnamdi Azikiwe U J Int’l L & Juris 128.
49 Ibid.
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that the law curriculum is not skills focused and lacks opportunity for 
community service and the development of the mentality in using law for 
social change and development”.50
In francophone Africa, law clinics were run in partnership with NGOs and law 
students. In Morocco, a Human Rights Clinic Programme was established in 
partnership with the Law Faculty of Mohammedia at the University of Hassan II 
by the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative in 2005.
In Asia, the development of clinical legal education has been described 
as “amorphous”.51 The reason has been attributed to the fact that it is a “broad 
continent with many nationalities, religions, ethnicities, languages and cultures” 
and the same can be said of the legal systems:
“which possess a mixture of common law, civil law, Shari’ah law, and 
customary law structures, often with a number of these structures existing 
within a single nation state. These legal systems have a multitude of roots 
and origins, with some dating back centuries and others having a more 
recent strong colonialist infl uence”.52
While legal education in Asia is also as “multifaceted” as the various legal systems, 
there are also common attributes.53 One of the primary issues common around 
Asia is that students are often “passive learners”, while teachers are seen as the 
“gurus imparting knowledge”.54 Clinical legal education challenges this attitude as 
the clinical teacher is “not the ‘sage on the stage’ but the ‘guide and the side’”.55 
Further, lawyering skills, professional ethics and societal responsibilities are not 
generally taught at the undergraduate level.56 While clinical legal education is 
seen as addressing these issues within Asian legal education, Lasky and Sarker 
highlighted that:
“one contemporary core commonality of most of these Asian CLE 
programs can be found in their focused social justice mission of delivering 
legal assistance and empowerment to the poor and marginalized, while 
simultaneously developing legal knowledge, skills, ethics, and pro bono 
values within the participating university students”.57 (emphasis added)
50 Ibid.




55 Richard Wilson, “Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide Acceptance of Clinical Legal 
Education” (2009) 10 German LJ 823, 829.
56 See Lasky and Sarker, “Introduction: Clinical Legal Education and Its Asian Characteristics” (n.4) p.6.
57 Ibid.
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Throughout Southeast Asia, the development of clinical programmes has often 
been in conjunction with organisations external to the university. Organisations, such 
as the United Nations, through their Development Programme,58 the Open Society 
Justice Initiative59 and Bridges Across Borders South East Asia Community Legal 
Education Initiative,60 as well as a number of other non-governmental organisations 
have worked with universities and assisted indigent groups.61
In India, early clinical programmes were inspired by two infl uential reports 
published in the 1970s aiming to integrate legal education with attempts to encourage 
the legal profession to contribute to social change.62 Both reports highlighted that 
clinical legal education would provide skills training while benefi ting the poor.63 In 
1981, the Committee for Implementing Legal Aid Schemes concluded that “court 
or litigation-oriented legal aid programs could not alone provide social justice in 
India” and recommended the establishment of legal aid clinics in law schools to 
motivate student to provide legal aid to the poor.64 In 1997, the Bar Council of India 
issued a circular directing all universities and law colleges to incorporate clinical 
type programmes into their three- and fi ve-year law curricula.65 Interestingly, 
the type of activities which satisfi ed the circular included “moot court; student 
chambering; attendance, observation, and refl ection of both civil and criminal 
trials; drafting pleadings and conveyances; professional ethics; and training in 
legal aid”.66 It appears that these activities are predominantly for the educational 
benefi t of the student, particularly in relation to skills and legal practice, rather than 
providing any benefi t to the poor.
In Continental Europe, the clinical movement fl ourished in the former 
Soviet countries of Central and Eastern Europe.67 Throughout the Communist-
era, members of the legal profession lacked ability and competence and/or were 
reluctant to engage in rule of law, human rights and public interest lawyering. 
This mentality persisted after the fall of Communism. It is against this backdrop 
that an ambitious agenda for law reform was set in motion throughout the 1990s 
58 For further information, see www.undp.org/.
59 For further information, see www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/programs/open-society-justice-
initiative.
60 For further information, see www.babseacle.org/.
61 See generally Bruce Lasky and MRK Prasad, “The Clinical Movement in Southeast Asia and India: A 
Comparative Perspective and Lessons to be Learned” in Bloch (ed), The Global Clinical Movement: 






67 See generally Dubravka Aksamovic and Phillip Genty, “An Examination of the Challenges, Successes and 
Setbacks for Clinical Legal Education in Eastern Europe” (2014) 20(1) Int’l J Clinical Legal Educ 427; 
Martin Tomoszek, “Legal Clinics and Social Justice in Post-Communist Countries” in Chris Ashford and 
Paul McKeown (eds), Social Justice and Legal Education (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 
2018).
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including reform of legal institutions, legislation and the need to educate and 
empower a new generation of legal professionals. A fundamental problem existed 
in that universities saw themselves as identifying and defi ning concepts of law 
rather than analysing and solving legal problems. As a consequence, various 
international donor initiatives were launched to train judges and lawyers on issues 
related to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. One initiative started in 
1996 related to the promotion of human rights and the operation of university 
legal clinics. Students were “trained in legal skills and values” and would provide 
free legal assistance. The initiative received fi nancial support from a number of 
organisations including the American Bar Association’s Central European and 
Eurasian Law Initiative, the Ford Foundation, the Open Society Institute and 
Soros Foundations Network. Between 1997 and 2002, more than 75 university 
law clinics were established in more than 20 countries. The clinics usually 
focused on “both skills and values training” while working with vulnerable and 
indigent groups.
Western Europe has long been regarded as the last bastion resisting the clinical 
movement.68 Wilson identifi es fi ve critiques of clinical legal education that have 
been addressed in other parts of the world, but have arguably stifl ed development 
in Europe, namely, the existence of pre-existing apprenticeships before entry into 
the legal profession; the large size of undergraduate classes; a threat to the legal 
profession losing paying clients; the number of small law fi rms; and the utilisation 
of clinics to fi ll the legal services gaps for the poor.69
Wilson also identifi es “traditions” within the civil law system that perhaps 
hindered the development of clinical legal education. First, the “conception of law” 
is different between civil and common law jurisdictions. Civil law systems see the 
law as “a series of fundamental principles”, while in common law jurisdictions, 
the law is “a means of providing remedies for certain cases: remedies proceed 
rights”.70 Second, the nature and status of the professoriate are different in civil 
law jurisdictions. The professoriate “not only expresses the law but formulates 
it”.71 This echoes the academic/practitioner divide cited in the literature. Finally, 
Wilson highlights the high level of state control over legal education resulting in 
standardised programmes with little room for innovation.
However, despite the aforementioned challenges, clinical legal education has 
started to infi ltrate the Western European law school. One reason cited for the ingress 
of clinical activity is the Bologna Process seeking to harmonise education across 
the signatory countries, including all European Union member states. The Bologna 
Process requires a focus not only on technical knowledge but also the competencies 
68 The United Kingdom is the exception in Western Europe.
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and skills required for a successful legal career and active participation in economy 
and society.72 The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe has also produced 
a report identifying the skills and attributes of a successful lawyer. There is a focus 
on skills, ethics and values that cannot be taught in a classroom or a lecture theatre 
but instead are best learnt through clinical programmes.73 The Quality Assurance, 
Accreditation and Assessment Committee, a committee of the European Law 
Faculties Association, identifi ed four “competencies” for law students. One of 
these competencies includes “an understanding of core values associated with the 
law”.74 In 2013, the European Network for Clinical Legal Education (ENCLE) was 
established. ENCLE’s objectives include, inter alia, the pursuit and promotion 
of social justice values and diversity as core values of the legal profession and 
improvement to the quality of legal education.75
The clinical literature originates predominantly from the United States.76 In 
the early clinical literature, while it is noted that there were some educational 
benefi ts from participation in assisting to indigents, this was secondary 
to community service.77 Mkwebu highlighted the dangers of citation bias, 
attaching higher status to the literature from the United States at the expense 
of publications from elsewhere.78 Further, often the same group of authors are 
cited,79 for example, Stephen Wizner, Jane Aiken and Jon Dubin, each with a 
distinguished background of public service activities, are fi erce proponents of 
public service.80
There is little empirical evidence to support the transformational impact 
of clinical legal education on students’ public interest ethos.81 A number of 
quantitative studies have found no evidence that clinical experiences while in law 
school infl uenced a desire in students to conduct public service and/or pro bono in 
72 William Woodruff and Andreas Bucker, “The Bologna Process and German Legal Education: Developing 
Professional Competence through Clinical Experiences” (2008) 9 German LJ 575.
73 See Wilson, “Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide Acceptance of Clinical Legal Education” 
(n.55).
74 Ibid.
75 ENCLE, “About ENCLE: What Are Our Goals?”, available at encle.org/about-encle/what-are-our-goals 
(visited 26 March 2018).
76 Tribe Mkwebu, “A Systematic Review of Literature on Clinical Legal Education: A Tool for Researchers 
in Responding to an Explosion of Clinical Scholarship” (2015) 22(3) International Journal of Clinical 
Legal Education 1, 22.
77 See Grossman, “Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis” (n.4) p.174.
78 See Mkwebu, “A Systematic Review of Literature on Clinical Legal Education: A Tool for Researchers 
in Responding to an Explosion of Clinical Scholarship” (n.76) p.28.
79 Ibid., p.31.
80 See Barry et al, “Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave” (n.4); Wizner, “Beyond Skills 
Training” (n.4); Stephen Wizner and Jane Aiken, “Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics 
in Enhancing Access to Justice” (2004) 73 Fordham L Rev 997; Wizner, “Is Social Justice Still Relevant” 
(n.4); Dubin, “Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives” (n.4); Jane Aiken, “The Clinical Mission 
of Justice Readiness” (2012) 32 BCJL & Soc Just 231.
81 See Schrag and Melstner, “Refl ections on Clinical Legal Education” (n.4).
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their future career.82 Other studies suggest an increased willingness to participate in 
public service and/or pro bono activity following graduation.83
Notions of social justice, public interest and service are perhaps more nuanced. 
While respondents in the studies highlighted above did not report an increased 
willingness to participate in public service and pro bono work, they did report 
improvement to their awareness of social and economic issues such as poverty.84 Thus, 
while clinical programmes may not create an army of “social justice warriors”, it may 
be inculcating an ability within students to think about and critically evaluate the law 
and its wider social context. Indeed, the MacCrate Report also noted the limitations on 
a law school’s ability to prepare students for life in practice. While a law school can:
“help students recognize ethical dilemmas and can provide the rudiments 
of training for resolving them … the exposure of students to these issues 
in law school clinical programs … is very limited compared to the variety 
and complexity of ethical dilemmas that students confront in practice”.85
The MacCrate Report states that practising lawyers “may be more signifi cant than 
law teachers” in teaching professional values.86
If we examine the development of clinical legal education, its origins and global 
spread, patterns begin to emerge. We see that clinical legal education has taken root 
in periods of social and political upheaval, for example, the civil rights movement, 
the fall of communism and apartheid. In the United Kingdom and Australia, clinical 
legal education was adopted during the period of educational reform with “new 
universities” adopting the method and thus differentiating themselves from the 
Establishment. We can hypothesise that this is due to the activist traditions of clinical 
legal education. Often, clinical programmes have been established with international 
sponsorship aimed at social and economic change. Clinical programmes are 
often expensive to run in comparison to traditional classroom teaching. Clinical 
programmes may therefore need to address the aims (and values) of sponsor 
organisations to attract the necessary funding. We must also remember that a basic 
82 See Deborah Rhode, “Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice” (2003) 53(3) Journal of Legal Education 
413; Robert Granfi eld, “Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: Results on the Impact of 
Mandatory Pro Bono Programs” (2007) 54 Buffalo Law Review 1355; Paul McKeown, “Law Student 
Attitudes towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience at Northumbria University” (2015) 
22(1) International Journal of Clinical Legal Education 6.
83 See Sally Maresh, “The Impact of Clinical Legal Education on Decisions of Law Students to Practice 
Public Interest Law” in Jeremy Cooper and Louise Trubek (eds), Educating for Justice: Social Values and 
Legal Education (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 1997); Deborah Schmedemann, “Priming for Pro Bono Publico: 
The Impact of the Law School on Pro Bono Participation in Practice” in Robert Granfi eld and Lynn 
Mather (eds), Private Lawyers and the Public Interest: The Evolving Role of Pro Bono in the Legal 
Profession (New York: OUP 2009); Bharat Malkani and Linden Thomas, “The Birmingham Pro Bono 
Group: A Case Study of Social Justice in Legal Education” in Chris Ashford and Paul McKeown (eds), 
Social Justice and Legal Education (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2018).
84 See works referred to in note 82.
85 See MacCrate Report (n.15) p.235.
86 Ibid., p.236.
JICL-5(1)-3. Hey Teacher by Paul McKeown.indd   12 18/05/18   1:59 PM
233
 Social Justice Values through Clinical Legal Education 13
premise of clinical legal education is real-life experience. If clinical programmes are 
going to provide their students with a real-life experience, they need a source that 
experience. At the risk of sounding cynical, the poor and disadvantaged in society 
are a source of clients as they are unlikely to receive assistance elsewhere. Whether 
the educational mission or the social justice mission primarily motivates a clinical 
programme, it is likely that the poor and disadvantaged will provide the client base 
of the programme. As a consequence, an epistemic system belief has emerged in 
relation to the notion of social justice and public service, inextricably fusing the 
concepts within the very fabric of clinical legal education. So much so that for many, 
it has become a part of the defi nition of clinical legal education.
The purpose of this historical tour is to provide the narrative explanation for the 
widely held beliefs that social justice and clinic are inextricably intertwined, that to 
attempt to disentangle them is wrong and that the principal goals of clinical activity 
are the material benefi t to the community and the moral benefi t to the students. 
We would also like to explore the philosophical and psychological nature of these 
beliefs. Achinstein87 gave us a framework for understanding the different ways in 
which beliefs are formed, held and supported through different engagements with 
Hypothesis (H) and Evidence (E) (Table 1).88 This framework allows us to interrogate 
the basis for beliefs and assumptions and could be used hierarchically, privileging 
certain kinds of knowledge and evidence and dismissing others as lesser or fl awed,89 
but this would be a misunderstanding of the way in which human beings deal with 
complexity.90 Epistemic system and subjective evidence necessarily form large parts 
of our reality, as it is simply not practical to interrogate everything in daily life with 
the rigour needed to produce potential, much less veridical evidence.
We introduce this framework as a background to the discussion that follows, as 
a prompt for writers and readers to ask “Why do I think this? How do I know?”. 
For example, the historical overview above suggests the hypothesis that the United 
Kingdom has the most “educationally-driven” model of clinic and that educational 
goals are rated above social justice goals91 although social justice remains a close 
second. The different kinds of evidence for this hypothesis are often woven together in 
the discourse, with culturally specifi c explanations merged with the data from empirical 
studies. This is not to say that these different kinds of evidence cannot or should not 
87 Peter Achinstein, The Book of Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
88 This table is a summary of Kvernbekk’s 2011 discussion of Achinstein developed by Elaine Hall for the 
Association of Law Teachers 2016 conference keynote: “The Use of Evidence in Writing about Legal 
Education.”
89 Tone Kvernbekk, “The Concept of Evidence in Evidence-Based Practice” (2011) 5 Educational Theory 
515, particularly the discussion that Veridical evidence for a proposition is an ideal state (cf Peircean ideas 
of the “long run” discussed in Cornelis de Waal, Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013)) or a temporary state of certainty in which we consider there is suffi cient “warrant for action” 
(John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: MacMillan, 1938)) and so we can act “as if” the 
evidence were veridical and permanent. This is useful where discussions of potential evidence meet the 
need for certainty in policymakers.
90 Charles Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief” Popular Science Monthly (Vol 12, November 1877) p.1.
91 See Carney et al, “The LawWorks Law School Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014” (n.23).
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support one another but that as academics and clinicians we must be clearer about how 
we are constructing our arguments: the a priori logic of a subjective response may be 
strong and the data from a potential study constructed to deductively explore the logic 
may be rigorous. This does not mean that together they are unassailable. The logic of 
the subjective response is falsifi able both through a competing a priori argument and/
or through the failure of the data to support the hypothesis. Indeed, if we can ever get 
close to veridical evidence, it is by putting all forms of argument into harm’s way both 
from their natural enemies and from the potential challenge of other forms of evidence.
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A further challenge to our mental architecture in relation to clinic is to imagine the 
ideal conditions for collecting potential or veridical evidence based on this belief 
system and compare this to the reality in the fi eld. If it were the case that educational 
benefi ts are as important as social justice benefi ts, several key indicators such as 
equality of opportunity and access for students, central position and value shown 
through credit-bearing and clinical skills as the focus of assessment and impact on 
the fi nal grade would arguably need to be present to indicate these values being 
expressed in practice (Figure 1).
Where one or more of these factors is absent, it becomes necessary to challenge 
the originally stated value, the extent to which it is subordinate to other values or 
pressures in the environment and therefore the extent to which it could potentially 
be shaping the learning experience.
92 Unsurprisingly, there are no data as yet to support this assertion that meets the veridical threshold.
93 Limited data, much contested on both sides of this assertion, see Richard Grimes, Learning through 
Experience: Developing Clinical Models for Legal Education (PhD Dissertation, Northumbria University, 
2017).
94 Rachel Dunn, “The Taxonomy of Clinics: The Realities and Risks of All Forms of Clinical Legal 
Education” (2016) 3(2) Asian Journal of Legal Education 174.
95 Jill Alexander and Carol Boothby, “Framing Clinical Legal Education at Northumbria Law School: 
Challenges Old and New” (forthcoming, 2018) 5 German Journal of Legal Education.
96 Elaine Hall, Cath Sylvester and Carol Boothby, “Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt? Using Large Data 
Sets to Explore the Impact of Clinical Education” (Seminar, IJCLE/ACCLE Conference, Toronto, July 
2016); Sylvester, Hall and O’Boyle, this volume.
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II. Do Values Change at University and If So, How?
This section seeks to unpack the “taken-for-granted” in academics’ discourse about 
what we do and to expose some of our assumptions, abductive leaps and fondly held 
beliefs to critical scrutiny. In the spirit of Peirce,97 this process is intended to assuage 
our discomfort, since we are no longer satisfi ed in the fi xed beliefs about the plasticity 
of students’ values and how that idea sits within a relatively straightforward model 
of transformative higher education. We make no claims to reaching full scientifi c 
enquiries on each of the points raised, since we have not the resource or expertise to 
do so. Nevertheless, we want to signpost where the method of authority has been used 
in respect of psychological and neuroscientifi c literature and where the method of 
a priori has been used and make clear the logical stutter and fl ow of our constructions.
97 See Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief” (n.90).
Figure 1: Decision Tree Exploring the Central Position of Clinic in the 
Curriculum
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A. Becoming a person — the formation of values and 
beliefs into early adulthood
The age of criminal responsibility has varied across history and culture with a great 
deal of ahistorical and culturally imperialist snootiness about others’ practices 
compared to our (exemplary) own.98 There remains, however, a thread of awareness 
that there is a point in a young person’s cognitive and moral development when 
they understand both that there is a concept of right and wrong and that this concept 
applies directly to their own actions. A number of ideas cluster around this thread: 
that this happens at different ages for individuals and that locally constructed norms 
of right and wrong may vary are relatively uncontroversial addenda; that good and 
evil are innate in the individual has become relatively unfashionable; and cultural 
primacy (particularly in the academy) is given to the notion that values and virtues 
are acquired socially. Where is this process of “virtue acquisition” happening and 
what do we (think we) know about how?
(i) Family and culture
In this section, we are primarily using the method of authority, drawing on an 
integrative psychotherapeutic literature to provide a narrative of development 
that is rooted in individuals’ experience. The neuroscientifi c perspective on 
the development of the self is not entirely absent from this discourse, but it is 
subordinated to metaphors of the social world. The world of the infant is initially 
undifferentiated: there are no “others” and everything revolves around the child’s 
sensory gratifi cation.99 It is through the inevitable and healthy frustrations of desire 
and the disappointments of the fallible fl esh that the infant develops both a sense of 
good and bad experience from their own point of view as well as a sense of others 
as meaningful and separate individuals.100 Gradually, the child develops from this 
sense of self and others a self-consciousness.101 The child comes to understand their 
role in the family, the location of power and the thoughts feelings and actions that 
are and are not permitted:102 some of this comes through explicit family messages 
 98 Problematised by Raymond Arthur, “Exploring Childhood, Criminal Responsibility and the Evolving 
Capacities of the Child: The Age of Criminal Responsibility in England and Wales” (2016) 67(3) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 269.
 99 Louis Cozolino, The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain (New York: Norton, 
2002).
100 Allan Schore, “Minds in the Making: Attachment, the Self-organising Brain and Developmentally-
Oriented Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy” (2001) 17(3) British Journal of Psychotherapy 299–328; 
Allan Schore, “The Effects of a Secure Attachment Relationship on Right Brain Development, Affect 
Regulation and Infant Mental Health” (2001) 22 Infant Mental Health Journal 7.
101 Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy (London: Constable 
& Robinson, 1961); Jeremy Holmes, The Search for the Secure Base: Attachment Theory and 
Psychotherapy (Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 2001).
102 Donald Winnicott, “The Theory of the Parent-Child Relationship” (1960) 41 International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis 585; Ronald Laing and Aaron Esterson, Sanity, Madness and the Family (Oxford: 
Routledge, 1964).
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and the overt use of reward and sanction103 and some from less overt sources. Most 
of us can call to mind an example from childhood when we learned via a sanction 
that it was not ok to bite your sister.104 We internalised and generalised105 this 
experience so that, when we went to school, we were aware that biting others (no 
matter how annoying they were) was likely to also be not ok. There is a high level 
of social convergence across time and cultures in acceptable public behaviour, 
suggesting that the performance of “good” is something we curate quite well, 
passing on to our children the skills of seeming that we ourselves have learned. 
It is a different thing to be and to seem, and the evidence base for each has only a 
small amount of overlap.
This is where the less explicit messages in the family are important, since this 
is where the critical divergence begins. We have observed that generally there 
is agreement that it is not ok to bite your sister and that this principle can be 
expanded to other contexts and individuals. However, at the moment or moments 
where we built this understanding, each of us will have developed different 
contextual moral architecture which will impact our position when we meet new 
laws or dilemmas:
[empathetic] because it hurts and nobody likes to be hurt;
[pragmatic] because she shrieked and nearly made mummy drop something 
and so mummy got angry;
[avoidant] because the smack I got hurt a lot. 
This is where the microsystem106 of the family makes a signifi cant difference 
because what is “normal for round here” is interpreted by the child as a fundamental 
truth and carried unconsciously on into later life. It may not be the intention of the 
parents and carers in that moment to reinforce a pragmatic over an empathetic 
understanding of why something is not acceptable nor is it necessarily morally or 
objectively “better” to follow a particular route. It is just very important to recognise 
that the reasons why a group of people exhibit a socially acceptable behaviour 
are going to be variable in both type and intensity, so any argument that assumes 
convergence of understanding and motive underneath a convergent behaviour is 
likely to be fl awed.
In the next section, we draw on the history, philosophy and sociology of 
education literature to understand where our concepts about learning, the infl uence 
of the educator and the plasticity of belief might have come from.
103 Barry Singer, “Psychological Studies of Punishment” (1970) 58(2) California Law Review 405.
104 A personal example, please insert your own relevant equivalent.
105 Daniel Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant (Oxford: Routledge, 1985).
106 Urie Bronfenbrenner, “The Experimental Ecology of Education” (1976) 5(9) Educational Researcher 5.
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(ii) “Give me the child before he is seven and I will show you the man”
The juxtaposition does seem a little unfair to the Jesuits.107 Was Loyola really 
claiming that the education offered was producing a whole batch of similarly clean 
souls or just that shaping habitual behaviour in a pro-Christian, pro-social manner 
would increase the chances that each individual would fi nd their own best life and 
chance of salvation? Nevertheless, the idea of education as a civilising force is 
central to this article and needs unpacking, regardless of whether we can blame the 
Jesuits. It is fi rst quite important to describe the positionality of “the child” in this 
debate: for philosophers and educational theorists up until the 19th century, the child 
is most defi nitely a boy and one from a privileged background and the education 
he experiences is one that will prepare him for a leadership role in his family, his 
community and beyond, so whether the aim is to replicate received wisdom or to 
disrupt and develop new understanding it is located within this powerful position. 
Whether the desire is to make him “good”, “effective” or indeed both, the purpose of 
this education is for a wider societal good, the child’s learning will be the society’s 
protection and advancement. The concept of “basic education” was viewed with 
suspicion; it was deemed necessary to have rich, individualised and challenging 
educational experiences to come away with any benefi ts: “A little learning is a 
dangerous thing; drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring: there shallow draughts 
intoxicate the brain, and drinking largely sobers us again.”108 However, by the end 
of the 19th century, the policy of mass education had become increasingly visible in 
the legal and political structures in Europe and America, with an emphasis on basic 
skills for men and an increasing number of women.109 This can be seen as a purely 
economic phenomenon that the development of industry and commerce produced 
both demand-side (skilled labour) and supply-side (literate consumer) drivers. 
However, the impetus for mass education also came from religious and social concerns 
about the depravity of the industrial cities: whether empirically true that moral 
decay was increasing, it was certainly true that the distressing sights of poverty and 
desperation were more visible. Moreover, in the cities, inequalities were juxtaposed 
without the restraint of tradition and small communities and so crimes, particularly 
those against property, increased.110 Thus, although the cognitive curriculum of 
the early schools was basic literacy and numeracy, they all had an explicit moral 
107 Particularly when you consider that Loyola probably did not say this. Arnold Beichman et al, Three 
Myths (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1981) p.48: posit that this saying was “attributed to him 
(perhaps mischievously) by Voltaire”.
108 Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism (1709). Printed for W Lewis in Russel Street, Covent Garden and 
sold by W Taylor at the Ship in Pater-Noster Row, T Osborn near the Walks, and J Graves in St James 
Street.
109 Paul Bolton, “Education: Historical Statistics” (Commons Briefi ng SN/SG/4252, House of Commons 
Library, 28 November 2012): free primary education for all in England comes in the Education Act 
1918, which also raises the school leaving age from 12 to 14 years.
110 For an overview, Clive Emsley, “Crime and Punishment: 10 Years of Research” (2005) 9(1) Crime, 
Histoire & Societies 117.
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curriculum as well, one in which “good” was assessed through displays of passive 
behaviour and deference to authority fi gures. The underlying pedagogic theory is 
one of exposure: “the child” has not yet absorbed the requisite good, by exposing 
him to it in this institution we will make sure he “gets” it and we will know that he 
“gets” it because he will not transgress. However, it is only recently that neuroscience 
has offered the tantalising possibility that we can view that process in real time, 
potentially giving insight into the difference — if any — between being and seeming.
B. Is neuroscience any help in understanding 
cognitive architecture?
There is an ongoing fi ght against “neuromyths”,111 and the tired metaphors of 20th 
century attempts to understand the structure of the brain which need not detain 
us here. Neuroscientists are not offering the snake-oil promises of old, although 
more cautious commentators question the nature of the observations themselves, 
for example, neuroimages:
“are not photographs of the brain in action in real time … beautiful colour-
dappled images are actually representations of particular areas in the brain 
that are working the hardest as measured by increased oxygen consumption 
… Despite well-informed inferences … it is very diffi cult for scientists to 
look at a fi ery spot on a brain scan and conclude with certainty what is 
going on in the mind of a person”.112
Nevertheless, recent advances mean that our understanding of processes and 
structures in the brain is at a new level of detail and sophistication: one which is 
cautious about the physical traces of complex processes; which takes into account 
the interaction between genetics and environment; and which is cautious about 
the implications of data relating to cohort averages for predicting individual 
functioning.113 There is a growing community working actively to translate the 
observations of brain development and activity for teachers and considering the 
curriculum design, pedagogy and assessment implications of these observations.114 
However, there are important caveats, even from these dedicated advocates: 
111 Phillip Newton, “The Learning Styles Myth Is Thriving in Higher Education” (2015) Frontiers in 
Psychology 1908; Elaine Hall, “The Tenacity of Learning Styles: A Response to Lodge, Hansen, and 
Cottrell” (2016) 2(1) Learning: Research and Practice 18.
112 Sally Satel and Scott Lilienfeld, Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience 
(New York: Basic Books, 2015) pp.4–5.
113 Lucy Foulkes and Sarah-Jane Blakemore, “Studying Individual Differences in Human Adolescent Brain 
Development” (2018) 21 Nature Neuroscience 315.
114 See, for example, the 2018 special issue created for the Chartered College of Teachers and particularly 
Paul Howard-Jones et al, “Applying the Science of Learning in the Classroom” Impact (February 
2018), available at impact.chartered.college/article/howard-jones-applying-science-learning-classroom/ 
(visited 10 March 2018).
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“Although the science provides principles and a scientifi cally determined 
understanding of how learning works, based on concrete measurement of 
behaviour and brain function, it does not provide a list of ‘top tips’ or practices 
that are guaranteed to work with any class or individual in any context.”115
The overall picture from this fi eld is that we do not yet have a granularity of 
knowledge suffi cient to explain the microprocesses in the brain, and while there 
are exciting terms — subcortical structures, neuromodulators — in play, they are 
operating as powerful metaphors rather than maps for practice. Interestingly, while 
some academics have posited a tension between biological and psychological 
understandings of learning, empirical evidence of change can be seen in the 
overlap: training in neuroscience ideas has an impact on learners’ belief in their 
ability to learn,116 although not their short-term achievement. Mastery and self-
concept researchers117 have suggested that changes in belief take time to transfer 
into impact on attainment, but the relatively small number of long-term studies 
indicate that belief in the possibility of change is more critical to performance in 
college and lifelong learning than prior attainment.
This seems to indicate that physical routes to attitude change might be 
discoverable, but we are positing their existence on demonstrations (or failed 
demonstrations) of behavioural or cognitive change:
 “‘These early experimenters,’ the D.H.C. was saying, ‘were on the wrong 
track. They thought that hypnopædia could be made an instrument of 
intellectual education …’
‘The - Nile - is - the - longest - river - in - Africa - and - the - second - in - 
length - of - all - the - rivers - of - the - globe…’ The words come rushing 
out. ‘Although - falling - short - of …’
‘Well now, which is the longest river in Africa?’
The eyes are blank. ‘I don’t know.’”118
Huxley’s example makes clear that we can spot where the brain has been washed 
in information, but the information has not been converted into knowledge. His 
characters were unable to learn cognitively from repetition in sleep, but they were 
able to absorb social conditioning and to accept the values and norms of their culture. 
115 Ibid.
116 Eleanor Dommett et al, “The Impact of Participation in a Neuroscience Course on Motivational 
Measures and Academic Performance” (2013) 2 Trends in Neuroscience and Education 122.
117 Herbert Marsh and Richard Shavelson, “Self-concept: Its Multifaceted, Hierarchical Structure” (1985) 
20(3) Educational Psychologist 107; Carol Dweck, “From Needs to Goals and Representations: 
Foundations for a Unifi ed Theory of Motivation, Personality, and Development” (2017) 124(6) 
Psychological Review 689.
118 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (Harmondsworth: Chatto & Windus, 1932) pp.54–60.
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However, the crux of the story is that these too were a veneer of performance: Bernard 
cynically enacted while rejecting the values, and Lenina, who appears a true believer, 
is not revolted but excited by savage John’s difference and rejects him not because of 
his violation of societal rules but because he worships her in an unfamiliar way. The 
critical question, given that “social normativity thus does not account for all of our 
cognitive competence”,119 is whether we can tell the difference between conversion 
and performance for students encountering our moral curriculum.
While values and virtues education have developed into discrete disciplines 
since that time, they have not moved much beyond this exposure model and the main 
problem with the exposure/inoculation model is the observation of adolescence, 
where transgression is not only something that happens but something that seems to 
be developmentally necessary. We return, therefore, to the psychological literature.
(i) The second rapprochement phase: “Only Morrissey understands me”
As toddlers, we begin to explore the world, our relationship with important others 
and our self-consciousness by playing with the boundaries of safety and danger, 
conformity and transgression. This often takes the form of running away to the 
other side of the swings when it is “time to go home” and having to be coaxed/
chased/carried. This developmental phase, rapprochement,120 is important in that 
it gives each individual a degree of authorship in their own narrative, choosing 
both when and how to act and how to understand the outcomes of the action. 
Traditionally, psychotherapy literature recognises two rapprochements: one as the 
very young child separates physically (and emotionally) from the family and then 
later as the adolescent separates cognitively/emotionally (and physically).121 The 
adolescent seeks to form their identity through new rounds of attachment processes 
of idealisation and twinning with self-chosen others, while still seeking to elicit 
response through the impact transference122 from the (apparently despised) primary 
attachment fi gures. Emerging neuroscientifi c data123 on adolescent brain functioning 
suggest a biochemical and electrical model for self-absorption, which can also be 
understood through metaphors of focus and attention: it is a big job to form a sense 
of self and quite possibly nobody outside the self can really understand.
Though experienced by parents and authority fi gures as rejection, it is possible 
to view adolescent behaviour as a critical and indeed scientifi c endeavour in which 
119 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Heidegger and the ‘Cartesian Brainwash’ — Towards a Non-Individualistic 
Account of ‘Dasein’” (2004) 35(2) Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 132.
120 Margaret Mahler et al, The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
121 Heinz Kohut, How Does Analysis Cure? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
122 The talionic impulse (the desire to evoke pain in others) is only part of adolescent “acting out”. More 
crucially, it is the ability to shock and evoke response from an important, loved other that is critical. 
James Masterson, The Search for the Real Self: Unmasking the Personality Disorders of Our Age 
(New York: The Free Press, 1988).
123 Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Inventing Ourselves: The Secret Life of the Teenage Brain (London: Doubleday, 
2018).
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received wisdom is tested against alternatives. Nor is this a battle to the death: the 
extent to which the new models of the world are incorporated into the old echoes 
the adaptation of indigenous faith behaviours into colonised religious practice,124 
from both the old and the new, we keep that which is meaningful and valuable to us, 
weaving it together. This last is more often than not a conscious activity, since the 
adolescent is actively seeking a comfortable enough identity as a way of managing 
self-consciousness and is asking themselves aspirational and moral questions about 
how they are in the world and how they want to be. Therefore, at the point of 
applying for higher education, the young person will be somewhere in their second 
rapprochement,125 with a world view accreted over time from their family of origin, 
their experience — passive and active — in the worlds of school, community and 
friendships and their emerging conscious philosophy.
(ii) Is university subject choice an identity project?
At a recent international clinical conference, colleagues reporting on their students’ 
wonderful work with prisoners referred to the group as “baby lawyers”. There was 
laughter and nodding in the room, this was a way of referencing the students that 
resonated with the audience: they were at the beginning of a journey to become like 
us, in fact they were already like us, part of the family. Refl ecting on it now, it seems 
to contain a number of rather cosy assumptions about what students are doing on a 
law course. Do all the fresh-faced fi rst years defi nitely want to be something legal: 
solicitors, barristers, in-house counsel, legal advisors? Are they choosing a shared 
identity with us, based on core values and beliefs? How do we (think we) know this?
The landscape of higher education participation is an important background 
for this discussion. In the United Kingdom,126 participation in higher education 
increased from 3.4 per cent in 1950, to 8.4 per cent in 1970, 19.3 per cent in 1990 
and 33 per cent in 2000, shifting over a couple of generations from a minority 
to a mainstream activity.127 Levels of participation adjusted to the proportion of 
the population of young people entering fi rst degrees (a slightly different measure, 
excluding mature and part-time students, which may be a more useful fi gure for 
the purpose of this article) show that in 2015, 31 per cent of 18-year olds had 
a university place.128 This expansion of participation is not evenly spread across 
124 Victoria Bricker, The Indian Christ, the Indian King: The Historical Substrate of Maya Myth and Ritual 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).
125 Increasingly, psychotherapists are considering the possibility that we never complete the work of the 
rapprochement and that we are always working on this in one form or another until we die.
126 This section refl ects very particularly on the Higher Education context in England and Wales, and 
while there are common factors in other countries, we make no claims for a smooth translation to other 
jurisdictions and training regimes.
127 See Bolton, “Education: Historical Statistics” (n.109) p.14.
128 Full Fact, “Are There Record Numbers of Young People Going to University?” (1 August 2016), 
available at https://fullfact.org/education/are-there-record-numbers-young-people-going-university/ 
(visited 12 March 2018); UCAS, “End of Cycle Report 2015” (December 2015), available at www.ucas.
com/sites/default/fi les/eoc-report-2015-v2.pdf (visited 10 March 2018).
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society,129 but nevertheless it does represent a different market for law schools as 
the young people deciding on their courses are signifi cantly less likely to have 
family knowledge and traditions to draw upon than previous cohorts. The decision 
about which course, at which institution is a complex one, and although a huge 
amount of metrical data are publicly available, the interpretation of them is diffi cult 
since they mostly refl ect the experiences and outcomes of previous cohorts.
When lawyers were made in law offi ces,130 those young men who became 
articled clerks might reasonably be assumed to be entering upon and committing to 
a profession just as their brothers joined the Navy or the Church, either as members 
of the elite moving from their academic education to a professional practice or as 
members of the aspirant middle classes seeking to become a part of a professional 
community through the acquisition of skills. Although the composition of the legal 
profession131 in general and the elite in particular (the “Magic Circle” fi rms, the 
Bar and the judiciary)132 still demonstrates that social and cultural capital are more 
important than skills,133 the entrance to an undergraduate law degree by any student 
is not a particularly good predictor of working as a lawyer.134
The purpose of higher education is a divisive subject. By defi nition, a university 
is “a high-level educational institution in which students study for degrees and 
academic research is done”.135 However, it is arguable that a university is much more 
than an institution for the creation and teaching of knowledge. In the 16th century, 
Francis Bacon espoused that knowledge should be useful stating that it “may not 
129 UCAS, “Record Number of 18 Year Olds Accepted to University This Year, UCAS Report Shows” 
(UCAS, 14 December 2016), available at www.ucas.com/corporate/news-and-key-documents/news/
record-numbers-18-year-olds-accepted-university-year-ucas-report-shows (visited 10 March 2018): 
Of the fi fth of the young English population from backgrounds with the lowest entry rate to higher 
education, 13.6 per cent entered university in 2016, a rise from 13.5 per cent in 2015 (an increase of 
0.1 per cent point). The young people in this group typically have lower family incomes, live in areas 
where fewer people go to university, attend state schools and are more likely to be men or in the White 
ethnic group. In comparison, of the fi fth of young people from backgrounds with the highest entry rate, 
52.1 per cent went to university in 2016, an increase of 1.2 per cent points. Young people in this group are 
more likely to come from higher income families, live in advantaged areas, attend independent schools 
or be women or in the Asian or Chinese ethnic groups. Those from backgrounds with the highest entry 
rates were 3.8 times more likely to enter university in 2016 than their peers with the lowest entry rates.
130 Michael Eraut, Developing Professional Knowledge and Competence (Oxford: Routledge, 1994).
131 At least in England and Wales, for which we have access to data.
132 Rosaline Sullivan, “Barriers to the Legal Profession Legal Services Board” (Legal Services Board, 
2010); Louise Ashley et al, A Qualitative Evaluation of Non-educational Barriers to the Elite Professions 
(Report for the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, 2015).
133 Andrew M Francis, “Legal Education, Social Mobility and Employability: Possible Selves, Curriculum 
Intervention, and the Role of Legal Work Experience” (2015) 42(2) Journal of Law and Society 173.
134 With the exception of a small number of institutions which offer Exempting degrees, all law graduates 
have to complete an additional year (on a Legal Practice Course (LPC) or Bar Practitioners Training 
Course (BPTC)) to be eligible for entry into the profession. Access for non-law graduates to the 
professional course is through the Graduate Diploma in Law (GDL), an additional year. Current routes 
therefore are typically six to seven years long: three-year Law undergraduate plus LPC/BPTC plus two 
years training contract/pupillage or three-year undergraduate plus GDL, plus LPC/BPTC plus two years 
training contract/pupillage.
135 Oxford Dictionaries, “University”, available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/defi nition/university.
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be as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire and 
gain to her master’s use; but as a spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort”.136
Students enter higher education for a myriad of reasons. The factors range from 
an interest in the subject to a desire to obtain a particular job requiring a particular 
qualifi cation. One study reported that 47 per cent of respondent students cited “To 
help get a job or better job” or “Wanted to pursue a particular career and needed a 
qualifi cation” as the most important reason for entering higher education.137 In contrast, 
16 per cent of respondent students cited interest in the subject as the most important 
reason. The competing objectives of higher education also highlight the confl ict 
between various stakeholders. While students want more “skills and employability-
based activities”, academics have expressed concern that there is “less room … to 
teach philosophy, theory, rights, justice, the liberal arts kind of side of it”.138
A law degree is a professional degree. In most, if not all jurisdictions, prospective 
lawyers are required to have an academic qualifi cation before seeking admission to 
the profession. For example, in England and Wales, a Qualifying Law Degree is 
the most common route to qualifi cation as a solicitor or a barrister.139 In the United 
States, admission to the bar in most states require some form of attendance and 
qualifi cation from a law school prior to taking the bar exam. In New York state, s.520 
of the Rules of the Court of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and Counselors 
at Law prescribes fours routes for an applicant to qualify to take the New York Bar 
Exam, all of which require some form of classroom study at a law school.
With this in mind, we must consider what a legal education at university 
teaches students: is it merely legal doctrine providing students with knowledge 
of the framework, rules and procedural steps they will encounter within the legal 
system? Alternatively, should legal education encompass more than knowledge and 
seek to broaden the individual? Cramton considered the “ordinary religion” of the 
law school as including:
“a skeptical attitude toward generalizations; an instrumental approach to law 
and lawyering; a ‘tough-minded’ and analytical attitude toward legal tasks and 
professional roles; and a faith that man, by the application of his reason and 
the use of democratic processes, can make the world a better place”.140
136 Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning in the Works of Francis Bacon (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 
1844) p.174.
137 C Callender (undated), “Full and Part-Time Students in Higher Education: Their Experiences and 
Expectations”, available at www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/ncihe/report2.htm (visited 01 March 18).
138 Legal Education and Training Review, Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services Education and 
Training Regulation in England and Wales (LETR, June 2013) p.45.
139 Although it should be noted that under proposals made Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) for the 
introduction of Solicitors Qualifying Examination, new solicitors would not be required to hold a law 
degree. For further information, see Solicitors Regulation Authority, “A New Route to Qualifi cation: 
The Solicitors Qualifying Examination”, available at www.sra.org.uk/sra/consultations/solicitors-
qualifying-examination.page (visited 10 March 2018).
140 Roger Cramton, “The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom” (1978) 29 Journal of Legal 
Education 247, 248.
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In regard to values, Cramton stated that the lawyer is “engaged in the implementation 
of the values of others … he need not be concerned directly with value questions”. 
Further, Cramton also expressed that emotion, imagination, sentiments of affection 
and trust and a sense of wonder or awe at the inexplicable are “off limits for law 
students and lawyers”.141 The traditional approach to lawyering is to dehumanise 
the case to use legal skill to achieve the desired outcome, whether that is for the 
client or a cause. Finally, Cramton highlighted that faith in that the world can be 
a better place through application of reason and the use of a democratic process 
allows the pursuit of social justice.142 It is recognised that in a “pluralistic and 
tolerant society”, it is unlikely that there will be unanimous consensus as the 
morally virtuous outcome. However, if there is consensus on the decision-making, 
society will be a better place. The law school is a training ground for those who 
wish to function within the existing system. The aim of all education, including 
legal education, should be the encouragement of self-learning that includes the 
mind, spirit and body of the whole person.143
A key fi nding of the Legal Education and Training Review (LETR) relates 
to the teaching of legal ethics and professional values. The report found that 
ethics and professionalism were areas of knowledge lacking among new 
recruits.144 While many elements of a traditional legal education were relevant, 
there was a perceived need to increase the emphasis on teaching legal ethics 
and legal values.145
The QAA states that the skills and qualities of mind for a graduate of law 
include, inter alia, “an awareness of principles and values of law and justice, and 
of ethics”.146 A contextual statement was added to the 2015 Benchmark Statements 
to refl ect ethical awareness which states:
“At undergraduate level students are aware of the consequences of law as 
a human creation and that it is subject to the ethics and values of those that 
make and apply it. The implications of this in the context of securing justice 
and the public interest is considered as part of legal study. Law schools 
will determine for themselves how ethics are addressed in the curriculum, 
but it is expected that students will have opportunities to discuss ethical 





144 See Legal Education Training Review, Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services Education and 
Training Regulation in England and Wales” (n.138) p.34.
145 Ibid., p.45.
146 See Quality Assurance Agency, “Subject Benchmark Statement: Law (2015)” (n.1) p.7.
147 Ibid., p.6.
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The inclusion of the benchmark statement is recognition that ethics and values are 
at the core of legal education. The statements go some way to address the concerns 
raised in the LETR report. If we accept that ethics and values should be addressed 
in legal education, what are those ethics and values?
A starting point may be to adopt professional ethics as prescribed by the 
relevant code of conduct published by the relevant regulatory body. We teach 
our students the rules that set out how one must act in any given situation. The 
problem with this approach in England and Wales is the shift to Outcomes Focused 
Regulation (OFR).148 The emphasis was on acting in a principled manner rather than 
in compliance with particular rules. The approach to ethical learning is different as 
students need to learn how to make professional judgments rather than adopting a 
deontological approach.149
Legal education is very fond of comparing itself to medical education,150 
but there are some very important structural differences in the way in which the 
higher education market works for these two subjects. On the supply side, the 
number of places for medical students in England and Wales is fi rmly controlled: 
it is an expensive training, heavily subsidised by the government, so complex 
calculations are made to predict how many cardiologists, renal specialists and 
general practitioners will be needed, and recruitment is tailored to this, taking 
into account how many potential doctors will change their minds en route.151 
Law schools in contrast are limited in their recruitment only by the size of their 
classrooms and the workloads of their staff, as well perhaps as the reputational 
trade-off of large courses. Despite the heavy use of wigs on our websites, we 
know that very few of our students will ever get to wear one. If fewer than half of 
law students go on to be lawyers,152 is that because there simply are not enough 
jobs? The pattern of employment in the law for law graduates is infl uenced but not 
determined by the ranking of the institution: it is certainly the case that graduates 
of Oxford or Cambridge who want training contracts are more likely to get them 
than graduates of Nottingham or Northumbria, but it seems equally the case 
that the currency of a law degree is not limited to the law. Law graduates from 
any institution can put that degree together with their other inherited or accrued 
cultural capital in exchange for jobs in linked fi elds such as business, politics, 
local and national government.
148 The SRA moved to OFR in October 2011.
149 Andrew Boon, “Professionalism under the Legal Services Act 2007” (2010) 17(3) International Journal 
of the Legal Profession 195.
150 Paul Maharg, Transforming Legal Education: Learning and Teaching the Law in the Early Twenty-First 
Century (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007).
151 Vivienne Baumfi eld, Understanding Cost, Value and Quality in Professional Learning: What Can 
Teacher Educators, Medical Educators and Legal Educators Learn through Co-inquiry? (Symposium on 
the BERA Research Commission, The British Educational Research Association Conference, University 
of Leeds, September 2016).
152 Something that has been an area of concern for 50 years. JC York and RD Hale, “Too Many Lawyers? 
The Legal Services Industry: Its Structure and Outlook” (1973) 26 J Legal Educ 1.
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Does that mean that law schools with wig-based marketing campaigns are 
operating in bad faith? Many legal education scholars would argue that they are 
not,153 since the role of the law school is not to produce a practitioner but rather 
a graduate who “thinks like a lawyer”. This “liberal arts” view of the law degree 
has its roots in the academic background of the elite entrant to the lawyers’ 
offi ce, where the history, culture and philosophy of the law are studied, and the 
hermeneutic skills of legal argument, writing and research are treated not as skills 
as such, rather as cultural and behavioural norms, acquired by osmosis.154 In 
contrast, the “disciplinary practitioner” faction make much of the transferability of 
the embedded skills development in their degrees.155
To sum up, we have a much larger cohort of law students. We are not sure 
why they have chosen to study law, since there are many career routes open to law 
graduates and the choice of law may refl ect nothing more than a slight preference 
for three years doing this rather than history or business. We are not confi dent that 
we can facilitate their transition to legal professionalism and we know that access 
is structurally limited by class, culture capital. Why then, does this meme of shared 
identity persist and why do we think it can be intensifi ed through the university 
experience?
C. University education as transformation
We like to characterise the work that we do as meaningful and of high quality. 
This section unpacks this using more precise philosophical language156 since 
we need to be careful about the elision of different kinds of quality (Figure 2): 
fi tness defi ned by a regulatory body157 is not the same as fi tness as defi ned by the 
learners in an andragogic environment;158 the democratic benefi ts of perfection, 
in which everyone has access to an identical experience, are in confl ict with a 
curriculum of enquiry that privileges individual transformative experiences of 
dissonance.159
153 Anthony Bradney, Conversations, Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-fi rst 
Century (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003); Jess Guth and Chris Ashford, “The Legal Education 
and Training Review: Regulating Socio-Legal and Liberal Legal Education?” (2014) 48(1) The Law 
Teacher 519.
154 Chris Ashford, “Response: The Needs of the Legal Profession and the Liberal Law School: (Re)
negotiating Boundaries” in Chris Ashford, Nigel Duncan and Jessica Guth (eds), Perspectives on Legal 
Education: Contemporary Responses to the Lord Upjohn Lectures (London: Taylor & Francis, 2015) 
p.177.
155 Ibid. The gap between these factions is much more visible to them than to the outsider.
156 Drawing on Line Wittek and Tone Kvernbekk, “On the Problems of Asking for a Defi nition of Quality 
in Education” (2011) 55(6) Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 671.
157 For example, the Solicitors’ Regulatory Authority in England and Wales.
158 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1996).
159 Jack Mezirow, “Transformative Learning as Discourse” (2003) 1 Journal of Transformative Education 58.
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Figure 2: Five Types of Quality160
Therefore, effective and rigorous valuations of quality need to be predicated upon 
explorations of academics’ core beliefs and values as educators and gatekeepers 
to the profession. If we return to the belief that the educational benefi t of clinic 
is privileged in the United Kingdom over social justice goals, there are different 
critical questions to ask depending on our preferred indicator of quality. If we believe 
that clinic is an elite activity, one for which only the most academically successful 
students are fi tted, then the way in which we set up, evaluate and develop clinic 
would conform to “quality as exception” standards. However, if the belief is that 
clinic is an educational “good” for all students we would strive towards “quality as 
perfection” standards, where the important elements of clinic can be part of a “core 
offer”. Our decisions about what are the important elements might be informed 
by the “quality as fi tness” criteria derived from theory, from legal regulators, 
from employers or from a combination of these. Given how labour-intensive and 
potentially risky clinics are, we would have to engage with “quality as value”.
In this article, we are principally concerned to deal with claims for clinical 
experiences as transformational, with equal emphasis on “clinic” and “experience”. 
We engage with the weak framing of experiential learning161 as a transformative 
experience, not simply in cognitive terms but in terms of personal and professional 
identity. The international move towards an increasingly outcomes-based approach 
to legal education and training has raised the profi le and encouraged the development 
160 See Wittek and Kvernbekk, “On the Problems of Asking for a Defi nition of Quality in Education” 
(n.156): drawn from Wittek and Kvernbekk’s analysis of Mari Elken’s literature review.
161 Barbera Bernstein, Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity, Theory, Research, Critique (London: 
Taylor & Francis, 1996); Reijo Miettinen, “The Concept of Experiential Learning and John Dewey’s 
Theory of Refl ective Thought and Action” (2000) 19(1) International Journal of Lifelong Education 54.
JICL-5(1)-3. Hey Teacher by Paul McKeown.indd   29 18/05/18   1:59 PM
250
30 Journal of International and Comparative Law
of a wide range of experiential learning practices. These are often described by 
students as “the highlight of my degree”, but they are not there simply for attraction 
and variety. There is an implicit pedagogic intent which is based in part on broad 
Higher Education outcomes of graduate skills and “public good” graduates162 and 
in part on an implicit sense of what it is to be a member of that discipline.
The problems of defi nition (“what is clinic?”) are inseparable from the intent 
of the pedagogue (“what is clinic for?”) and, as these can only be tested empirically 
through the experience of participants (“how well did clinic do….?”), our contention 
is that intent must be the point of focus, where we start and continually return in a 
refl exive feedback loop based on the essentially Pragmatist questions of purpose, 
fi tness and continuing enquiry.163
Broadly, three kinds of claims are being made (Table 3) which rest on a variety 
of potential core beliefs about students, learning and the law and which have a 
range of supporting evidence. There are claims relating to experiential learning 
and dissonance; claims relating to the operationalising of rote and tacit knowledge 
and the development of practice expertise; and fi nally, claims about being and 
becoming through a process of observation and modelling.
Table 3: Forms of Claim Made about the Transformational Nature of Clinic 164165166







Ways of knowing: 
socialisation and 
professional values166
Claim Students are transformed…
by the contact with 
clients from different 
backgrounds and 
communities; they see 
the complexity of the 
problems and attach the 
issues to real lives; they 
develop empathy and 
sociopolitical criticality
by the opportunity 
to apply legal 
knowledge and 
skills, with real-
world standards and 
deadlines, they have 
irreversible insights 
into how to use what 
they have learned
by refl ecting on their 
own professional 
identity; by comparing 




and other legal 
professionals
162 Melanie Walker and Monica McLean, Professional Education, Capabilities and the Public Good: The 
Role of Universities in Promoting Human Development (Oxford: Routledge, 2013).
163 John Dewey, “Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth” (1941) 38(7) Journal of Philosophy 169.
164 Daniel Powers and Christopher Ellison, “Interracial Contact and Black Racial Attitudes: The Contact 
Hypothesis and Selectivity Bias” (1995) 74(1) Social Forces 205; Helmut Fennes and Karen Hapgood, 
Intercultural Learning in the Classroom: Crossing Borders (London: Cassell, 1997); Basil Singh, “Shared 
Values, Particular Values, and Education for a Multicultural Society” (1995) 47(1) Educational Review 11.
165 Jan Meyer and Ray Land, “Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge (2): Epistemological 
Considerations and a Conceptual Framework for Teaching and Learning” (2005) 49 Higher Education 
373; Melissa Weresh, “Stargate: Malleability as a Threshold Concept in Legal Education” (2014) 63 
Journal of Legal Education 689.
166 See Eraut, Developing Professional Knowledge and Competence (n.130); Etienne Wenger-Trayner et al, 
Learning in Landscapes of Practice: Boundaries, Identity, and Knowledgeability in Practice-Based 
Learning (Oxford: Routledge, 2014).
JICL-5(1)-3. Hey Teacher by Paul McKeown.indd   30 18/05/18   1:59 PM
251
 Social Justice Values through Clinical Legal Education 31
How might some of these claims be evidenced? At a minimum, we might demand 
that the terms of reference are made clear and that it is possible to isolate and 
measure the factors involved. In Figure 3, there are three components that might be 
needed to explore the robustness of exposure and contact pedagogies.
Before entering clinic, some baseline assessment of students’ views about 
their clients, the law and access to justice would be needed. How might that be 
gathered? Where students are selected for clinic, they sometimes write about their 
view of clinic as a part of the application: it seems likely that they will either 
already possess values aligned to the clinic or be savvy enough to profess them in 
such circumstances. This leaves no evidential basis to claim transformation, even 
if something more than confi rmation and replication of values has taken place. If 
some robust and authentic measure of students’ views is used, there still remain 
the nature of the clientele and the extent to which contact is a novel or strange 
experience. Intersectional understandings of personhood167 mean that we can no 
longer use simple group descriptors of social class or race and assume that all clients 
and students sit on opposite sides of a divide nor that the routes to understanding 
between clients and students are only mediated through the unravelling of the 
legal problem. Interpersonal factors mean that relationships are more complex and 
moments of connection and identifi cation, as well as of alienation and rejection, 
are diffi cult to predict, track or analyse. This brings us to the third element: the 
procedures in clinic that structurally enable students to refl ect and engage with 
relationships. It is normal for client interactions to be evidenced and analysed in 
the form of notes, discussions and refl ections, and these form the backbone of 
167 Kalwant Bhopal and John Preston (eds), Intersectionality and “Race” in Education (Oxford: Routledge, 
Vol 64, 2012); Angela Ferguson et al, “Intersections of Race-Ethnicity, Gender, and Sexual Minority 
Communities” in Marie Miville and Angela Ferguson (eds), Handbook of Race-Ethnicity and Gender in 
Psychology (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2014) p.45.
Clinic
Students with limited (measurable) 
knowledge/ awareness of issues
Clients with varied issues 
and backgrounds different 
to students
Structures within clinical experience 
for recording views and reflecng on 
change
Figure 3: Exposure Pedagogy Claims — Some Key Elements Underpinning 
Evidence of Change
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supervision in clinic.168 However, the expressed intent (and perhaps the primary 
intent) of these is to ensure acceptable practice and service for the client. The idea 
that the student’s world view is growing and changing is implicit at best in the 
curriculum as experienced: this means that both supervisor and student have to 
consciously shift away from the core of their work to look at this aspect. Moreover, 
the mechanisms commonly used to track and analyse student–client relationships 
from both perspectives, although commensurate in some ways,169 are uneven in 
terms of essence and power: students may write in depth refl ections and clients may 
tick a Likert scale box. Thus, even where all three of these elements are considered, 
we may not be able to accurately track what happens in the clinic nor make claims 
about “what’s in the arrow”.170
III. Do We Have Great Power and Great Responsibility or 
Delusions of Grandeur?
The psychological and sociological perspectives on the development of the self do 
not offer much support for the idea that any single experience institutes radical re-
shaping: rather the evidence is that each new thing, however, dissonant or shocking, 
becomes part of the existing ecology, woven out of “nature, nurture and fate”.171 
Neuroscience is not ready to help: we do not yet have tools that are suffi ciently 
quick or discriminatory to track the process(es) of learning, and the metaphors 
for change are still only metaphors. Change appears to be both too fast, as in the 
irreversible moments of illumination on achieving a threshold concept,172 and 
too slow, as in the gradual process by which new skills become incorporated into 
practice, temporarily disappearing from awareness into automation and, sometimes, 
re-emerging through metacognitive refl ection as expertise.173 Some students spend 
a few weeks in clinic, most have less than a year: can we envision an a priori model 
of experience and change in which students might reasonably within that limited 
space have a cocktail of cognitive and emotional learning that would result in a 
shift in values? It might well be possible to do this. However, there are signifi cant 
168 Jeff Giddings and Michael McNamara, “Preparing Future Generations of Lawyers for Legal Practice: 
What’s Supervision Got to Do with It” (2014) 37 UNSWLJ 1226.
169 Commensurate in that they are authentic snapshots of views/satisfaction with the relationship. However, 
the imbalance of form and difference in engagement mean that direct comparison or simple triangulation 
is not robust.
170 Judith Little, Nodes and Nets: Investigating Resources for Professional Learning in Schools and 
Networks (Nottingham: National College for School Leadership, 2005).
171 James Masterson and Ralph Klein (eds), Psychotherapy of the Disorders of the Self (London: Brunner-
Routledge, 2013).
172 Elaine Hall, “Grasping the Nettle of Doctorateness” (Paper presented at the 2016 International 
Conference on the Professional Doctorate, Belfast, to appear in the Special Issue of Studies in Continuing 
Education) (in press, 2018).
173 Kate Wall and Elaine Hall, “Teachers as Metacognitive Role Models” (2016) 39(4) European Journal of 
Teacher Education 403.
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barriers to exploring and testing this hypothesis: for while the creative task, with 
the requirements of complexity, fl exibility and granularity would be daunting, the 
practical task of communicating (to students and clinical colleagues), delivering 
and assessing it would be a Herculean endeavour.174
Nevertheless, there is a strong belief, perhaps subjective or part of an epistemic 
system but still pervasive within the clinical education community, that clinic 
does have that effect on students’ knowledge, skills and values. In developing this 
article, we have had to consider that the absence of evidence is not the same as 
the evidence of absence, at least in the short term. One way to understand this is 
the strength of clinicians’ belief: in most settings, the person who runs the clinic 
has a passionate (if tempestuous) relationship with clinical work. They have 
a commitment to the students and their learning, they love the collegial nature 
of supervision and they recognise the value to the clients of the work offered by 
the clinic. They may also have a particular passion for the clinic’s specialism, 
community or cause. It is likely, therefore, that multiple levels of effect are in play. 
First, the clinician is teaching something immediate, relevant and interesting with 
real pressures and tight deadlines, intensifying the experience and the immediate 
impact on the students. They may not like or understand what is going on (or they 
may enjoy it hugely), but the intensity of the experience is a factor. Second, the 
clinician is a passionate expert and role model, whose impact is likely to be of 
greater magnitude than that of the “standard teacher”: so much so that their data 
might be excluded from a standard meta-analysis.175 There is another, fi nal level, 
which brings together the Hawthorne effect and the power of belief. The students 
are made aware that “something special” will happen in clinic, and they obligingly 
— like the factory workers at Hawthorne — produce effects in response to the 
stimulus as they understand it. There is arguably also a twist of the clinician’s self-
concept in the mix, since the clinician’s belief in her effi cacy can be observed to 
have an effect of its own that is more than a “shared delusion”176 and sheds some 
light on the endurance of epistemic system and subjective belief. Clinic might work 
in the way that we think it does, because we think that it does and we create an 
environment in which these effects are anticipated and noted when they occur: 
thus, through a collective operation of confi rmation bias, we can create a clinic 
effect. That is not to say that there is not an objective clinic effect, there just is not 
currently robust enough evidence for it and still less empirical evidence for how 
174 Clinic is already a hard sell in some contexts because of its resource intensive and risky nature, see Dunn, 
“The Taxonomy of Clinics: The Realities and Risks of All Forms of Clinical Legal Education” (n.94). 
Imagine telling your Dean that it needed more time and resource to investigate whether it was doing 
what we had always claimed that it did. It is therefore not at all that surprising that really systematic 
investigations of legal education are incredibly rare: Elaine Hall, “The Use of Evidence in Writing about 
Legal Education” (Association of Law Teachers 2015 Conference Keynote Speech, 2016).
175 Elaine Hall and Steve Higgins, “How Do You Solve a Problem Like Maria? What Meta-analysis Can 
Tell Us about Effective Educational Innovations and the Teacher Effect” (International Association of 
Cognitive Educational Psychology Conference, Durham University, Durham, 2005).
176 Ben Goldacre, Bad Science (London: Fourth Estate, 2009).
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it might work. Either way, something is probably going on, and clinicians are all 
convinced that this is a good thing. There is, however, a small defi nitional problem.
When considering notions of social justice and values, clinicians are seeking 
to inculcate notions of what is “good” and what is “bad”. Such questions have 
been debated by moral philosophers for thousands of years. This article will not 
provide a detailed analysis of the debate in moral philosophy but merely highlights 
the debate to demonstrate that not everything is black and white. Moral realists 
hold that moral facts are objective facts. Things are good and bad independent 
of us and then we discover morality. Antirealists hold the view that moral facts 
are not out there in the world until we put them there, facts about morality are 
determined by facts about us. Therefore, morality is not something we discover, 
but something we invent.
Normative ethics provide frameworks to assist in determining what is good 
and what is bad. Normative ethics can be split into three branches: virtue ethics, 
deontology and consequentialism. Virtue ethics focus on the character of the 
individual and with various virtue traits such as compassion and generosity seen 
good and ought to be exhibited. According to the proponents of virtue ethics, 
individuals should exhibit these virtuous traits even if the outcome is seen as “bad”. 
Deontologists concentrate on the act being performed and consider whether that 
act is intrinsically good or bad. Consequentialists argue that we ought to look at 
the outcome and act in a way that brings the best possible outcome for making the 
world a better place. In essence, the end justifi es the means and therefore the act in 
itself does not matter.
Applied ethics is probably the most useful branch of moral philosophy within 
the context of this article as it addresses practical issues faced in life such as abortion, 
distributive justice and famine relief. Abortion is a highly contentious issue with 
some proponents supporting the right to life of the unborn child while others cite 
women’s right to choose. Such a debate is likely to have renewed signifi cance with 
the Republic of Ireland, where abortion is prohibited under the constitution,177 
announcing a referendum on repealing the ban. While some theorists have posited 
that abortion is morally permissible,178 others have contended that aborting a foetus 
is morally wrong on the grounds that killing any person is wrong.179 With regard to 
distributive justice, there is disagreement among theorists as to the morally correct 
approach. Egalitarian theorists such as Rawls allow for inequalities where they 
benefi t the least advantaged in society.180 Libertarians, such as Nozick, disagree 
with Rawls’ “difference principle” and instead espouse “entitlement theory”, 
namely that people have entitlement over things and it is unjust to deprive people of 
177 Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.
178 See Judith Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion” (1971) 1(1) Philosophy & Public Affairs 47; Frances 
Kamm, Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy (New York: OUP, 1992).
179 Don Marquis, “Why Abortion Is Immoral” (1989) 86 Journal of Philosophy 82.
180 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP, Revised Edition, 1999).
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those things even for the benefi t of others.181 A Marxist critique of Rawls considers 
the distinction between distribution and production. Wolff highlighted this point, 
quoting Marx: “Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a 
consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The 
latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself.”182 Notions 
of actions which may be considered good or moral as opposed to bad or immoral 
may not always be easily defi ned and will often depend on an individual’s moral 
positioning. Within the context of the law, and therefore clinical legal education, 
we can envisage a tiered approach to moral reasoning. Some concepts, such as the 
holocaust and apartheid, will be considered immoral.
On the next tier down, there will be legal issues which are divisive. Examples 
include issues such as abortion, euthanasia and the confl ict between religious 
freedom and sexual orientation. We are also beginning to develop new issues in 
the world of social media characterised with the naming of alleged perpetrators of 
sexual harassment. While it is a fundamental freedom not to be harassed, assaulted 
or even raped, there is also a fundamental right to the presumption of innocence.183 
In the world of social media, individuals are effectively being found guilty without 
due process and are subjected to penal sanctions such as lost employment.
At a more mundane level, but one which will be experienced in legal clinics 
on a daily basis, clinicians and their students will be faced with individual cases 
questioning the morality of the client or the case. One example would be a landlord 
and tenant dispute where a landlord is seeking possession of the property and thus 
seeking to evict the tenant. I would preface this with the caveat that we are not 
concerned at present with whether the landlord is legally entitled to possession. Is 
it immoral for the clinic to represent the landlord in seeking to recover possession? 
Is it morally permissible to represent the tenant in attempting to retain possession of 
their home? Some legal clinics adopt a policy that they will only represent tenants.
If the landlord is seeking possession because the tenant has complained about 
the condition of the property, or the landlord is merely seeking to increase the 
rent with new tenants, then it is arguable that it is unjust to recover possession of 
the tenant’s home.184 However, if the reason for seeking possession was the anti-
social behaviour of the tenant such as loud noise, harassment of neighbour and even 
criminal activity within the property. The question could legitimately be posed as 
to whether it is still unjust to seek possession of the tenant’s home? A utilitarian (as 
181 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, original work published in 1974).
182 Robert Wolff, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of a Theory of Justice (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
183 Article 11 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone charged with a penal offence has 
the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has 
all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”; art.6(2) of European Convention on Human Rights states: 
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law.”
184 A libertarian may argue that the house is the property of the landlord, and therefore, it is unjust to deprive 
the landlord of possession.
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a form of consequentialism) perspective suggests that the greatest good is served 
by evicting the individual and therefore benefi ting the wider community.185 From 
a Kantian (as a form of deontology) perspective, it is arguable that a landlord 
has a duty to the wider community to protect them from an anti-social tenant 
(particularly, if the landlord is a Social Landlord). From a virtue ethical position, 
it is arguable that it is courageous to evict an anti-social tenant, particularly one 
involved in criminal activity. Adopting such a pluralistic approach suggests that, 
from a philosophical perspective, it would be morally permissible to evict a tenant.
The world is not black and white, and indeed, there is a signifi cant grey area 
when we consider cases within a clinical setting. Therefore, we must be cautious 
as to the imposition of our own moral perspective on our students. Notions of what 
is just and unjust will often be determined by an individual’s moral positioning. 
Because our students may adopt a different moral position to ourselves does not 
mean they are morally wrong. Therefore, what can we do?
Our role is to provide the students with the framework to critique the world 
in which they live and strive to develop their own moral position. Within the 
professional ethics of a lawyer, there is perhaps one right that means any position 
is morally defensible, regardless of the case and that is the right a fair hearing with 
due process.
IV. Concluding Thoughts
At the core of clinical legal education is the integration of theory and practice, 
a pedagogical method of teaching students how to be lawyers. While this 
incorporates legal skills training, it has also become synonymous with moral 
educational development and the inculcation of a social ethos among students. 
There is a natural symbiotic relationship between clinical legal education, social 
justice and public service. There are indigent people, as well as marginalised and 
unrepresented groups who require assistance from those with legal knowledge 
and skill. The motivations to undertake a clinical programme can be varied.186 
Extrinsically motivated students who possess legal knowledge and skill (some 
more than others) which they may wish to hone their knowledge and skills for 
their future careers. Alternatively, intrinsically motivated students may wish to 
use their skill and knowledge for the benefi t of others. Many students will have 
both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. While the literature generally adopts an 
idealistic perspective as to the relationship between clinical legal education, social 
justice and public service, there is a pragmatic relationship. In essence, the students 
need experience, while some sections of society need assistance. As such, clinic has 
185 There may of course be arguments that you are not resolving the problem, merely moving it.
186 Paul McKeown, “Pro Bono: What’s in It for Law Students? The Students’ Perspective” (2017) 24(2) 
International Journal of Clinical Legal Education 43.
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often taken root in areas where there is a signifi cant need due to poverty or other 
forms of social upheaval.
Unfortunately, the evidence does not exist to warrant grandiose claims as to 
the transformative experience clinical legal education has on students. We have 
been unable to fi nd theoretical models of change that would satisfactorily account 
for the “one semester of clinic changed my world view” response quoted in many 
articles, nor does the neuroscientifi c or psychological literature suggest that such 
radical changes would operate in this way. An individual’s moral development is 
constructed over the course of their lifetime and has numerous infl uential factors. 
It is perhaps naive to suggest that a clinical experience will shatter their whole 
moral matrix, but this is the kind of validation that clinical teachers have sought 
from their students, and perhaps unsurprisingly, students who have had a positive 
learning experience have framed it as transformational. Much more fi nely grained 
analysis of student experience and identity is needed before the transformational 
nature of clinic is clearly identifi ed and understood. Until then, we need to be more 
conservative in our claims.
A realistic expectation is perhaps that the clinical experience will infl uence 
the student through exposure to new experiences and at least provide them with 
the framework to critically examine the world in which they live. As illustrated 
above, concepts of justice, right and wrong, good and bad are complicated and 
perhaps in many cases a mirage. Adopting a pluralistic approach, there is no one 
“good”. Students must learn how to navigate the sociolegal system, develop moral 
reasoning and determine the “good” which they seek to achieve.
If a clinician seeks to impose their own beliefs on a student, the student will 
not have learnt how to critically evaluate a moral dilemma. The clinician is merely 
substituting one belief system for another. This may be particularly dangerous 
in assessed legal clinics where students believe that they must tell their clinical 
supervisor what they believe they want to hear. As Barnhizer suggested, clinicians 
must be prepared to have the legitimacy of their own beliefs called into question, 
thus enabling the exploration of competing interests and concepts of justice.187 In 
adopting such an approach, we inculcate in our students the ability to think rather 
than what to think.
“It is not the place of [clinicians] to prescribe what [students] ought to 
consider virtuous. But surely [clinics] should do whatever they can to 
prepare their students to arrive at thoughtful judgments of their own.”188
187 See Barnhizer, “The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education” (n.3) p.111.
188 Derek Bok, Our Underachieving Colleges: A Candid Look at How Much Students Learn and Why They 
Should Be Learning More (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) p.150.
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